Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parental rights of Mother to her three children were terminated after a trial in which she waived her right to counsel. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order and ordered a new termination proceeding, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mother to waive counsel because the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1242. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that section 15A-1242, a criminal statute, has no application in termination of parental rights proceedings. Remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether the role of a guardian ad litem is one of assistance or substitution, one of the issues presented on appeal. View "In re P.D.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Penny Cummings filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a doctor and a health care facility. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants after a jury found that Defendants were not liable for Plaintiff's injuries. Based on two affidavits submitted by jurors after the trial alleging juror misconduct, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order setting aside the verdict and awarding a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by considering the evidence of alleged juror misconduct in the form of the two affidavits because the affidavits were inadmissible pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 606(b), which reflects the common law rule that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible for the purposes of impeaching the verdict except as they pertain to extraneous influences that may have affected the jury's decision.View "Cummings v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this action were inmates who had been sentenced to death by lethal injection. Respondent, North Carolina Council of State, approved the lethal injection protocol after it was submitted to the Council by the Department of Corrections (DOC), an administrative agency. Although Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the state's method of execution, at issue on appeal was whether the Council's statutorily-mandated approval of the DOC's action was subject to the requirements of the North Carolina APA when the DOC's action was exempt from the APA. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) ALJ recommended that the Council reconsider its approval of the execution protocol. The Council declined to reconsider its approval based upon its conclusion that the OAH did not have jurisdiction to review the issue. The superior court dismissed Petitioners' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the superior court's ruling that the APA does not apply to the Council's approval of the execution protocol, and (2) affirmed the court's ruling, as modified, that Petitioners' rights do not include the right to present evidence to the Council and that the Council's obligations do not include a substantive review of the protocol before it is approved.View "Conner v. N.C. Council of State" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Moore was convicted of obtaining property by false pretense and was sentenced to six to eight months in prison, suspended subject to supervised probation. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was ordered to pay restitution. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated the restitution award as unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision vacating the award, holding that, while there was some evidence to support an award of restitution, the evidence presented did not adequately support the particular amount awarded here. Remanded to the trial court for a new hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Nakia Nickerson guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, contending that it was a lesser-included offense of the crime of possession of stolen goods. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods, and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle requires proof of at least one essential element not required to prove possession of stolen goods, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle cannot be a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods; and (2) as such, Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. View "State v. Nickerson" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Hill was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon for taking $100 from the victim by means of threatening the use of a sharp object. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented substantial evidence that (1) the victim's money was taken via the use or threatened use of a dnagerous weapon, and (2) the victim's life was endangered or threatened by Defendant's use of a dangerous weapon during the course of the robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

Janice Willis executed a general warranty deed reserving a life estate in her home for herself and conveying the remainder to her Eddie in fee simple. While Janice was still alive, Eddie died, and his interest passed to his children. Janice subsequently sought reformation of the deed based on unilateral mistake of the grantor in the absence of fraud. The trial judge granted a directed verdict for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that, under Crawford v. Willoughby and its progeny, reformation of a deed was unavailable as a remedy in this case. View "Willis v. Willis" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Respondent John Totten, a district court judge, be censured for conduct in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376(b). Respondent had suppressed the breath alcohol concentration test taken by a defendant charged with driving while impaired and careless and reckless driving without a motion to suppress and a hearing as required by law. The Supreme Court ordered that Respondent be censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and section 7A-376(b). View "In re Totten" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between the City of Kannapolis (Defendant), which rezoned rural land to promote commercial development, and neighboring landowners (Plaintiffs). At issue was whether Defendant approved a statement of reasonableness as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-383 when adopting the zoning amendment. The trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims and dismissing Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show the city council did not approve a statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the zoning amendment at issue was invalid because Defendant failed to properly approve a statement under section 160A-383, thus rendering the amendment void. Remanded. View "Wally v. City of Kannapolis" on Justia Law

As a result of conduct inappropriate to her judicial office, including disposing of at least eighty-two cases in violation of the N.C. General Statutes, the Judicial Standards Commission entered a recommendation that the Supreme Court suspend Respondent Denise Hartsfield, a district court judge, without compensation for a suitable period of time. Respondent had moved traffic citations off their scheduled court dates and added them to traffic dockets that she presided over with the alleged understanding that Respondent would enter a favorable judgment in those matters. After weighing the severity of Respondent's conduct against her candor and her cooperation, the Court concluded that Respondent should be suspended without compensation from the performance of her judicial duties for seventy-five days. View "In re Hartsfield" on Justia Law