Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On July 29, 1994, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The date of the offense was August 25, 1993. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). The General Assembly enacted the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to supercede the FSA for offenses committed on or after the SSA's effective date, October 1, 1994. In contrast to the FSA, the SSA imposed shorter terms of imprisonment for second-degree murder. On March 28, 2011, Defendant filed an amended motion for appropriate relief requesting modification of his sentence under the SSA. The superior court ordered that Defendant's life sentence be modified to a term of 157 to 198 months under the SSA. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant's offense was controlled exclusively by the FSA; and (2) the superior court violated a clear and unambiguous statute by modifying Defendant's sentence in accordance with the SSA. Remanded. View "State v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature based on the victim's age and inability to consent due to a mental disability. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish whether the victim had the requisite mental capacity to consent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the State was not required to use expert testimony pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 702 to establish the extent of the victim's mental capacity to consent to sexual acts under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand Defendant's motions to dismiss. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Richard Lee was pulled over for speeding and taken to an intake center to undergo chemical analysis of his blood alcohol level. Lee did not agree to take the test despite a police officer's admonitions that Lee's driving privileges would be revoked if he refused. The officer then executed an affidavit regarding Lee's refusal to submit to chemical analysis. The DMV later suspended Lee's driving privileges for one year. A hearing officer concluded that the revocation of Lee's driving privileges was proper, and the superior court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the DMV lacked the authority to revoke Lee's driving privileges because the DMV never received the statutorily-required affidavit indicating that Lee had willfully refused to submit to chemical analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-16.2(d) requires that the DMV first receive a properly executed affidavit from law enforcement swearing to a willful refusal to submit to chemical analysis before revoking driving privileges, the DMV lacked the authority to revoke the driving privileges of Lee.View "Lee v. Gore" on Justia Law

Defendant Khuram Choudhry was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry pertaining to defense counsel's possible conflict of interest arising from counsel's prior representation of a State's witness. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) although the trial court heard argument from the prosecutor and from defense counsel on this issue and made direct inquiry of Defendant after placing him under oath, under the facts of this case, the inquiry was insufficient to assure that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made his decision regarding counsel's continued representation; but (2) Defendant failed to make a threshold showing that defense counsel's performance was adversely affected by the conflict, much less that Defendant was prejudiced by the representation.View "State v. Choudhry" on Justia Law

After two decades of marriage, William and Teresa Underwood divorced. The district court entered a consent order requiring William to make monthly alimony payments to Teresa. Ten years later, William asked the trial court to terminate his alimony obligation because Teresa was cohabitating with another man. The trial court terminated the alimony payments. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the authority to terminate or modify the alimony payments because a reciprocal consideration provision in the consent order demonstrated that the parties unambiguously intended the order to be unmodifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err because (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-16.9(b) requires the termination of alimony payments to a dependent spouse who engages in cohabitation, and (2) the reciprocal consideration provision was unenforceable. Remanded.View "Underwood v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the clerk of superior court had the authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees that a trustee-attorney in a foreclosure proceeding paid to himself in addition to his trustee's commission. The superior court affirmed the clerk's order. The court of appeals vacated the clerk's and trial court's orders, holding that the clerk lacked the statutory authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees paid in a foreclosure proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the clerk exceeded his statutory authority by reducing the trustee-attorney's attorney's fees, and (2) absent a viable challenge for breach of fiduciary duty from a creditor with standing, the trustee-attorney's payment of attorney's fees to himself in addition to a trustee's commission could not be upset. View "In re Foreclosure of Vogler Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court entered a disposition order awarding full custody of Child to the Department of Social Services (DSS). Child's mother and father (Respondents) appealed. While Respondents' appeals of the disposition order were pending, DSS filed a motion to terminate Respondents' parental rights. Respondents moved to dismiss the motion, alleging a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court's disposition order. Thereafter, the trial court denied Respondents' motions to dismiss the termination motion. The trial court then terminated Respondents' parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, although the termination motion was filed by DSS during the pendency of the appeal from the disposition order, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1003 prohibits only the exercise of jurisdiction before issuance of the mandate and that issuance of the mandate by the appellate court returns the power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction to the trial court; and (2) because the trial court here did not exercise jurisdiction before the mandate's issuance, Respondents' parental rights were properly terminated. View "In re M.I.W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for trafficking in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, and carrying a concealed gun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a search that was conducted only after officers had arrested him for carrying a concealed gun and placed him in a police car. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was not reasonable for the arresting officers to believe Defendant's vehicle contained evidence of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals with instructions to reinstate the trial court's decision, holding that the search of Defendant's vehicle was constitutionally permissible under Arizona v. Gant, and the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for relief. View "State v. Mbacke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Starr was convicted of four counts of assaulting a firefighter with a firearm. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedures of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1233 when it denied the jury's request to review the testimony of one of the firefighters involved in the incident. The court of appeals held that because the trial court instructed the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the jury's request. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court in this instance violated section 15A-1233 by failing to exercise its discretion, and the error was preserved by operation of law for appellate review; but (2) Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that the error was prejudicial. View "State v. Starr" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and sale of cocaine and pled guilty to habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and vacated Defendant's convictions, concluding that in the absence of expert testimony as to the chemical analysis of the substance, the evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, that the substance was a controlled substance. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the testimony of Defendant's witness, which identified the substance as cocaine, provided evidence of a controlled substance sufficient to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "State v. Nabors" on Justia Law