Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
This case involved a dispute between the trustee of a Trust and Fannie Mae concerning which party’s mortgage lien on certain apartments had priority status. N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-37(b) establishes a conclusive presumption that the conditions of prior liens are satisfied after fifteen years from either the date on which the instrument requires performance or the date of maturity of the last installment of debt. The statute further authorizes a senior lienholder to extend the “life of the lien” by filing an affidavit with the register of deeds. Here, the trial court granted summary judgment for Fannie Mae, ruling that, pursuant to section 45-37(b), the Trust’s lien had expired, and the Trust’s failure to file an affidavit extending the life of its lien enabled Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 45-37(b) allows creditors or purchasers for value from a grantor to benefit from the conclusive presumption that prior liens expire after fifteen years irrespective of when those creditors obtain their interest; and (2) in this case, section 45-37(b) acted to terminate the Trust’s lien and permitted Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered by a senior lien. View "Falk v. Fannie Mae" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

by
Douglas Lunsford was injured in an accident involving multiple tortfeasors. Lunsford filed a negligence action against Thomas Mills, Mills’ employer James Crowder, and Shawn Buchanan, who carried liability policies totaling $1,050,000. Plaintiff was covered by two underinsured motorist (UIM) policies with North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) with combined limits of $400,000. Buchanan’s provider tendered to plaintiff the $50,000 limits of Buchanan’s policy, and Plaintiff settled his claim with Mills’ and Crowder’s coverage provider for $850,000. Farm Bureau, an unnamed defendant, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage because the combined policy limits of Defendants exceeded Plaintiff’s UIM limits. Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was was entitled to recover $350,000 - Farm Bureau’s UIM policy limits minus an offset for Buchanan’s insurance payment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lunsford. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an insured is only required to exhaust the liability insurance coverage of a single at-fault motorist in order to trigger the insurer’s obligation to provide UIM benefits; but (2) the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Lunsford was entitled to interest and costs against Farm Bureau. View "Lunsford v. Mills" on Justia Law

by
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree sexual offense, three counts of first-degree rape, and five counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding (1) the trial court erred in prohibiting witness testimony about Defendant’s character of being respectful towards children; and (2) the trial court erred in not substituting the term “alleged victim” for the word “victim” in the pattern jury instructions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in prohibiting evidence of Defendant’s respectful attitude towards children, as the proffered evidence was not sufficiently tailored to the State’s charges of child sexual abuse and was thus inadmissible; and (2) the trial court’s use of the term “victim” in the jury instructions was not impermissible commentary on a disputed issue of fact, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to use the phrase “alleged victim” instead of the word “victim” in its charge to the jury. View "State v. Walston" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Cumberland County Health System, Inc. (CCHS), seeking damages based upon negligence after an accidental fire during a surgery caused first and second degree burns to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed motions to compel discovery of certain documents in the possession of CCHS. Defendants claimed the documents were shielded from discovery by N.C. Gen. Stat. 131E-95, which protects the “proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and materials it produces and the materials it considers.” The trial court disagreed with Defendants and granted the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that section 131E-95 did not apply because Defendants had not shown that the withheld documents were part of a medical review committee’s proceedings, were produced by a medical review committee, or were considered by a medical review committee as required by the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CCHS failed to demonstrate the existence of a medical review committee within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, the documents were not shielded from discovery on this basis. View "Hammond v. Saini" on Justia Law

by
Defendant drove by Patrice Harney’s home, where Harney was sitting on her front porch, shouted a phrase used by gang members, and ultimately fired repeated bullets into Harney’s home when she retreated from his attack. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of attempted first-degree murder and five counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property. The Court of Appeals reversed the attempted murder conviction, concluding that the State had failed to produce sufficient evidence of Defendant’s premeditation and deliberation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence supported an inference that Defendant deliberately and with premeditation set out to kill Harney by shooting repeatedly at Harney on her porch and through her home. View "State v. Childress" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Based upon an affidavit by a state law enforcement officer, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s home and outbuildings on his property. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant and seized fifty-five marijuana plans, indoor growing supplies, firearms and ammunition, and $1540 in cash. Defendant was indicted for maintaining a dwelling to keep a controlled substance, manufacture of a controlled substance, and trafficking in marijuana by possession, among other offenses. The trial court suppressed the items seized under the search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. View "State v. Benters" on Justia Law

by
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. On remand, the trial court awarded sentencing points for Defendant’s two prior Tennessee misdemeanor convictions, determining the Tennessee offenses of theft of property and domestic assault to be substantially similar to the North Carolina offenses of larceny and assault on a female. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee offense of theft of property is substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of larceny; and (2) reversed the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault on a female. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault and the North Carolina offense of assault on a female to be substantially similar without reviewing the Tennessee statute defining the offense of assault and erred in determining that the two offenses were substantially similar. Remanded. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

by
Defendant guaranteed loans made by Regions Bank to certain entities that later defaulted on the obligations. As part of a restructuring agreement, Defendant executed a forbearance agreement and waived “any and all claims, defenses and causes of action” in exchange for Regions Bank’s agreement not to exercise collection remedies under the loan documents. The LC Entities later defaulted on their obligations under the forbearance agreement. Plaintiff subsequently purchased Regions Bank’s interest in the LC Entities’ loans. Plaintiff then sought recovery of the indebtedness from Defendant. The trial court entered judgment for Defendant, concluding that Regions Bank had procured her guaranty in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and that this violation constituted an affirmative defense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in executing the forbearance agreement, Defendant waived her potential claims against the lender, including those under the ECOA, in exchange for leniency in repaying the debt. Remanded. View "RL Regi N.C., LLC v. Lighthouse Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking