Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO. View "Lanvale Props. v County of Cabarrus" on Justia Law

Erik Williams drowned at a park owned by defendant county and operated by defendant county parks and recreation department. Williams' estate filed a claim against Defendants alleging negligence. Defendants made a limited motion for summary judgment, contending that Williams's allegations were barred by the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity. The trial court denied Defendants' limited motion, concluding that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity because they charged and collected a fee for the use of the park. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that because the decision of the court of appeals that Defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity turned predominantly upon the fact that the services Defendants provided could also be provided by nongovernmental entities, without consideration of a number of additional factors, the case must be vacated and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Estate of Williams v. Parks & Recreation Dep't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, medical center, sued Defendant, former patient, seeking to recover the value of medical services Plaintiff provided Defendant while he was admitted to its medical center. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Defendant in the amount of $14,419 for the medical care he had received, supporting its contention it should receive that amount by submitting several affidavits. The trial court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff on the issue of damages. The court of appeals reversed, stating that although Defendant did not contest liability, an issue of material fact remained on the amount owed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the medical center's affidavits from its employees that stated the amount of its bill and asserted the amount was reasonable were minimally sufficient of its right to payment; and (2) the patient's affidavit illustrating the differences between the retail price of, and the amount charged by the medical center for, certain medications failed to show that an issue of material fact remained for trial. View "Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v Talford" on Justia Law

The driver and passenger of an automobile were killed when the condition of a state-maintained road caused the vehicle to veer off the roadway. The driver lost control of the car and struck an oncoming automobile head-on. Plaintiffs, the estates of the decedents, sued DOT for negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA). The Industrial Commission determined that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the public duty doctrine and granted DOT's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the public duty doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the limitation placed on the use of the public duty doctrine by the General Assembly's 2008 amendment to the STCA applied in this case; and (2) consequently, the doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' claims. View "Ray v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The suit arose from Plaintiff's visit to the dentist for a routine tooth extraction, which Plaintiff alleged resulted in a broken jaw. The trial court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment for Plaintiff's failure to comply with N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j) in proffering her only expert witness. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the expert witness could have been reasonably expected to qualify under N.C. R. Evid. 702 as required by Rule 9(j). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's proffered expert witness could have been "reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness" under Rule 702, and therefore, Plaintiff satisfied the preliminary requirements of Rule 9(j). Remanded. View "Moore v. Proper" on Justia Law

Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend a detention of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child under the age of thirteen and two counts of first-degree statutory rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted conclusory expert testimony on whether the juvenile victim had been sexually abused, as it was "highly plausible" that the jury would have reached a different result absent the expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified, holding (1) the admission of the testimony was plain error; but (2) the plain error standard requires a determination that the jury "probably would have" returned a different result. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Towe" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape of a child, two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, two counts of sexual offense with a child, and five counts of indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial for Defendant's two convictions for sexual offense with a child, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by a disjunctive jury instruction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in ordering a new trial for two of Defendant's sexual offense convictions based on fellatio, as the State satisfied the corpus delicti rule by presenting evidence of the trustworthiness of Defendant's confession to the incidents of fellatio. View "State v. Sweat" on Justia Law

After Defendant appealed his district court conviction for driving while impaired, the superior court granted Defendant's motion to suppress based upon its conclusion that there was not probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle because of the contradictory testimony of the arresting officers and the allegations contained in Defendant's affidavit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the superior court erred by applying the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard to determine the validity of Defendant's traffic stop. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the superior court did not apply the correct legal standard and failed to make findings of fact sufficient to allow a reviewing court to apply the correct legal standard. Remanded. View "State v. Salinas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of committing a misdemeanor sexual battery. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony referring to Defendant's post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's determination of guilt, concluding that the admission of the statements was not plain error; but (2) vacated the trial court's order requiring that Defendant register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of the post-Miranda testimony was error; but (2) this error did not amount to plain error. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law