Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Brenda G. Branch, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District 6A, should be publicly reprimanded for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute and which violates the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. The recommendation was based on the Commission’s findings that Branch engaged in misconduct that resulted from insufficient inquiry into her obligations regarding a certain case and her insufficiently-based conclusions regarding the parties. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s findings and concluded that Branch be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge" on Justia Law

In 2013, Duke Energy Carolinas filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to adjust and increase its North Carolina retail electric service rates. The Commission entered an order granting a $234,480,000 annual retail revenue increase, approving a 10.2 percent return on equity (ROE), and authorizing the use the single coincident peak (“1CP”) cost-of-service methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission made sufficient findings regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers, and these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record; (2) the use of 1CP did not unreasonably discriminate against residential customers; and (3) no improper costs were included in the Commission’s order. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

When two detectives were parked in Defendant’s driveway, they saw three potted marijuana plants within the home’s curtilage. The detectives seized the plants before returning the next day with a warrant to search Defendant’s home. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the seized plants, claiming that discovery of the plants was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure of the plants violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the detectives’ seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Grice" on Justia Law

Following the census conducted in 2010, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs sought to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court concluded that the General Assembly applied traditional and permissible redistricting principles to achieve partisan advantage and that no constitutional violations occurred. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the twenty-six districts drawn to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, holding that the trial court erred when it applied strict scrutiny before making adequate findings of fact, but because the trial court correctly found that each of the twenty-six districts survived strict scrutiny, the case need not be remanded for reconsideration under what may be a less demanding standard of review; and (2) affirmed as to the remaining challenged districts. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

In building their home, Plaintiffs purchased SuperFlex, a stucco-like material, to cover the house’s exterior. GrailCoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. (collectively, GrailCoat), the manufacturers of SuperFlex, provided an express twenty-year warranty for the product. Several years after the construction of their home was completed, the product failed. Plaintiffs brought suit against GrailCoat and Hartley Construction, Inc., the company that had designed and built the home, for damages. Hartley moved for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-50(a)(5), North Carolina’s six-year statute of repose for claims arising out of improvements to real property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty against GrailCoat, holding that GrailCoat knowingly and freely entered into a valid contract of sale with Plaintiffs that provided for a warranty term that exceeded the repose period, and therefore, GrailCoat waived the protections provided by the statute of repose. View "Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) charged Twin County Motorsports, Inc. with violating N.C. Gen. * Stat. 20-183.7B(a)(3) for allowing a person not licensed as a safety inspection mechanic to perform safety inspections. Lance Cherry, an officer and shareholder of Twin County, requested a hearing before the DMV and appeared at the hearing on behalf of Twin County. After concluding that sufficient evidence sustained the finding that Twin County violated section 20-183.7B(a)(3), the hearing officer levied a civil penalty and suspended Twin County’s inspection license. The Commissioner of the DMV upheld the hearing officer’s order. Twin County appealed, arguing that Twin County, as a corporation, should not have been represented by Cherry, a nonattorney, at the DMV hearing. The trial court agreed and remanded the matter for a new hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a nonattorney’s appearance on behalf of a corporate entity before an administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore, the trial court erred in reversing the DMV’s final agency decision in this case. View "In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was one of a group of prisoners called Bowden-class inmates who committed offenses between 1974 and 1978 and received death sentences that were later reduced to life imprisonment. Defendant accrued various credits during his incarceration, and the Department of Correction (DOC) applied some of Defendant’s credits towards earlier parole eligibility but not towards the calculation of an unconditional release date. In 2005, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was entitled to immediate release from prison because, after applying his various credits, he had completed his life sentence. The trial court ultimately concluded that all of Defendant’s credits should be applied to his sentence for all purposes, including calculating an unconditional release date, and the DOC erred in refusing to apply Defendant’s credits in this way. The trial court then determined that Defendant had served his entire sentence and ordered the DOC to release Defendant unconditionally. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DOC was not required to apply the credits towards the calculation for an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate, and therefore, Defendant remained lawfully incarcerated and was not entitled to release. View "State v. Bowden" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Carolinas (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its North Carolina retail electric services rates and asking that the rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. Duke subsequently stipulated to an ROE of 10.5 percent. The Commission entered a Rate Order approving the revenue increase and ROE contained in the stipulation. The Attorney General appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the Commission concluded that the Rate Order was supported by the evidence and was reasonable in light of the stipulation as a whole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s order authorizing a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke contained sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that the order was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under theories of both premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred by declining to give an accessory before the instruction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-5.2 and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder under a theory of felony murder was supported by ample evidence, and therefore, no new trial was warranted, and the conviction must stand. View "State v. Grainger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law