Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After visiting a county office building to pay his water bill, James Bynum fell while walking down the front steps. As a result, Bynum’s legs and right arm were paralyzed. Bynum and his wife filed a complaint against the County alleging that the County negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and repair a county office building. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity because the County’s operation of the building was governmental in nature. View "Bynum v. Wilson Cnty" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree kidnapping, possession of a firearm by a felon, assault of a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of removal, an essential element of second-degree kidnapping. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant’s second-degree kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an appellate court concludes that a defendant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, the court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a lesser included offense of the convicted crime, and if the court so determines, the jury’s verdict is recognized as a verdict of guilty to the lesser included offense; (2) the court of appeals in this case erred by refusing to consider whether Defendant’s actions constituted the lesser included offense of attempted second-degree kidnapping; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendant’s actions satisfied each element of attempted second-degree kidnapping. Remanded for entry of judgment on the lesser offense. View "State v. Stokes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Eric Jones was found guilty of two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of identity theft, and Jerry White was found guilty of four counts of trafficking in stolen identities. The charges arose from unauthorized charges made on the credit cards of several persons. The trial court subsequently dismissed the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and all trafficking in stolen identities charges against White on the basis that the indictments were insufficient as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Jones possessed the specific intent to commit identity theft; and (2) the indictments against the defendants were insufficient to support the convictions against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and against White for trafficking in stolen identities. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of trafficking in opium by possession. During the trial, a laboratory report of the results of a chemical analysis of the contraband were admitted, over Defendant’s objection, without calling the testing chemist as a witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State failed to establish that Defendant waived his confrontation rights because the record did not demonstrate that the State had provided a pretrial copy of the lab report to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant failed properly to raise or preserve the issue regarding the State’s compliance with the statutory requirement that the State provide a copy of the lab report to a defendant before trial. Remanded. View "State v. Whittington" on Justia Law

The trial court entered two orders, the first of which ceased reunification efforts between Mother and her children, and the second of which terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court's cease reunification order failed to satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-507, which requires trial courts to make written findings of fact that further reunification efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the child's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home. The court of appeals reversed both orders after finding perceived deficiencies in the cease reunification order but without considering the termination of parental rights order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's written findings of fact in a permanency planning order that consider the factors in section 7B-507 need not recite the statutory language verbatim but should address the substance of the statutory requirements; (2) even if the permanency planning order is deficient standing alone, the appellate court should review that order in conjunction with the termination of parental rights order to determine whether the statutory requirements are met; and (3), in this case, both the permanency planning order and the termination of parental rights order complied with the statutory mandate. View "In re L.M.T" on Justia Law

Defendant Corinna and her husband founded Piedmont Southern Air Freight, a shipping company. Corinna later delegated responsibility and authority for the company to her son Jack. Jack partnered with Larry to create Piedmont Express Airways and Piedmont Capital Holding of North Carolina. Plaintiffs each gave the Piedmont companies $200,000 as a loan and as an investment. After all of Plaintiffs' $400,000 had been spent, Plaintiffs sued Jack, Larry, Corinna, and the Piedmont companies to recover the funds, alleging several claims. As for Corinna, only Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty and piercing the corporate veil claims were submitted to the jury. The jury entered a verdict against Corinna on those issues. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the breach of fiduciary duty issue, holding that Plaintiffs' evidence on their breach of fiduciary duty claim was insufficient as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs' agency claims were the only remaining claims to which personal liability may attach under the piercing the corporate veil doctrine. Remanded for consideration of Plaintiffs' cross-appeal from the trial court's dismissal of their agency claims against Corinna and the effect of the agency claims on the application of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine. View "Green v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury while working for Defendant. Since Plaintiff's injury, his wife (Wife) attended to his needs. The North Carolina Industrial Commission later determined that Plaintiff required attendant care services, which Wife provided. Plaintiff and Defendant disagreed whether Wife should be compensated for the attendant care she provided Plaintiff before the Commission approved her rendering that service. The Commission concluded that Wife's attendant care services were medical compensation for which Defendant was responsible and further compensated Wife for the attendant care services previously provided. The court of appeals reversed in part the opinion and award entered by the Commission that provided retroactive compensation for Wife's attendant care services to her husband. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals on that issue because the court relied on a provision of the Commission's medical fee schedule that was not authorized by the legislature. Remanded. View "Mehaffey v. Burger King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the 2011 legislative changes made to North Carolina's pre-kindergarten program failed to comply with the state's constitutional obligations recognized in Leandro v. State and Hoke County Board of Education v. State. After a hearing, the trial court found that some of the changes violated the State Constitution and mandating that the State not deny any eligible at-risk four-year-old admission to the North Carolina pre-kindergarten program. While the State's appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended the challenged statutory provisions. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal as moot because the 2012 amendments constituted material and substantial changes to the provisions that the trial court found unconstitutional, and thus the questions originally in controversy between the parties were no longer at issue. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v State" on Justia Law

Greensboro police officers recovered a firearm ten to twelve feet from a car in which Defendant, a convicted felon, was a passenger. Defendant was arrested and later confessed that the firearm belonged to him. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon because, pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, the State did not present corroborative evidence, independent of Defendant's confession, tending to show that the crime in question occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the State v. Parker articulation of the corpus delicti rule, the State was not required to submit alternative evidence proving Defendant's identity as the perpetrator beyond Defendant's confession, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the State to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law