Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of media organizations and reporters sought copies of law enforcement recordings of a march in Graham, North Carolina. The Superior Court granted their petition, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order, arguing that the trial court failed to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request copies of the recordings under the statute. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not understand that it could place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, stating that anyone may seek copies of law enforcement recordings under the provision invoked by the petitioners, so the trial court had no reason to question their eligibility. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously believed that it could not condition or restrict the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not need to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request the recordings, but it did err in believing it could not place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings. View "In re The McClatchy Company, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2000, Betty J. Brown took title to a property in Charlotte, North Carolina. She obtained a loan from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation in 2004, secured by a deed of trust. In 2010, a judgment was entered against Brown in South Carolina, which was domesticated and recorded in North Carolina in 2014. In 2016, Brown refinanced the First Horizon loan with Nationstar Mortgage LLC, which paid off the remainder of the First Horizon loan. The deed of trust for the Nationstar loan was recorded after the 2010 judgment. MidFirst Bank is Nationstar’s successor in interest for the 2016 loan. In 2019, enforcement proceedings began against Brown to collect the 2010 judgment. The property was seized and sold at an execution sale, with Brown's daughter, Michelle Anderson, placing the successful bid.The trial court granted summary judgment to MidFirst Bank, asserting that the Nationstar deed of trust still encumbered the property even after the execution sale. The court also held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, allowing Nationstar to assume the rights and priorities of the First Horizon deed of trust. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the Nationstar lien was extinguished by the execution sale and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was not available to MidFirst Bank because it was not "excusably ignorant" of the publicly recorded judgment.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that it erred by applying the incorrect standard regarding equitable subrogation. The court held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applies when money is expressly advanced to extinguish a prior encumbrance and is used for this purpose. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to be remanded to the trial court for reassessment under the correct legal standard. View "MidFirst Bank v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a contract between a plaintiff, Pamela Phillips, and the defendant, Charlotte Metro Credit Union. In 2014, Phillips opened a checking account with the Credit Union and agreed to a standard membership agreement. This agreement included a "Notice of Amendments" provision, which allowed the Credit Union to change the terms of the agreement upon notice to Phillips. In 2021, the Credit Union amended its membership agreement to require arbitration for certain disputes and to waive members' right to file class actions. Phillips did not opt out of this amendment within the given 30-day window. Later that year, Phillips filed a class action complaint against the Credit Union for the collection of overdraft fees on accounts that were never overdrawn. The Credit Union responded by filing a motion to stay the action and compel arbitration.The trial court denied the Credit Union's motion to stay and compel arbitration, concluding that the "Notice of Amendments" provision did not permit the Credit Union to unilaterally add an arbitration provision. The Credit Union appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's determination and remanded the case to the trial court to stay the action pending arbitration.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Arbitration Amendment was within the universe of terms of the contract between the parties, and thus complies with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and does not render the contract illusory. As such, the Arbitration Amendment is a binding and enforceable agreement between Phillips and the Credit Union. View "Canteen v. Charlotte Metro Credit Union" on Justia Law

In 2022, Walter D. Giese was charged with cyberstalking and making harassing phone calls to Sharon Griffin, the county manager for Onslow County, North Carolina. Giese moved to disqualify District Attorney Ernie Lee and his staff from prosecuting him, arguing that Griffin's role as county manager, which included overseeing the county's facilities and public services and proposing the county budget, created a conflict of interest. Giese contended that the prosecutors had a "self-interest" in appeasing Griffin, which could influence their decision-making in his case. The district court agreed and barred the Fifth Prosecutorial District from handling the case. The State challenged this decision, but the superior court upheld the disqualification order, finding a conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the superior court's order and vacated it, finding that the lower courts had erred in disqualifying the entire Fifth Prosecutorial District without finding an actual conflict of interest. The court clarified that an actual conflict of interest exists when the prosecution, by virtue of a prior attorney-client relationship, obtains confidential information that has been or is likely to be used to the detriment of the defendant. The court found that this was not the case here, as there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the Fifth Prosecutorial District had ever represented Giese or obtained confidential information that could be used against him. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Giese" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tevin Demetrius Vann, was found guilty of first-degree murder, murder of an unborn child, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The case revolved around the murder of a woman, Ashley Ann McLean, who was found dead in a hotel room. Evidence pointed to the defendant, including text messages between him and the victim, surveillance footage of him entering and leaving the hotel, and his confession to assaulting the victim. However, the defendant later recanted his confession during the trial.The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals after the trial court denied the jury's request to review partial transcripts of testimony from the lead detective, the medical examiner, and the defendant. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, concluding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts. The court noted that the trial court had granted previous requests from the jury to review evidence and had instructed the jury that it was their duty to recall the testimony. The court concluded that the defendant failed to provide affirmative evidence that the trial court did not understand or properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, the court found no prejudicial error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Vann" on Justia Law

In 2017, the City of Greenville, North Carolina, installed traffic cameras at its most dangerous intersections as part of its Red Light Camera Enforcement Program (RLCEP). The program was funded through a cost-sharing agreement with the Pitt County Board of Education (Board), which received 100% of the collected red light penalties and then reimbursed the City for the actual costs of maintaining the program. In 2018, plaintiffs Eric Fearrington and Craig Malmrose received citations for red light violations captured by RLCEP cameras and challenged their citations in court, arguing that the RLCEP violated Article IX, Section 7 of North Carolina’s Constitution, which promises public schools the “clear proceeds” of all penalties, forfeitures, and fines.The trial court ruled in favor of the Board and City, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim and remanded for entry of summary judgment in their favor. The Board and City then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for discretionary review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing but limited the available remedies to injunctive and declaratory relief, not a “refund.” On plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, however, the court reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the Interlocal Agreement and the Local Act authorizing it did not countermand the constitutional provision’s text or purpose. The court did not discern a “plain and clear” constitutional violation, and thus reversed the award of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their constitutional claim, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Greenville and the Board. View "Fearrington v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Mack Washington, who was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old stepdaughter, N.M. The abuse was reported by N.M. to her mother, who then reported it to the police. During the investigation, N.M. revealed to a social worker that she had been sexually abused by another individual, a 15-year-old teenager, in the past. Washington was indicted on two counts of sexual offense with a child by an adult and six counts of indecent liberties with a child.Before the trial, Washington sought to admit the portion of N.M.’s interview where she discussed the additional abuser, arguing that it did not fall under Rule 412’s definition of “sexual behavior” because it did not discuss “any specific sex acts.” The trial court denied the motion and excluded the evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Washington was found guilty of all remaining charges and sentenced to 332 to 478 months imprisonment.On appeal, Washington argued that the trial court erred in excluding the interview because sexual abuse does not fall within the definition of ‘sexual behavior’ under Rule 412. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the plain language of Rule 412 does not speak to a consensual requirement and held that the trial court did not err in excluding the interview.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the language of Rule 412 is clear that all evidence of a complainant’s sexual behavior, other than the sexual act at issue, is irrelevant regardless of whether that sexual behavior was consensual or nonconsensual. Therefore, N.M.’s statements about the additional abuser in her SAFEChild interview constitute evidence of sexual behavior “other than the sexual act” committed by Washington in this case and were properly excluded. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

The defendant, a massage therapist, was accused of sexually assaulting a client during a massage session. The victim reported the incident to the police the day after it occurred, and the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of second-degree forcible sexual offense and one count of sexual battery. The defendant pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of second-degree forcible sexual offense. The defendant was sentenced to sixty days in custody, which was suspended, and placed on twenty-four months of supervised probation. He was also ordered to surrender his massage therapist license and register as a sex offender.The defendant appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual battery charge because the indictment did not include the essential element of the offense being committed "by force." The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that the indictment was invalid because it only expressly mentioned one of the essential elements of the crime.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that the indictment was valid because it implied the use of force and provided the defendant with adequate notice of the charge against him. The court noted that nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies the use of some degree of force. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the indictment was facially valid and sufficiently alleged facts to place the defendant on notice of the charge against him. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Daniel Raymond Jonas was indicted for possession of a controlled substance after officers found methamphetamine in his car during a traffic stop. Jonas filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. Jonas then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, also known as an "open plea." He did not give notice of his intent to appeal before entering his guilty plea, but minutes after sentencing, his counsel gave oral notice of appeal on the record.The Court of Appeals unanimously held that Jonas was not required to give notice of intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress prior to entering his guilty plea because he did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The Court of Appeals also held that the stop of Jonas's vehicle was unconstitutional, and that the trial court erred when it denied Jonas's motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to extend the rule from State v. Reynolds, which requires a defendant to give notice of intent to appeal before finalizing plea negotiations, to cases where a defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement. The court declined to do so, holding that when a defendant enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement, the defendant does not waive his or her right of appeal by pleading guilty without prior notice of intent to appeal. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Jonas" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation lawsuit filed by Louis M. Bouvier, Jr., Karen Andrea Niehans, Samuel R. Niehans, and Joseph D. Golden against William Clark Porter, IV, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky PLLC, Steve Roberts, Erin Clark, Gabriela Fallon, Steven Saxe, and the Pat McCrory Committee Legal Defense Fund. The plaintiffs were accused of voting in two states in an election protest filed by the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed that these accusations, which were later proven to be false, defamed them and damaged their reputations.The case was initially heard in the Superior Court, Guilford County, where the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted as to the defendants' affirmative defenses, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the absolute privilege, which protects individuals from defamation claims for statements made in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, applied to the election protests. However, the court also introduced a "participation" requirement, stating that the privilege only applied to those who participated as a party, counsel, or witness in the proceeding.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The court held that the absolute privilege broadly protects all individuals involved in any aspect of election protests from defamation claims. The court rejected the "participation" requirement introduced by the Court of Appeals, stating that the privilege applies to the occasion, not the individual. The court concluded that the defendants were protected by the absolute privilege and were therefore entitled to summary judgment. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower court for dismissal with prejudice. View "Bouvier v. Porter" on Justia Law