Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Cumberland County Health System, Inc. (CCHS), seeking damages based upon negligence after an accidental fire during a surgery caused first and second degree burns to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed motions to compel discovery of certain documents in the possession of CCHS. Defendants claimed the documents were shielded from discovery by N.C. Gen. Stat. 131E-95, which protects the “proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and materials it produces and the materials it considers.” The trial court disagreed with Defendants and granted the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that section 131E-95 did not apply because Defendants had not shown that the withheld documents were part of a medical review committee’s proceedings, were produced by a medical review committee, or were considered by a medical review committee as required by the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CCHS failed to demonstrate the existence of a medical review committee within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, the documents were not shielded from discovery on this basis. View "Hammond v. Saini" on Justia Law

Defendant drove by Patrice Harney’s home, where Harney was sitting on her front porch, shouted a phrase used by gang members, and ultimately fired repeated bullets into Harney’s home when she retreated from his attack. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of attempted first-degree murder and five counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property. The Court of Appeals reversed the attempted murder conviction, concluding that the State had failed to produce sufficient evidence of Defendant’s premeditation and deliberation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence supported an inference that Defendant deliberately and with premeditation set out to kill Harney by shooting repeatedly at Harney on her porch and through her home. View "State v. Childress" on Justia Law

Based upon an affidavit by a state law enforcement officer, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s home and outbuildings on his property. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant and seized fifty-five marijuana plans, indoor growing supplies, firearms and ammunition, and $1540 in cash. Defendant was indicted for maintaining a dwelling to keep a controlled substance, manufacture of a controlled substance, and trafficking in marijuana by possession, among other offenses. The trial court suppressed the items seized under the search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. View "State v. Benters" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. On remand, the trial court awarded sentencing points for Defendant’s two prior Tennessee misdemeanor convictions, determining the Tennessee offenses of theft of property and domestic assault to be substantially similar to the North Carolina offenses of larceny and assault on a female. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee offense of theft of property is substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of larceny; and (2) reversed the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault on a female. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault and the North Carolina offense of assault on a female to be substantially similar without reviewing the Tennessee statute defining the offense of assault and erred in determining that the two offenses were substantially similar. Remanded. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant guaranteed loans made by Regions Bank to certain entities that later defaulted on the obligations. As part of a restructuring agreement, Defendant executed a forbearance agreement and waived “any and all claims, defenses and causes of action” in exchange for Regions Bank’s agreement not to exercise collection remedies under the loan documents. The LC Entities later defaulted on their obligations under the forbearance agreement. Plaintiff subsequently purchased Regions Bank’s interest in the LC Entities’ loans. Plaintiff then sought recovery of the indebtedness from Defendant. The trial court entered judgment for Defendant, concluding that Regions Bank had procured her guaranty in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and that this violation constituted an affirmative defense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in executing the forbearance agreement, Defendant waived her potential claims against the lender, including those under the ECOA, in exchange for leniency in repaying the debt. Remanded. View "RL Regi N.C., LLC v. Lighthouse Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Plaintiff was terminated later that year for “reduction of staff due to lack of work.” Employer accepted Plaintiff’s injury as compensable. In January 2009, Plaintiff began to receive unemployment benefits from Employer and Insurer (together, Defendants). In December 2010, Defendants sought to terminate payment of compensation, alleging that Plaintiff could no longer show he was disabled. The Industrial Commission concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after December 2010 and that Defendants were entitled to a credit for any payments they had made after that date, finding that Plaintiff’s inability to find work was not due to his injury but to large-scale economic factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove that his inability to earn the same wages as before his injury resulted from his work-related injury. View "Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Dominion North Carolina filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting an 11.25 percent return on equity (ROE), among other things. During the course of public hearings, the Commission received evidence that Dominion made certain adjustments to a study of the costs of providing retail electric service to a large industrial customer. The Commission ultimately issued an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent and approving of Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err by approving Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study; but (2) the portion of the Commission’s order in which it authorized a 10.2 percent ROE for Dominion did not contain sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that it was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The State submitted as an aggravating factor that Defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy. The trial court also instructed the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of murder if it determined that he acted in concert to commit the murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court concluded that an aggravated sentence was justified in this case. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence of his concerted action was the same evidence used to support the aggravating factor, and thus, the use of this aggravating factor to enhance his sentence violated the statutory prohibition against using evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense to also prove an aggravating factor. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder under an acting-in-concert theory was not the same evidence the State used to support the aggravating factor. View "State v. Facyson" on Justia Law