Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the order of the trial court requiring Father’s consent before proceeding with the adoption of a minor child (Child), holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s order. Specifically, the Court held (1) as a matter of law, Father’s evidence did not establish that he made reasonable and consistent payments for the support of Mother or Child before the filing of the adoption petition; and (2) therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s order requiring Father’s consent. View "In re Adoption of C.H.M." on Justia Law

There was sufficient evidence of restraint that was separate and apart from that inherent in the commission of Defendant’s first-degree sexual offense to support Defendant's second-degree kidnapping conviction.Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including felonious breaking or entering, first-degree sexual offense, second-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury, and intimidating a witness. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction for second-degree kidnapping, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that any restraint was separate and apart from the force necessary to facilitate the sex offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence of the element of restraint that was separate and apart from that inherent in the commission of the sex offense. View "State v. China" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 412(b)(2) where other evidence showed that Defendant was not infected with those STDs.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of STDs because its inclusion would have made sexual contact between the complainant and Defendant less likely, thereby qualifying for the Rule 412(b)(2) exception. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the exception was not applicable in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s offer of proof indicated that the STD evidence fell within the Rule 412(b)(2) exception, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in ruling that there was no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The General Assembly intended for N.C. Gen. Stat. 9-95(e)(3) of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, which provides that a Class 1 misdemeanor “shall be punished as a Class I felon[y]” when the misdemeanant has committed a previous offense punishable under the Act, to establish a separate felony offense rather than merely to serve as a sentence enhancement of the underlying misdemeanor.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to a marijuana possession charge, acknowledged his prior convictions in violation of the Act, and admitted his habitual felon status. Although the marijuana possession charge was a Class 1 misdemeanor, the judge treated it as a Class I felony because of the prior conviction. Because of Defendant’s habitual felon status, the court punished the Class I felony as a Class E felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the substantive offense remained a class 1 misdemeanor, and consequently, Defendant’s habitual felon status could not be used to further enhance a sentence that was not itself a substantive offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly elevated Defendant’s possession of marijuana offense and then correctly punished that substantive Class I felony as a Class E felony on the basis of his habitual felon status. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

The trial court erroneously instructed the jury when it omitted the relevant stand-your-ground provision from its instructions on self-defense, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial with proper self-defense and stand-your-ground instructions.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s “omission of a jury instruction that a person confronted with deadly force has no duty to retreat but can stand his ground” was error, or plain error. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) by omitting the relevant stand-your-ground provision from the agreed-upon instructions on self-defense, the trial court’s jury instructions constituted preserved error; and (2) Defendant showed a reasonable possibility that, had the trial court included the stand-your-ground provision in its instructions, a different result would have been reached at trial. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs failed to state claims for tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair and deceptive practices, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).After Plaintiffs asserted various causes of action against Defendants, including the "Metropolitan defendants" and "dancer defendants," the Metropolitan defendants and dancer defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The business court granted the motion to dismiss as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims except for the claims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages against the dancer defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to state valid claims for forties interference with contract, unfair and deceptive practices, and unjust enrichment against the Metropolitan defendants; (2) Plaintiffs failed to state valid claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and civil conspiracy against all defendants. View "Krawiec v. Manly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Respondent William Henry Shipley, a deputy commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons 1 and 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376.The Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Respondent be publicly reprimanded for engaging in conduct inappropriate to his office by wrecking his vehicle while driving under the influence of an impairing substance. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and supported the Commission’s conclusions of law; and (2) based upon these findings and conclusions and the Commission’s recommendation, Respondent should be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Inquiry Concerning a Deputy Commissioner, William Henry Shipley" on Justia Law

An indictment charging Defendant with obtaining property by false pretenses sufficiently identified the crime charge because it described the property obtained as “United States Currency” and named the items conveyed to obtain the money.Defendant was charged by indictment with, among other offenses, two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. The trial court found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions for two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, concluding that the indictment was fatally defective because the description of the property obtained fell short of the specificity required. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the indictment was facially valid because it gave Defendant reasonable notice of the charges against him and enabled him to prepare his defense; and (2) the state presented sufficient evidence of Defendant’s false representation that he owed the stolen property he conveyed. View "State v. Mostafavi" on Justia Law

A respondent such as the respondent in this case has a statutory right to a jury trial in an appeal of an Asheville Civil Service Board (Board) decision to superior court.Appellant Robert Frost, a police officer in the Asheville Police Department, was terminated for his alleged use of excessive force against a citizen. Frost appealed his determination to the Board. The Board concluded that Appellant’s termination was not justified and that his termination should be rescinded. The City then filed a petition for a trial de novo in the superior court to determine whether officer Frost’s termination was justified. Appellant filed a timely response to the petition requesting a jury trial. The City moved to strike the request claiming that Appellant had no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial. The superior court denied the City’s motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to section 8(g) of the Asheville Civil Service Law, a respondent may demand a jury trial in a superior court appeal of a Board decision. View "City of Asheville v. Frost" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were entitled to seek compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 40A-51 based upon the extended flooding of their property as a result of actions taken by the City of Boiling Spring Lakes for an allegedly private purpose.The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, which concluded that Plaintiffs had proven their section 40A-51 cause of action because the City took a temporary easement in a portion of Plaintiffs’ property without filing a complaint containing a declaration of taking. In reversing, the court of appeals ruled that there can be no inverse condemnation when property is not taken for a public purpose. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a property owner seeking to assert a statutory inverse condemnation claim under section 40A-51 need not show that the condemnor acted to further a public purpose. View "Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes" on Justia Law