Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In building their home, Plaintiffs purchased SuperFlex, a stucco-like material, to cover the house’s exterior. GrailCoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. (collectively, GrailCoat), the manufacturers of SuperFlex, provided an express twenty-year warranty for the product. Several years after the construction of their home was completed, the product failed. Plaintiffs brought suit against GrailCoat and Hartley Construction, Inc., the company that had designed and built the home, for damages. Hartley moved for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-50(a)(5), North Carolina’s six-year statute of repose for claims arising out of improvements to real property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty against GrailCoat, holding that GrailCoat knowingly and freely entered into a valid contract of sale with Plaintiffs that provided for a warranty term that exceeded the repose period, and therefore, GrailCoat waived the protections provided by the statute of repose. View "Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) charged Twin County Motorsports, Inc. with violating N.C. Gen. * Stat. 20-183.7B(a)(3) for allowing a person not licensed as a safety inspection mechanic to perform safety inspections. Lance Cherry, an officer and shareholder of Twin County, requested a hearing before the DMV and appeared at the hearing on behalf of Twin County. After concluding that sufficient evidence sustained the finding that Twin County violated section 20-183.7B(a)(3), the hearing officer levied a civil penalty and suspended Twin County’s inspection license. The Commissioner of the DMV upheld the hearing officer’s order. Twin County appealed, arguing that Twin County, as a corporation, should not have been represented by Cherry, a nonattorney, at the DMV hearing. The trial court agreed and remanded the matter for a new hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a nonattorney’s appearance on behalf of a corporate entity before an administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore, the trial court erred in reversing the DMV’s final agency decision in this case. View "In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was one of a group of prisoners called Bowden-class inmates who committed offenses between 1974 and 1978 and received death sentences that were later reduced to life imprisonment. Defendant accrued various credits during his incarceration, and the Department of Correction (DOC) applied some of Defendant’s credits towards earlier parole eligibility but not towards the calculation of an unconditional release date. In 2005, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was entitled to immediate release from prison because, after applying his various credits, he had completed his life sentence. The trial court ultimately concluded that all of Defendant’s credits should be applied to his sentence for all purposes, including calculating an unconditional release date, and the DOC erred in refusing to apply Defendant’s credits in this way. The trial court then determined that Defendant had served his entire sentence and ordered the DOC to release Defendant unconditionally. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DOC was not required to apply the credits towards the calculation for an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate, and therefore, Defendant remained lawfully incarcerated and was not entitled to release. View "State v. Bowden" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Carolinas (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its North Carolina retail electric services rates and asking that the rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. Duke subsequently stipulated to an ROE of 10.5 percent. The Commission entered a Rate Order approving the revenue increase and ROE contained in the stipulation. The Attorney General appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the Commission concluded that the Rate Order was supported by the evidence and was reasonable in light of the stipulation as a whole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s order authorizing a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke contained sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that the order was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under theories of both premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred by declining to give an accessory before the instruction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-5.2 and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder under a theory of felony murder was supported by ample evidence, and therefore, no new trial was warranted, and the conviction must stand. View "State v. Grainger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between the trustee of a Trust and Fannie Mae concerning which party’s mortgage lien on certain apartments had priority status. N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-37(b) establishes a conclusive presumption that the conditions of prior liens are satisfied after fifteen years from either the date on which the instrument requires performance or the date of maturity of the last installment of debt. The statute further authorizes a senior lienholder to extend the “life of the lien” by filing an affidavit with the register of deeds. Here, the trial court granted summary judgment for Fannie Mae, ruling that, pursuant to section 45-37(b), the Trust’s lien had expired, and the Trust’s failure to file an affidavit extending the life of its lien enabled Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 45-37(b) allows creditors or purchasers for value from a grantor to benefit from the conclusive presumption that prior liens expire after fifteen years irrespective of when those creditors obtain their interest; and (2) in this case, section 45-37(b) acted to terminate the Trust’s lien and permitted Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered by a senior lien. View "Falk v. Fannie Mae" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Douglas Lunsford was injured in an accident involving multiple tortfeasors. Lunsford filed a negligence action against Thomas Mills, Mills’ employer James Crowder, and Shawn Buchanan, who carried liability policies totaling $1,050,000. Plaintiff was covered by two underinsured motorist (UIM) policies with North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) with combined limits of $400,000. Buchanan’s provider tendered to plaintiff the $50,000 limits of Buchanan’s policy, and Plaintiff settled his claim with Mills’ and Crowder’s coverage provider for $850,000. Farm Bureau, an unnamed defendant, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage because the combined policy limits of Defendants exceeded Plaintiff’s UIM limits. Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was was entitled to recover $350,000 - Farm Bureau’s UIM policy limits minus an offset for Buchanan’s insurance payment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lunsford. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an insured is only required to exhaust the liability insurance coverage of a single at-fault motorist in order to trigger the insurer’s obligation to provide UIM benefits; but (2) the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Lunsford was entitled to interest and costs against Farm Bureau. View "Lunsford v. Mills" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree sexual offense, three counts of first-degree rape, and five counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding (1) the trial court erred in prohibiting witness testimony about Defendant’s character of being respectful towards children; and (2) the trial court erred in not substituting the term “alleged victim” for the word “victim” in the pattern jury instructions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in prohibiting evidence of Defendant’s respectful attitude towards children, as the proffered evidence was not sufficiently tailored to the State’s charges of child sexual abuse and was thus inadmissible; and (2) the trial court’s use of the term “victim” in the jury instructions was not impermissible commentary on a disputed issue of fact, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to use the phrase “alleged victim” instead of the word “victim” in its charge to the jury. View "State v. Walston" on Justia Law