Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendants formed a limited liability company. The operating agreement contained an arbitration provision providing that any dispute arising out of the operating agreement shall be settled by arbitration. Plaintiff later filed suit against Defendants, alleging numerous claims, including breach of good faith and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration on those two issues under the operating agreement. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) the two claims in question did not arise out of the operating agreement or any breach or violation of the agreement, and (2) alternatively, Defendants waived any right they had to arbitration by engaging in discovery that would not have been available as a matter of right during the arbitration process and that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by these actions. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish prejudicial actions inconsistent with arbitration, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order finding waiver of contractual arbitration rights. Remanded. View "HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Employee Benefit Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained loans from Defendant, a bank. Plaintiffs later, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, filed a complaint alleging that Defendant's loan transactions violated North Carolina's unfair and deceptive practices statute. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that they paid loan discount fees but did not receive discounted loans and that the fees they were charged in connection with origination of their loans were unnecessary and unreasonable. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their loan discount claims and excessive pricing claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1. The court of appeals affirmed entry of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' loan discount claims but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the excessive fees claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed in regards to Plaintiffs' loan discount claims; and (2) Plaintiffs' excessive pricing claims were not recognized by section 75-1.1. Remanded. View "Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and Defendant thereafter admitted his habitual felon status. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of testimony by an expert in forensic chemistry regarding the results of a chemical analysis performed by another chemist violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The court of appeals reversed and granted Defendant a new trial, concluding that the admission of the testimony was error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if admission of the testimony was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the testimony of an expert in forensic science as to her opinion that the substance found in Defendant's vehicle was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her laboratory violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated in this case, where (1) the admission of the expert's opinion, from the expert's own analysis of the data, constituted the substantive evidence being prevented against Defendant, and Defendant was able to cross-examine the expert concerning all aspects of her testimony; and (2) even assuming the admission of the expert's opinion violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ortiz-Zape" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court permitted a State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) special agent to testify that the substance found on Defendant was cocaine based solely on her supervisor's notes and lab report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated where (1) the SBI agent presented an independent opinion formed as a result of her own analysis, not surrogate testimony; (2) Defendant was able to conduct a cross-examination that exposed the weaknesses in the agent's testimony; and (3) the supervisor's lab notes were not admitted into evidence. View "State v. Brewington" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug-related counts. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions for two counts of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine and one count of sale or delivery of cocaine, holding that the trial court violated Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by admitting into evidence lab reports through the testimony of a substitute analyst. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a Confrontation Clause violation where the testifying analyst did not give her own independent opinion, but rather gave "surrogate testimony" reciting the testing analysts' opinions. The Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' decision that Defendant was entitled to a new trial for the sale or delivery charge; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' decision vacating Defendant's conspiracy convictions, as those convictions were not affected by the erroneous admission of the substitute analyst's testimony. View "State v. Craven" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and attaining a habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Defendant a new trial, holding that the testimony of a forensic scientist who stated her expert opinion that a substance was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her labor violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal the issues he raised before the Court; and (2) even if Defendant had timely objected to the testimony at trial, he would not be entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not err in admitting the expert's opinion that the substance was cocaine, as the testimony did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "State v. Brent" on Justia Law

After a house on property belonging to a motorcross park caught fire, an investigator for property's insurer (Farm Bureau) found evidence of arson. The investigator's findings also included allegations that the park's president and sole shareholder (Volpe) had failed to report to Farm Bureau that there was a deed of trust on the property when she insured it and when she filed a claim of loss after the fire. Volpe was subsequently charged with obtaining property by false pretenses based upon her sale of the burned property to a purchaser who did not know it was encumbered. The trial court found Volpe was not involved in the fire, that Farm Bureau caused a criminal proceeding to be instituted against Volpe, and that Farm Bureau was liable to Volpe for malicious prosecution. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding that the insurance investigator's report to a law enforcement officer did not constitute the initiation of a malicious prosecution, and Farm Bureau's actions did not constitute an unfair and deceptive practice. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully's Motorcross Park, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the parents of Defendant's former husband, Tyson. Defendant and Tyson began living on a twenty-three-acre parcel of land owned by Plaintiffs in 1984. Defendant and Tyson made several improvements to eight acres of the property, including building a bridge and adding heat and running water to the house. Tyson moved away from the property in 2001. When Tyson began divorce proceedings in 2008, Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant vacate the property. Defendant refused to do so. In 2010, Plaintiffs successfully filed a complaint for summary ejectment against Defendant. Defendant appealed and counterclaimed to quiet title by way of adverse possession. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that Defendant only possessed a portion of the twenty-three acre parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not state in her pleading that she possessed just a portion of the disputed partial or present evidence implying that she sought adverse possession of anything less than the twenty-three acres, Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on adverse possession of a portion of the property. View "Minor v. Minor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief based upon newly discovered evidence, alleging that, after the trial, Defendant's father told a probation officer that the contraband belonged to him. The trial court set aside Defendant's convicted and ordered a new trial, concluding that the father's post-trial statement constituted newly discovered evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that due diligence was used to procure the father's testimony at the trial, and the information implicating the father was available to Defendant before his conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding Defendant had newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law