Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense based on insertion of male sex organ into the mouth of the alleged victim and first-degree sex offense based on insertion of the male sex organ into the anus of the alleged victim. The court of appeals (1) held that there was no error with respect to the first offense, and (2) held that the trial court's failure to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree sexual offense was plain error and granted a new trial with respect to the second offense. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that Defendant failed to show plain error under the standard set forth in State v. Lawrence. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) to increase its state retail electric service rates approximately 15.2 percent over current revenues. The application requested that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. The Commission approved a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke. The attorney general appealed the Commission's order, arguing that the order was legally deficient because it was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and did not include sufficient conclusions and reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make the necessary findings of fact to support its ROE determination. Remanded to the Commission to enter sufficient findings of fact. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Defendant was named in two indictments and entered a negotiated plea in each. The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Defendant took advantage of a position of trust, then sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for the convictions on both indictments. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had stipulated to the aggravating factor in the earlier indictment only and that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence on the latter indictment because he had entered no stipulation in that case. The court of appeals vacated the sentence imposed on the latter indictment and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on that indictment, finding that the transcript of plea was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant unambiguously stipulated to application of the aggravating factor for both indictments and that application of the aggravating factor for both indictments was supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. View "State v. Khan" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with a number of violations of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, including trafficking in twenty-eight grams or more of a mixture containing opium. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the General Assembly did not intend the charges stemming from possession of prescription medications be based on total weight. The opium trafficking statute explicitly provides that a defendant's criminal liability shall be based on the total weight of the mixture involved. The trial court denied Defendants' motions, and the jury found Defendants guilty as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because tablets and pills are mixtures, the opium trafficking statute applies in cases involving tablets and pills of prescription pharmaceutical drugs, and thus, Defendants were properly sentenced under the opium trafficking statute. View "State v. Ellison" on Justia Law

In 2005, Tonya Bass executed an adjustable rate promissory note with Mortgage Lenders Network USA. The Note was then transferred several times: from Mortgage Lenders to Emax Financial Group, from Emax to Residential Funding Corporation, and from Residential Funding to U.S. Bank. The Note evidenced these transfers by three stamped imprints. In 2009, U.S. Bank filed this foreclosure action after Bass failed to make timely payments. The trial court dismissed the foreclosure action, concluding that because the Note was not properly indorsed and conveyed to Emax or Residential Funding, U.S. Bank was not the rightful holder of the Note. The court based its ruling that the first stamp was "unsigned" and failed to establish negotiation from Mortgage Lenders to Emax. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the indorsements on the Note unambiguously indicated the intent to transfer the Note from each preceding lender and finally to U.S. Bank; and (2) therefore, U.S. Bank was the holder of the Note and had the authority to bring this foreclosure action against Bass. View "In re Foreclosure of Bass" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the City of Lumberton and four companies that ran promotional sweepstakes as part of their business plans. In 2010, the City amended its existing privilege license tax on businesses that utilized electronic machines to conduct sweepstakes. The prior tax for these companies was $12.50 per year. The new law made the minimum tax owed by these businesses $7,500. This change imposed a 59,900% minimum increase per business location. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding the new tax to be constitutional. Addressing the Just and Equitable Tax Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the court of appeals affirmed, determining that the tax did not amount to a prohibition of the companies' businesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's privilege license tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a matter of law, as the present tax transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation. View "IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton" on Justia Law

Defendant, in his role as department head, wrote an annual review of Plaintiff, a tenured associate professor, in which Defendant concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the department's expectations and had engaged in disruptive behavior and conduct. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the annual review contained false and defamatory statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in his individual capacity and that Defendant had published the review for the purposes of libel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, as the complaint did not specify whether Plaintiff was suing Defendant in his individual or official capacity, and therefore, the Court must presume Defendant was being sued in only his official capacity. View "White v. Trew" on Justia Law

In 2007, Brunswick County conducted an authorized appraisal of all property in the County. However, in 2008, which was not a statutorily designated year for setting property values for tax purposes, the County reassessed the tax value of real property belonging to Ocean Isle Palms LLC. Ocean Isle disputed the resulting tax values, arguing that the values were unlawful because they were based on an invalid reassessment. The County Board of Equalization and Review declined to change the valuations. On appeal, the Property Tax Commission found the 2008 revaluation was unlawful and granted Ocean Isle's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reassessment conducted in the nonreappraisal year 2008 violated the relevant statutes, and the alteration of the taxable value of Ocean Isle's property under the 2008 reassessment was unlawful. View "In re Ocean Isle Palms LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a secretary and office assistant at a middle school, was sprayed when a fire extinguisher Defendant was handling was abruptly discharged. Defendant was the principal of the school. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging gross negligence and loss of consortium on the part of her husband. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant willfully and wantonly engaged in reckless behavior when he was playing with the fire extinguisher, causing it to spray her, and that the spraying aggravated a preexisting medical condition. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's claim, as well as a summary judgment motion. The trial court denied both motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were co-employees, allowing Plaintiff to sue Defendant personally under the exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision established in Pleasant v. Johnson; but (2) Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to survive Defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Trivette v. Yount" on Justia Law