Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was assured by Bank that he would qualify for and receive a small business, government-backed loan. After Plaintiff was notified that no government-backed loan was available and aware that he had various potential causes of action against Bank, Plaintiff nonetheless sought and obtained a new commercial loan from the Bank and subsequently expressly waived all offsets and defenses. More than six years after Plaintiff first became aware that no government-backed loan was available, he filed a complaint alleging that he obtained the commercial loan in reliance upon the Bank’s representation that the government-backed loan was forthcoming. Bank raised the statutes of limitation as an affirmative defense and filed a compulsory counterclaim to collect on the amount owed on the commercial loan. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff chose to obtain a new commercial loan after learning no government-backed loan was available and repeatedly reaffirmed his obligations under the commercial loan and expressly waived any offsets and defenses to the loan and against Bank. Remanded. View "Ussery v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

A Bank issued two loans to an LLC guaranteed by two Guarantors. After the LLC defaulted, the Bank sued the LLC and the Guarantors for the outstanding indebtedness. Plaintiff then sold the properties at a foreclosure proceeding at which it was the sole bidder. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed all claims against the Bank. The Guarantors moved to join the LLC as a defendant in the action. The trial court entered an order ruling that joinder of the LLC was appropriate. The court then entered summary judgment against the Guarantors on the issue of their liability for payment of the deficiency. The LLC and the Guarantors then amended their answers to assert the anti-deficiency defense set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.36. After a trial, the court reduced the Guarantors’ liability pursuant to section 45-21.36, concluding that once the LLC was joined as a party, the Guarantors were entitled to benefit from the LLC’s use of section 45-21.36. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LLC was properly joined in this case; and (2) irrespective of the LLC’s presence in the litigation, the non-mortgagor Guarantors were entitled to raise the anti-deficiency defense. View "High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with impaired driving. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. At the suppression hearing held before Judge Abraham Jones, a material conflict in the evidence arose from a disagreement between two expert witnesses. Judge Jones orally granted Defendant’s motion but was not able to sign a proposed written order reflecting his decision before his term of office expired. Defendant subsequently presented the proposed order to Judge Orlando Hudson. Judge Hudson granted Defendant’s motion to suppress without hearing any evidence himself, finding that Defendant’s expert was credible and that no probable cause existed to support Defendant’s arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the oral ruling rendered by Judge Jones without reaching the State’s contention that Judge Hudson was without authority to sign the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-977 requires the judge who presides at the suppression hearing to make the findings of fact necessary to decide the motion; and (2) in this case, although a second judge made the findings of fact necessary to resolve the material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, he did so without hearing any evidence himself, and therefore, a new suppression hearing was required. View "State v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Georgia, entered into an employment contract with Employer. Plaintiff was in South Carolina when he signed the offer letter. Plaintiff later transferred to Employer's Charlotte, North Carolina division, but Plaintiff never had a route that involved any deliveries in North Carolina during his employment with Employer. After Plaintiff received a work-related injury, Plaintiff began receiving disability and medical compensation according to Georgia law. Plaintiff later filed a claim for benefits with the North Carolina Industrial Commission. The Commission concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s transfer to Employer’s Charlotte division involved a modification of Plaintiff’s employment contract, and that the modification was a proper basis to find the contract was “made” within North Carolina for purposes of establishing the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-36, which authorizes compensation pursuant to North Carolina law if an individual’s employment contract was “made” in North Carolina, does not apply to a contract initially made in another state and subsequently modified in North Carolina. View "Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felonious larceny, misdemeanor injury to personal property, first degree trespass, and misdemeanor possession of stolen property. The convictions stemmed from an incident in which police officers stopped Defendant’s vehicle while he was driving on the campus of the North Carolina State University (NCSU) and discovered copper wire taken from an electrical substation on campus. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the injury to personal property charge because the information filed failed to allege that NCSU and “NCSU High Voltage Distribution” were legal entities capable of owning property. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction for the injury to personal property charge, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the charge because the information failed to allege that NCSU High Voltage Distribution was capable of owning property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a criminal pleading alleges that injury to personal property was committed against multiple entities, at least one of which is capable of owning property, that pleading is not facially invalid. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

An investigation that began with an anonymous complaint to police led to a search of Defendant’s home. The police applied for and received a warrant to search the apartment. When the warrant was executed, the officers discovered controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm and ammunition. Defendant was arrested and indicted for drug trafficking, drug possession, and firearm charges. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his residence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant later pleaded guilty to several charges. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the the totality of circumstances, the evidence described in the affidavit was sufficient to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause to search Defendant’s apartment. View "State v. McKinney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two private corporations, sought a copy of the Automated Criminal/Infraction System database via the state’s Public Records Act (Act). The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) declined to produce an index of the ACIS database and declined to provide a copy of the ACIS. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking an order requiring production of the requested materials and seeking a declaration that the ACIS database is a public document or public information as defined in the Act. The trial court granted judgment for Defendants on their responsive pleadings and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed as to the AOC, concluding that ACIS is a public record subject to disclosure under the Act and that the AOC was the custodian of the ACIS. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-109(d), addressing “remote electronic access” to court records, is a more specific statute that overrides applicability of the Act in this case; and (2) the legislature intended that remote electronic access to the ACIS be available solely through nonexclusive contracts, as provided in section 7A-109(d). Remanded. View "LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt., Inc. v. N.C. Admin. Office of Courts" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife, Michelle Young. The court of appeals vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court had committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence concerning a complaint that had been filed and default judgments that had been entered in two actions - a wrongful death and declaratory judgment action that had been brought against Defendant by the executrix of Ms. Young’s estate and a complaint that had been filed in an action in which members of Ms. Young’s family sought to obtain custody of Emily, the daughter of Defendant and the victim, from Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by awarding Defendant a new trial based upon the admission of the challenged evidence. Remanded for consideration of Defendant’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s judgment. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an adult relative who supervises a child during a sleepover is a “caretaker” of that child under section 7B-101(3) of the Juvenile Code. R.R.N. was abused by Mr. B., a relative, when she spent the night at his house along with his wife and three children. The Wilson County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition alleging that R.R.N. was an abused and neglected juvenile, stating that Mr. B. was R.R.N.’s “caretaker” when R.R.N. spent a single night at his house. Respondent, R.R.N.’s mother, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Code did not apply because Mr. B. was not R.R.N.’s caretaker. The trial court disagreed and adjudicated R.R.N. to be an abused and neglected juvenile, thereby allowing the court to assume authority over R.R.N. and her family. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mr. B. was not R.R.N.’s “caretaker,” as contemplated by section 7B-101(e), when he sexually abused her, and therefore, the trial court erred in adjudicating R.R.N. an abused and neglected juvenile. View "In re R.R.N." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, second-degree burglary, and first-degree murder under the felony murder rule. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and ordered that Defendant receive a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a threatening voice mail message left by one of Defendant’s sisters for a different sister and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s ruling that the probative value of the voice mail message was outweighed by other concerns under N.C. R. Evid. 403 was not “manifestly unsupported by reason.” View "State v. Triplett" on Justia Law