Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners filed a request that the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission issue a declaratory ruling clarifying the application of the Commission’s groundwater protection rules to coal ash lagoons. After the Commission issued its declaratory ruling, Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the Commission had misconstrued the applicable regulations and erred in failing to construe the applicable regulations in the manner contended for by Petitioners in their original request for declaratory relief. The trial court determined that portions of the Commission’s decision were plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations and reversed the Commission’s decision with respect to Petitioners’ second request for a declaratory ruling. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Petitioners’ appeal from the Commission’s declaratory ruling on mootness grounds, holding that the General Assembly’s enactment of Chapter 122 of the 2014 North Carolina Session Laws supersedes the rule at issue in this appeal with respect to coal ash lagoons located at facilities with active permits. Remanded. View "Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for felony breaking or entering a place of worship and felony larceny after breaking or entering. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of felony larceny and felony breaking or entering a place of religious worship. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s larceny conviction and reversed his conviction for breaking or entering, concluding (1) the larceny indictment was “fatally flawed” because it it did not specifically state that a church, the alleged co-owner of the stolen property, was a legal entity capable of owning property; and (2) there was insufficient evidence of Defendant’s intent to commit larceny. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the indictment was sufficient on its face because the name of a church necessarily imports an entity capable of owning property; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of Defendant’s criminal intent to sustain a conviction for felony breaking or entering a place of religious worship. Remanded. View "State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error by failing to adequately instruct the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that he had possessed and transported cocaine. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and awarded him a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury in accordance with footnote four to N.C.P.I. Crim. 260.17 and 260.30 because the trial court’s instructions here adequately addressed the issue that the jury had to decide to determine Defendant’s guilt or innocence. View "State v. Galaviz-Torres" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped and searched Defendant outside a shop known for drug activity. Defendant was subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, and conspiracy to posses with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the initial stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court sufficiently established that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of Defendant. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The district court entered an ex parte Domestic Violence Order of Protection (DVPO) against Defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50B-3. The court ordered Defendant in the DVPO to surrender his firearms and ammunition and further ordered that law enforcement officers shall search “Defendant’s person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.” When officers served the DVPO on Defendant at his residence, they entered the house to execute the search for weapons. Once inside the home, officers found a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was subsequently charged with drug-related offenses. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the relevant DVPO statutes do not authorize the district court to order a general search of Defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence for weapons; and (2) the ex parte DVPO was not a de facto search warrant. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) section 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of a defendant’s residence under a civil DVPO; and (2) because the search of Defendant’s home was conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement, it violated Defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. View "State v. Elder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for one count of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory rape, and first-degree sex offense with a child. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent two consecutive notes to the court indicating that they were deadlocked. The judge instructed the jurors to continue with their deliberations. The jury eventually found Defendant guilty of one count of first-degree statutory rape but failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining two counts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two counts on which the jury deadlocked. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-1235(c), which sets out procedures a trial court may follow when a jury is deadlocked, and that the error resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury.The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the instructions, any error was not preserved and was subject to plain error review; and (2) applying this standard, the trial court’s instructions did not result in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury. View "State v. May" on Justia Law

Defendant’s predecessor in title ("Wayne") owned two tracts of land (“Wayne Tracts”). Park Creek, LLC held adjacent land. Under a pre-approved plan, Wayne and the LLC began constructing a development plan for a residential subdivision using land owned by both Wayne and the LLC. When Wayne conveyed his property to Defendant, his revocable trust of which he was the trustee, future phases of the subdivision remained undeveloped. The Town of Midland later filed two condemnation actions against Defendant condemning three acres of Defendant’s property necessary for an easement. The trial court determined that no unity of ownership existed as to the contiguous tracts of land owned by Defendant and Park Creek, LLC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that no unity of ownership existed between the Wayne Tracts and the LLC Tract for the purpose of determining compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, where Defendant and the LLC had a vested right to complete the subdivision pursuant to the pre-approved plan, unity of ownership existed between the adjacent properties. View "Town of Midland v. Wayne" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from an automobile accident in which Justin Ward, operating a car owned by his mother, Sheena Ward, collided with a vehicle driven by Luis Carmona. Sheena filed suit against Carmona seeking damages for his alleged negligence. Carmona filed an answer and a third-party complaint naming Justin as a third-party defendant. A jury found both Carmona and Justin negligent and denied Sheena any relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the jury’s verdict finding both Carmona and Justin negligent in the operation of their vehicles; and (2) the Court of Appeals did not create a new theory of motor vehicle negligence inconsistent with North Carolina statutes and case law. View "Ward v. Carmona" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for the first-degree murders of three women, including Heather Catterton and Randi Saldana. Defendant was first tried capitally for the Catteron murder, which was the matter at issue in this appeal. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury recommended, and the trial court entered, a sentence of death. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court erred by (1) allowing admission of an excessive amount of the Saldana murder evidence under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) allowing Saldana’s sister to testify about Saldana’s good character; and (3) allowing the prosecution to argue without basis to the jury that defense counsel had in effect suborned perjury. Further, the cumulative effect of these three errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Hembree" on Justia Law

In 1973, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary for which he was sentenced to imprisonment “for his natural life.” In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief (MAR) asking the trial court to set aside his sentence on the burglary charge as cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court granted Defendant’s MAR, vacated the judgment in the second-degree burglary case, and resentenced Defendant to a term of thirty years. After giving credit for time served, the trial court ordered that Defendant be immediately released. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the original 1973 judgment and commitment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State of an MAR when the defendant has won relief from the trial court. View "State v. Stubbs" on Justia Law