Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the trial court did not err in its determination.Mother filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights on the grounds that the child was born out of wedlock, Father failed to provide substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to Mother and the child, and that Father had willfully abandoned the child. The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on willful abandonment and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly appointed a guardian ad litem for the child; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. View "In re C.J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights.The Pitt County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father, alleging four grounds to terminate his parental rights. The district court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on all of the grounds alleged in the petition. The district court further concluded that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights. View "In re N.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court holding that the City of Asheville improperly denied an application for the issuance of a conditional use permit submitted by PHG Asheville, LLC seeking authorization to construct a hotel in downtown Asheville, holding that the City lacked the authority to deny the requested conditional use permit.The trial court determined that PHG was entitled to the issuance of the requested conditional use permit because the City had improperly concluded that PHG failed to present competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that the proposed hotel satisfied the standards of a conditional use permit set out in the City's unified development ordinance. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PHG presented competent, material, and substantial evidence that the proposed hotel satisfied the relevant conditional use permit standards set out in the City's unified development ordinance. View "PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

In this dispute concerning the manner in which the cost of pensions for certain retirees should be funded, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) rulemaking procedures bind how the Retirement System's Board of Trustees adopt "cap factors" under the anti-pension spiking provision at issue in this case.In order to calculate the retirement benefit cap applicable to each retiree, the Act to Enact Anti-Pension-Spiking Legislation by Establishing a Contribution-Based Benefit Cap directs the Retirement System's Board of Trustees to adopt a contribution-based benefit cap factor recommended by an actuary, which the Board had traditionally adopted by resolution. Here, the Retirement System determined that Dr. Barry Shepherd's pension benefits were subject the contribution-based benefit cap. The trial court concluded that the Board of Trustees' adoption of the cap factor was void because the action was subject to rulemaking under the APA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board of Trustees was required to adopt the statutorily mandated cap factor utilizing the rulemaking procedures required by the APA; and (2) the Retirement System erred by billing the Board of Education an additional amount relating to Dr. Shepherd's pension, in light of the Board of Trustees' failure to adopt the necessary cap factor in an appropriate manner. View "Cabarrus County Board of Education v. Department of State Treasurer" on Justia Law

In this complaint seeking to have the Attorney General preliminarily and permanently enjoined from distributing monies received pursuant to an agreement between the Attorney General and Smithfield Foods, Inc. and several of its subsidiaries regarding the operation of hog farms to any recipient other than the Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund, the Supreme Court held that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of N.C. Const. art. IX, 7.In their complaint, Plaintiffs argued that payments made pursuant to the agreement constituted penalties under article IX, section 7 and that the Attorney General lacked the authority to enter into the agreement. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General, concluding that even if Smithfield and its subsidiaries had entered into the agreement in hope of avoiding future penalties, the payments made under the agreement were not penalties, forfeitures or fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of article IX, section 7. View "New Hanover County Board of Education v. Stein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights in his minor child, holding that the trial court did not err by concluding that Father's parental rights were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1).Youth and Family Services filed a motion seeking to have Father's parental rights to his child terminated on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving her in foster care or a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to her removal from the home. The trial court terminated Father's parental rights on both of the grounds alleged in the termination motion and concluded that termination of Father's parental rights would be in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by concluding that his parental rights to the child were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect. View "In re S.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the trial court appropriately found grounds to terminate Father's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7).Mother filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights on the basis of willful abandonment and Father's failure to pay child support. The trial court entered an order determining that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights on the basis of willful abandonment and concluding that it was in the child's best interest that Father's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by denying Father's motion to dismiss the petition and by terminating his parental rights on the basis of willful abandonment. View "In re B.C.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting the petition filed by Mother for the termination of Father's parental rights, holding that the trial court appropriately found grounds to terminate Father's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7).After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Father's parental rights, concluding that Father had willfully abandoned the child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7) and such abandonment justified termination and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's findings supported its adjudication under section 7B-1111(a)(7); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the child's best interest would be served by the termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re K.N.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father and Mother's parental rights to their two children, holding that the trial court did not err in its decision.The Department of Social Services filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother (together, Respondents) on grounds of neglect and willfully leaving the children in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Respondents' parental rights and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Respondents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that terminating Respondents' rights was in the children's best interests. View "In re Z.A.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment for the Town of Pinebluff, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Session Law 1999-35 required Moore County to approve Pinebluff's expansion request.Session Law 1999-35 amended North Carolina's extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-360, as it pertained to Pinebluff. After Pinebluff annexed land extending beyond the town's corporate boundaries, Pinebluff requested that the Moore County Board of Commissioners adopt a resolution to authorize the expansion of Pinebluff's ETJ two miles beyond the annexed boundary, pursuant to section 160A-360. The Board denied the request. Pinebluff filed a complaint against Moore County seeking a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pinebluff and directed Moore County to adopt a resolution authorizing Pinebluff to exercise its ETJ within the proposed area. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between subsections (e) and (f) of section 160A-360, as modified by Session Law 1999-35, and that subsection (e) prohibits Pinebluff from extending its ETJ into the requested areas within an agreement between Pinebluff and Moore County. View "Town of Pinebluff v. Moore County" on Justia Law