Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court made and relied upon findings of fact that were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in analyzing Mother's reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children.On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court made and relied upon finding of fact that were unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in assessing her reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that Mother had not made reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children's removal and that the children were likely to suffer neglect in the future. View "In re D.W.P" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the business court finding that the policy was unambiguous and dismissing Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, holding that the term actual cash value (ACV) is not susceptible to more than one meaning and unambiguously includes the depreciation of labor.The policy at issue in this case failed explicitly to provide that labor depreciation will be deducted when calculating the ACV of the damaged property. Plaintiff's home was insured by Defendant when the home was damaged by a storm. Defendant calculated the ACV by reducing the estimated cost of repair by depreciation of property and labor. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to represent a class of all North Carolina residents to whom Defendant paid ACV payments where the cost of labor was depreciated. The business court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the insurance policy unambiguously allowed for depreciation of the costs of labor and materials. View "Accardi v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Respondent Michael A. Stone, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 16A, be censured for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Laws 7A-376, holding that the Judicial Standards Commission's findings were adequately supported by clear and convincing evidence and supported the Commission's conclusions of law.The Commission filed a statement of charges against Respondent alleging that he had engaged in conduct inappropriate to his judicial office by, among other things, demonstrating a lack of respect for the office and by making a number of misleading and grossly negligent assertions regarding his representation of a former client. Based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission recommended that the Supreme Court censure Respondent. After weighing the severity of Respondent's misconduct against his candor and cooperation, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's recommended censure was appropriate. View "In re Stone" on Justia Law

In this action asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud the Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion to stay proceedings under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-75.12 on forum non conveniens grounds and denied as moot all other requested relief, holding that the balance of all relevant factors showed it would be more convenient for the parties to litigate these claims in England. Plaintiff, a Swiss biopharmaceutical company, sued an English contract research organization and its North Carolina-based parent, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. Defendants filed, among other pre-answer motions, a motion seeking to stay the proceedings under section 1-72.12. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion to stay and denied as moot all other requested relief, holding that, after considering the convenience of witnesses, ease of access to sources of proof, applicable law, and local interest factors, this case should be stayed on forum non conveniens grounds because Defendants showed that a substantial injustice would result if this case were to proceed in North Carolina and that England was a convenient, reasonable, and fair place of trial. View "Cardiorentis AG v. Iqvia Ltd." on Justia Law

In this action arising out of an alleged breach of a professional services agreement (PSA) between Vizant Technologies, LLC and YRC Worldwide Inc. the Supreme Court concluded that YRC's motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part, holding that partial summary judgment should be granted in YRC's favor on the issue of certain damages involving automated clearing house (ACH) batch payments.Vizant sought declaratory and injunctive relief against YRC as well as damages for breach of the PSA, claiming that it was owed outstanding fees for savings that YRC allegedly realized through successful efforts to pay using ACH rather than credit cards. Vizant argued that the PSA required YRC to pay a fee to Vizant because YRC realized savings as a result of the strategies identified by Vizant. YRC, however, argued that it did not owe Vizant a fee because Vizant's suggestions did not actually cause YRC to change business practices and realize savings. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part YRC's motion for summary judgment, holding (1) Vizant failed to produce evidence to support its claimed ACH damages; and (2) YRC's summary judgment motion is denied with regard to Vizant's breach of contract claim. View "Vizant Techs., LLC v. YRC Worldwide, Inc" on Justia Law

In this tax dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the final decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) entering summary judgment in favor of Graybar Electric Company, Inc., holding that dividends deducted on a corporation's federal corporate income tax return under the dividends-received deduction (DRD) of section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code do constitute "income not taxable" for purposes of calculating the corporation's net economic loss (NEL) deduction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-130.8(a) for North Carolina corporate income tax purposes.The Department found that the dividends received constituted "income not taxable" and that, therefore, Graybar was required to reduce its NEL deductions by the amount of the dividends apportioned to North Carolina. On appeal, (OAH) entered summary judgment for Graybar, holding that the dividends were taxable as a matter of law and were not "income not taxable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the dividends deducted pursuant too I.R.C. 243(a)(3) were "income not taxable" under section 105-130.8(a)(3); and (2) therefore, Graybar failed to bring itself within the statutory provisions authorizing the NEL deduction calculation it sought. View "North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Graybar Electric Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals vacating a judgment entered by the superior court convicting Defendant of indecent exposure and remanding for a new trial, holding that there was no error in Defendant's conviction.The court of appeals ordered a new trial in this case, concluding that the trial court should have instructed the jury that to find that Defendant's exposure was in the "presence" of someone under the age of sixteen as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-190.9 the State must show that the victim could have seen the exposure had she looked and that the failure to give the instruction was reversible error. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that the exposure be "in the presence of" the victim does not require a jury to find that the victim could have seen the exposed private parts had she looked; and (2) the evidence established that the proximity of the exposure to the victim was sufficiently close that a jury could find it was in the child's presence. View "State v. Hoyle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her four children, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights based upon her willful failure to pay a reasonable amount of the cost of care for the children during their placement in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(3).The court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights on the bases of neglect, willfully leaving the children in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during their placement in the custody of the Department of Social Services. The court also concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings fully supported the trial court's conclusion that one ground existed to terminate parental rights, and therefore, this Court need not address Mother's arguments challenging the remaining grounds. View "In re S.E." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on justification as a defense for the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, holding that the failure to give such an instruction was prejudicial, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial.The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on justification as a defense to possession of a firearm by a felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err by recognizing the availability of a common law justification defense for a possession of a firearm by a felon charge and by prescribing the factors set forth in United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000), as the framework within which to determine whether the trial court erred by failing to present the defense to the jury; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of each Deleveaux factor to require a justification instruction be given to the jury, and the failure to give that instruction was prejudicial. View "State v. Mercer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions but modified the court of appeals' decision because the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the definition of "sexual act" under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-27.1(4).A jury found Defendant guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child, guilty of felony child abuse by sexual act, and not guilty of first-degree statutory sexual offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error in defining "sexual act" and did not accurately define the phrase in the context of felony child abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-318.4(a2). The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury according to the definition of "sexual act" contained in section 14-27.1(4) but that the trial court's error did not amount to plain error. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the meaning of "sexual act" according to the definition found in section 14-27.1(4). View "State v. Alonzo" on Justia Law