Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing a superior court order, holding that Defendant failed to meet the required condition of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-269(a) that postconviction DNA testing of certain biological evidence was material to his defense, and Defendant further failed to satisfy his lesser burden to show under section 15A-269(c) that DNA testing may be material to his claim of wrongful conviction.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Defendant later filed a pro se motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to section 15A-269. The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming and that Defendant failed to show how conducting additional DNA testing was material to his defense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of an order appointing counsel to assist Defendant in which Defendant would attempt to establish the level of materiality required to obtain DNA testing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not satisfy the necessary conditions to obtain the appointment of counsel under section 15A-269(c). View "State v. Byers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, holding that Defendant failed to prove that his appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and being a habitual felon. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, Defendant asserted that appellate counsel's failure to cite State v. Pakulski, 356 S.E.2d 319 (N.C. 1987), amounted to ineffective assistance. After a successful appeal and remand, the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to make arguments under Pakulski. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the precedent established in Pakulski did not govern the instant case and that appellate counsel's failure to rely on Pakulski was objectively reasonable. View "State v. Collington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights.After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights, concluding that three grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interests. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that terminating Mother's rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court agreed, holding termination of Mother's rights was in the child's best interest. View "In re S.J.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals holding that Plaintiff failed properly to plead administrative negligence under N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.11(2)(b), holding that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on pain and suffering damages.Plaintiff failed a complaint for medical negligence against Defendant, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned verdicts finding that the decedent's death was caused by Defendant's negligence and negligent performance of administrative duties. The court of appeals reversed in part, vacated in part, and granting a new trial in part, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's award for pain and suffering, and (2) Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead administrative negligence. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on pain and suffering damages; (2) Plaintiff was not required to plead a claim for administrative negligence separate from medical negligence; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial; and (4) the trial court did not err by granting Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on contributory negligence. View "Estate of Savino v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court dismissing Defendant's motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in which Defendant asserted claims under the Racial Justice Act (RJA), holding that the retroactive application of the 2012 amended RJA and the 2013 repeal of the RJA violates the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.The trial court dismissed Defendant's MAR, concluding that it was voided by the repeal of the RJA. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for the reinstatement of Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding (1) the retroactivity provision of the RJA repeal violated the double jeopardy protections of the North Carolina Constitution; (2) the judgment sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a final judgment, and therefore, double jeopardy barred further review; and (3) the retroactive application of the RJA repeal violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Augustine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case for a new trial on an assault charge and vacating the judgment convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and remanding for entry of judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give his proffered jury instructions and that the proper remedy for this prejudicial error was to remand the case for a new trial on all charges.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule with an assault charge as the underlying felony. The court of appeals determined that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not instructing the jury on self-defense with regard to the assault charge and granted a new trial on the assault charge. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the failure to give the proposed instructions prejudiced Defendant and that Defendant should receive a new trial on all charges. View "State v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his two children on the ground of willful abandonment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father's parental rights.Mother filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights in both children on the grounds of willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care and willful abandonment. The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on willful abandonment and that termination was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings of fact supported the trial court's conclusion that Father willfully abandoned the children. View "In re J.D.C.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights in her daughter, holding that the issues raised by Mother and her counsel were meritless.The district court adjudicated grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), concluding that Mother had previously rejected the child and that there remained a high probability of the repetition of neglect. The court further concluded that a terminating Mother's rights was in the child's best interests. Mother appealed from the termination order, and her counsel filed a no-merit brief on her behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination order contained sufficient findings of fact to establish the existence of a statutory ground of neglect for terminating Mother's parental rights and that the district court judge did not abuse her discretion by concluding that it was in the child's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. View "In re J.A.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Business Court dismissing Defendant's crossclaims against a co-defendant, holding that the Business Court correctly dismissed the crossclaims.This appeal arose from litigation between Kenneth Nelson, Alliance Hospitality Management, LLC, and Orlando Residence, Ltd. Orlando filed this lawsuit against Alliance and Nelson seeking recovery of funds that Alliance allegedly wrongfully transferred. Nelson, appearing pro se, filed a document in which he asserted eighteen crossclaims against Alliance seeking damages and various forms of equitable relief. The Business Court dismissed the claims asserted by Orlando and all of Nelson's crossclaims. Nelson appealed, arguing that the Business Court incorrectly ruled that a crossclaim asserted by one defendant against a co-defendant automatically ceases to be viable once the plaintiff's original claims against the defendants are dismissed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) with the exception of certain crossclaims, the dismissal of the original action does not, by itself, mandate the dismissal of a crossclaim so long as the crossclaim meets the Rule 13(g) prerequisites for bringing such a claim; and (2) because res judicata barred Nelson's "qualifying claims," the dismissal of Nelson's remaining fifteen crossclaims was proper. View "Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hospitality Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the General Assembly did not intend for the means of proof mentioned in the Habitual Felons Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-7.4, to be exclusive, holding that the methods of proof listed in section 14-7.4 are not exclusive.Defendant was indicted on charges of interfering with an electronic monitoring device and attaining the status of habitual felon. Defendant was found guilty of interfering with an electronic monitoring device. During the habitual felon phase of the trial, the court introduced into evidence a computer printout from the Automated Criminal / Infraction System (ACIS) showing that Defendant had been convicted of felonious breaking and entering. The jury found that Defendant had attained the status of a habitual felon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the ACIS printout as proof of his prior conviction for the purpose of establishing that he was a habitual felon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 14-7.4 is permissive, rather than mandatory, with respect to the issue of how a defendant's prior convictions may be established and that such convictions may be proven by means of any admissible evidence. View "State v. Waycaster" on Justia Law