Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, in his role as department head, wrote an annual review of Plaintiff, a tenured associate professor, in which Defendant concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the department's expectations and had engaged in disruptive behavior and conduct. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the annual review contained false and defamatory statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in his individual capacity and that Defendant had published the review for the purposes of libel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as the complaint did not specify whether Plaintiff was suing Defendant in his individual or official capacity, and therefore, the Court must presume Defendant was being sued in only his official capacity. View "White v. Trew" on Justia Law

In 2007, Brunswick County conducted an authorized appraisal of all property in the County. However, in 2008, which was not a statutorily designated year for setting property values for tax purposes, the County reassessed the tax value of real property belonging to Ocean Isle Palms LLC. Ocean Isle disputed the resulting tax values, arguing that the values were unlawful because they were based on an invalid reassessment. The County Board of Equalization and Review declined to change the valuations. On appeal, the Property Tax Commission found the 2008 revaluation was unlawful and granted Ocean Isle's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reassessment conducted in the nonreappraisal year 2008 violated the relevant statutes, and the alteration of the taxable value of Ocean Isle's property under the 2008 reassessment was unlawful. View "In re Ocean Isle Palms LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a secretary and office assistant at a middle school, was sprayed when a fire extinguisher Defendant was handling was abruptly discharged. Defendant was the principal of the school. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging gross negligence and loss of consortium on the part of her husband. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant willfully and wantonly engaged in reckless behavior when he was playing with the fire extinguisher, causing it to spray her, and that the spraying aggravated a preexisting medical condition. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's claim, as well as a summary judgment motion. The trial court denied both motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were co-employees, allowing Plaintiff to sue Defendant personally under the exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision established in Pleasant v. Johnson; but (2) Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to survive Defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Trivette v. Yount" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to traffic in cocaine by transportation and possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure. Specifically, Defendant argued that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was engaging in illegal activity by operating a vehicle without a properly functioning brake light. The court of appeals reversed, holding that state law requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light, and therefore, the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the officer was mistaken about the requirements of the motor vehicle laws, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and under the totality of the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in this case. View "State v. Heien" on Justia Law

A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

In an effort to regulate gambling, the General Assembly passed N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which bans the operation of electronic machines that conduct sweepstakes through the use of an "entertaining display" such as video poker or video bingo. Originally, Plaintiffs were companies that marketed and sold prepaid products. As a promotion, Plaintiffs developed electronic sweepstakes systems where participants were allowed to access a gamestation terminal that revealed the content of the sweepstakes entry using different displays that simulated various game themes. After the General Assembly enacted the current version of section 14-306.4, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment. The trial court concluded that the law was constitutional. The court of appeals majority concluded that the announcement of the sweepstakes result and the video games were protected speech and that the entire statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislation regulated conduct and not protected speech and was therefore constitutional. View "Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The State filed a notice of appeal seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the State's appeal, finding that the State's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' dismissal of the State's appeal, holding that, under Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1448, the window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. View "State v. Oates" on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were owners of a condominium unit, and Petitioner was the administrator and manager of the condominium. At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred in granting a judgment and dismissal in favor of Respondents, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 42, reasoning that Petitioner's lien and foreclosure claim against Respondents' condominium unit was invalid because it was based upon an improperly administered assessment and not a valid debt. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the matter to the trial court, concluding that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful, in that it was not uniform and not levied on a pro rata basis, but concluded further that Petitioner did have the authority to make the assessment against Respondents. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful because it was not applied uniformly nor calculated in accord with Respondents' percentage undivided interest in the common areas and facilities; and (2) held that the remaining issues addressed by the court of appeals were not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "In re Foreclosure of Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to annul his twelve-year marriage to Defendant on grounds that their marriage was bigamous. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that at the time of Defendant's marriage to Plaintiff, Defendant was already married and thus any marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant was bigamous and consequently void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that from the district court's uncontested findings it followed that Plaintiff failed to show his marriage to Defendant was bigamous, and thus, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's annulment action. View "Mussa v Palmer-Mussa" on Justia Law