Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a trooper, was dismissed from the State Highway Patrol for allegedly violating the Patrol’s truthfulness policy. The State Personnel Commission (SPC) concluded that Petitioner’s dismissal was supported by just cause. The superior court reversed, determining that Petitioner’s conduct did not provide just cause for dismissal and that the decision to dismiss Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the official who dismissed Petitioner proceeded under a misapprehension of the law that he had no discretion over the range of discipline he could administer; and (2) as such, by upholding the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety’s use of a per se rule of mandatory dismissal for all violations of a particular policy, the SPC failed to examine the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s individual case as required by the state’s jurisprudence. Remanded for a decision by the employing agency as to whether Petitioner should be dismissed based upon the facts of this case and without the application of a per se rule. View "Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 decennial census, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs, registered voters, filed a complaint seeking to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The three-judge panel reviewing the redistricting plans upheld the plans. The Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. The Supreme Court reconsidered this case in light of Alabama and affirmed the three-judge panel’s judgment, holding that the General Assembly’s enacted plans do not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and satisfy state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. Moreover, the three-judge panel’s decision fully complies with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

The Judicial Standards Commission entered a recommendation that Respondent James T. Hill, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376 for engaging in inappropriate conduct while presiding over divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. Based upon these findings and conclusions, which the Court adopted as its own, the Supreme Court concluded and adjudged that Respondent should be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Judge James T. Hill" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of eighty-four to 113 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a lesser-included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that it was bound by its decision in State v. Oliver, which held that unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a lesser-included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, claiming that Oliver was wrongly decided because that decision incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Nickerson. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the Oliver court misapprehended the Supreme Court’s decision in Nickerson, and therefore, Oliver is overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion; but (2) nevertheless, the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a lesser-included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as guardian ad litem for Jakari Baize, filed a complaint against Defendants, healthcare providers, alleging negligence in failing properly to treat Jakari for a severe case of jaundice that left him permanently disabled. After discovery had been conducted and certain expert witnesses had been deposed, Plaintiff dismissed all claims against all defendants without prejudice. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for an award of expert witness fees for the actual time that the experts Plaintiffs had designated spent testifying during their respective depositions as costs under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-305. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by awarding the expert witness fees as costs because Defendants were statutorily required to subpoena the expert witnesses as a prerequisite for obtaining such relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the General Assembly eliminated the traditional subpoena requirement associated with the taxing of certain expert witness fees as costs in civil actions; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly taxed expert witness fees in accordance with section 7A-305(d)(11) against Plaintiff. View "Lassiter v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc." on Justia Law

Landowner sought to develop a townhouse community on residential property and obtained a zoning permit to develop the townhouses. Petitioner appealed the Zoning Officer’s formal determination to the Warren County Board of Adjustment. The Board overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision and revoked the zoning permit issued to Landowner. Landowner and Warren County subsequently entered into a consent order agreeing that the zoning permit would be reinstated. A Zoning Officer then issued a determination that the subject property was not restricted by Warren County Zoning Ordinances. Petitioner appealed the Zoning Officer’s determination. The Zoning Officer, however, did not place Petitioner’s appeal on the Board’s agenda. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in superior court, requesting that the court compel Respondents to place his appeal on the Board’s next available agenda for a hearing. The court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Zoning Officer had a mandatory statutory duty to transmit Petitioner’s appeal to the Board and the Petitioner had a right to have its appeal placed on the Board’s agenda. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a zoning officer may not refuse to transmit an appeal from his own zoning determining to the county board of adjustment for its review. View "Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for accessing a commercial social networking Web site as a registered sex offender in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-202.5. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 14-202.5 is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the statute violates the First Amendment and thus is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 14-202.5 is constitutional on its face, is constitutional as applied to Defendant, and is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "State v. Packingham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was assured by Bank that he would qualify for and receive a small business, government-backed loan. After Plaintiff was notified that no government-backed loan was available and aware that he had various potential causes of action against Bank, Plaintiff nonetheless sought and obtained a new commercial loan from the Bank and subsequently expressly waived all offsets and defenses. More than six years after Plaintiff first became aware that no government-backed loan was available, he filed a complaint alleging that he obtained the commercial loan in reliance upon the Bank’s representation that the government-backed loan was forthcoming. Bank raised the statutes of limitation as an affirmative defense and filed a compulsory counterclaim to collect on the amount owed on the commercial loan. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff chose to obtain a new commercial loan after learning no government-backed loan was available and repeatedly reaffirmed his obligations under the commercial loan and expressly waived any offsets and defenses to the loan and against Bank. Remanded. View "Ussery v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

A Bank issued two loans to an LLC guaranteed by two Guarantors. After the LLC defaulted, the Bank sued the LLC and the Guarantors for the outstanding indebtedness. Plaintiff then sold the properties at a foreclosure proceeding at which it was the sole bidder. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed all claims against the Bank. The Guarantors moved to join the LLC as a defendant in the action. The trial court entered an order ruling that joinder of the LLC was appropriate. The court then entered summary judgment against the Guarantors on the issue of their liability for payment of the deficiency. The LLC and the Guarantors then amended their answers to assert the anti-deficiency defense set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.36. After a trial, the court reduced the Guarantors’ liability pursuant to section 45-21.36, concluding that once the LLC was joined as a party, the Guarantors were entitled to benefit from the LLC’s use of section 45-21.36. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LLC was properly joined in this case; and (2) irrespective of the LLC’s presence in the litigation, the non-mortgagor Guarantors were entitled to raise the anti-deficiency defense. View "High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with impaired driving. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. At the suppression hearing held before Judge Abraham Jones, a material conflict in the evidence arose from a disagreement between two expert witnesses. Judge Jones orally granted Defendant’s motion but was not able to sign a proposed written order reflecting his decision before his term of office expired. Defendant subsequently presented the proposed order to Judge Orlando Hudson. Judge Hudson granted Defendant’s motion to suppress without hearing any evidence himself, finding that Defendant’s expert was credible and that no probable cause existed to support Defendant’s arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the oral ruling rendered by Judge Jones without reaching the State’s contention that Judge Hudson was without authority to sign the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-977 requires the judge who presides at the suppression hearing to make the findings of fact necessary to decide the motion; and (2) in this case, although a second judge made the findings of fact necessary to resolve the material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, he did so without hearing any evidence himself, and therefore, a new suppression hearing was required. View "State v. Bartlett" on Justia Law