Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Plaintiff was terminated later that year for “reduction of staff due to lack of work.” Employer accepted Plaintiff’s injury as compensable. In January 2009, Plaintiff began to receive unemployment benefits from Employer and Insurer (together, Defendants). In December 2010, Defendants sought to terminate payment of compensation, alleging that Plaintiff could no longer show he was disabled. The Industrial Commission concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after December 2010 and that Defendants were entitled to a credit for any payments they had made after that date, finding that Plaintiff’s inability to find work was not due to his injury but to large-scale economic factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove that his inability to earn the same wages as before his injury resulted from his work-related injury. View "Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Dominion North Carolina filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting an 11.25 percent return on equity (ROE), among other things. During the course of public hearings, the Commission received evidence that Dominion made certain adjustments to a study of the costs of providing retail electric service to a large industrial customer. The Commission ultimately issued an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent and approving of Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err by approving Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study; but (2) the portion of the Commission’s order in which it authorized a 10.2 percent ROE for Dominion did not contain sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that it was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The State submitted as an aggravating factor that Defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy. The trial court also instructed the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of murder if it determined that he acted in concert to commit the murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court concluded that an aggravated sentence was justified in this case. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence of his concerted action was the same evidence used to support the aggravating factor, and thus, the use of this aggravating factor to enhance his sentence violated the statutory prohibition against using evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense to also prove an aggravating factor. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder under an acting-in-concert theory was not the same evidence the State used to support the aggravating factor. View "State v. Facyson" on Justia Law

While on probation, Defendant was indicted for several crimes. After a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at the revocation hearing, which consisted of hearsay evidence, was not competent so as to satisfy a judge that Defendant had willfully violated a valid condition of probation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court was justified in activating Defendant’s suspended sentence where the evidence allowed the reasonable conclusion that Defendant had continued a course of criminal action and posed a danger to the public. View "State v. Murchison" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of felony breaking or entering, two counts of felony larceny, and one count of possession of cocaine. Defendant’s sentences for the offenses were suspended and he was placed on probation. After Defendant violated his probation the trial court revoked his probation and activated his sentences for the remaining offenses for which he was on probation. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation on one count of larceny because the original indictment for the offense was fatally defective. The Court of Appeals held that Defendant’s appeal was proper. The Supreme Court reversed this determination, holding that a defendant may not collaterally challenge the validity of an underlying indictment by means of an appeal from revocation of his probation. View "State v. Pennell" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a firefighter for driving erratically. Defendant unexpectedly drove away from the scene but was soon encountered by police officers, who cited her for driving while impaired and driving while license revoked. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, claiming that firefighters do not have legal authority to conduct traffic stops. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, finding that the firefighter’s actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant never challenged the actions of the arresting officers, she presented no legal basis for suppressing the evidence supporting her conviction. View "State v. Verkerk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Alabama corporation, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, a North Carolina limited liability company, in Alabama, alleging breach of contract. The Alabama court entered a default judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request to file a foreign judgment in a North Carolina court, presenting a certified copy of the Alabama judgment. In response, Defendant filed a motion for relief from and notice of defense to the foreign judgment. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that, in accordance with N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the intrinsic fraud of Plaintiff in obtaining the underlying Alabama judgment precluded enforcement of the Alabama judgment as a judgment of North Carolina. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, concluding that intrinsic fraud was not a sufficient ground under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deny Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the Alabama judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals as modified, holding that the Alabama judgment was a final judgment and was entitled to the same credit in North Carolina that it would be accorded in Alabama, and Rule 60(b) had no applicability as a defense to a foreign judgment. View "DocRx, Inc. v. EMI Servs. of N.C., LLC" on Justia Law

After Mother discontinued her romantic relationship with Father, she gave birth to Child. A couple filed a petition to adopt Child, after which the adoption agency filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the absent father. Father subsequently learned that Mother had given birth and filed motions seeking to intervene in the adoption proceeding and to secure child custody. The trial court denied Father’s motion to intervene. The trial court then allowed the adoption to proceed without Father’s consent and denied all motions made by him. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Father’s consent was not required under N.C. Gen. Stat. 48-3-601 but that insufficient facts existed as to whether applying section 48-3-601 to Father would violate his due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Father failed to obtain notice of the birth, to acknowledge paternity, and to establish himself as a responsible parent within the time set by statute, Father fell outside the class of responsible biological fathers who enjoy a constitutionally protected relationship with their natural children. View "In re Adoption of S.D.W." on Justia Law

Borrowers applied from a home mortgage loan from Lender. During the transaction, a loan officer made an incorrect statement about lien priority. Borrowers later filed breach of fiduciary and negligent misrepresentation claims against Lender, alleging that the junior status of Lender’s lien decreased the marketability and value of their home and exposed them to increased liability. The trial court granted Lender’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. The Court of Appeals concluded that material issues of fact barred summary judgment on Borrowers’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, reasoning that Lender’s assurance of a first priority lien on Borrowers’ new mortgage loan was an act beyond the scope of a normal debtor-creditor relationship. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Lender on both claims where no fiduciary duty existed and where Plaintiffs did not forecast evidence that they made a reasonable inquiry into the validity of the loan officer’s statements. View "Dallaire v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law