Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of bar owners and operators in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders initially required bars to close statewide, then imposed restrictions that effectively prevented them from operating, such as prohibiting onsite consumption of alcohol and limiting service to outdoor areas only. Some bars could not reopen at all due to lack of outdoor space, while others found the restrictions made operation unprofitable. The restrictions lasted for approximately nine months, during which time the plaintiffs allege they were forced to remain closed or operate at a loss.After the Governor allowed bars to fully reopen, the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Carteret County, alleging that the executive orders violated their fundamental rights to earn a living under the North Carolina Constitution. They sought damages and other relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the constitutional claims to proceed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated colorable constitutional claims and that sovereign immunity did not bar their action.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that, under established precedent, plaintiffs may bring direct constitutional claims against the state when they allege a violation of their rights and lack an adequate alternative remedy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could support violations of their rights to earn a living under the Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause. The Court also clarified that plaintiffs are not required to plead that they seek the least intrusive remedy at this stage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "Howell v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Philip Morris USA, Inc., a Virginia-based corporation doing business in North Carolina, was assessed additional franchise taxes by the North Carolina Department of Revenue for tax years 2012–2014. The Department determined that Philip Morris had improperly deducted certain debts from its capital base, as the debtor corporations were not subject to North Carolina’s franchise tax, contrary to the requirements of the relevant statute. After exhausting administrative remedies, Philip Morris petitioned the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a contested case hearing, arguing that the statute, as applied to it, violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the OAH rejected the Department’s argument that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Philip Morris’s constitutional claim and granted summary judgment in favor of Philip Morris, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. The Department sought judicial review, and the case was assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. The Business Court reversed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes, reasoning that such challenges must be heard by the judiciary, not administrative agencies, and that the relevant statutes did not confer such jurisdiction on the OAH.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s decision de novo. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 105-241.17 does not grant the OAH subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes. The Court reasoned that the power to rule on the constitutionality of statutes is reserved for the judiciary, and the statute’s language and legislative intent did not clearly confer such authority on the OAH. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Business Court’s order reversing the OAH’s decision and remanding the case for dismissal. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, responsible for training and certifying school bus drivers, was terminated after admitting to recertifying five bus drivers without conducting the required ride-along observations. The Department asserted that this conduct violated a criminal statute, N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1, which makes it a felony for an employee to knowingly enter false information concerning a driver’s license or special identification card into department records, and mandates dismissal for such violations. The Department argued that the false information about school bus driver certificates fell within the statute’s scope.The employee challenged his termination before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the statute did not apply because the information at issue concerned school bus driver certificates, not driver’s licenses, and concluded that the Department failed to prove just cause for termination. The Department appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since a school bus driver must have both a commercial driver’s license and a school bus driver’s certificate, false information about the certificate was “concerning a driver’s license,” especially since the information was entered into the same database as driver’s license records. The Court of Appeals did not address the just cause issue, finding the statutory violation dispositive.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified that courts must apply de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation, expressly rejecting any rule requiring deference to agency interpretations of state statutes. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1 does not apply to false information concerning school bus driver certificates, as the statute is limited to driver’s licenses and special identification cards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Savage v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were business associates who sought to purchase three restaurants known as Jib Jab. Plaintiff, with a background in investing, initiated negotiations and sought a partner with restaurant experience, leading to an oral agreement with defendant. Plaintiff was to handle acquisition terms and financing, while defendant would manage operations. No written partnership agreement was executed. Both parties made several unsuccessful attempts to secure financing, including SBA loans, but neither was willing to personally guarantee the loan, and plaintiff refused to pay off defendant’s unrelated SBA debts. Eventually, defendant proceeded alone, secured financing, and purchased Jib Jab through an entity he formed, without plaintiff’s involvement.Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging the formation of a common law partnership and asserting direct and derivative claims against defendant and the purchasing entity, including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, misappropriation of business opportunity, and requests for judicial dissolution and accounting. Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, resulting in dismissal of all derivative claims, certain direct claims, and claims for constructive trust. The remaining claims were plaintiff’s direct claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and claims for judicial dissolution and accounting.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims, holding that North Carolina law does not permit derivative actions by a general partner on behalf of a general partnership. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of conclusory tortious interference claims and upheld the Business Court’s decision to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and disregard an unsworn expert report. Finally, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that no partnership existed due to lack of agreement on material terms, and that plaintiff failed to show he could have completed the purchase but for defendant’s actions. View "Cutter v. Vojnovic" on Justia Law

Dr. Bruce Cairns, a division chief in the Department of Surgery and Medical Director of the Jaycee Burn Center at UNC Hospitals, was sued by Dr. James Hwang, a former surgeon at the UNC Burn Center. Dr. Hwang alleged that Dr. Cairns harassed him and created a hostile work environment, leading to his resignation. The case also involved a complaint filed with the UNC School of Medicine Human Resources Department, accusing Dr. Hwang of inappropriate behavior at a going-away party. Dr. Hwang claimed that Dr. Cairns falsely accused him of misconduct, including touching female coworkers inappropriately.The Superior Court of Durham County denied Dr. Cairns's motion to dismiss, finding that he was not entitled to public official immunity. The court also denied summary judgment, citing conflicting evidence about the origin of the Human Resources complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Dr. Cairns was a public official entitled to immunity and that Dr. Hwang did not provide sufficient evidence of malice.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that Dr. Cairns was not a public official entitled to public official immunity. The court found that his positions as division chief and Medical Director were not created by statute and did not involve the exercise of sovereign power. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the parties' outstanding arguments. View "Hwang v. Cairns" on Justia Law

Daniel Jones signed a blank application for a homeowner’s insurance policy, trusting his agent, J. Kim Hatcher Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Hatcher), to complete it accurately. Jones relied on Hatcher’s assurance based on their prior dealings and the commission Hatcher would earn. After Hurricane Florence destroyed Jones’s home, his insurer refused to cover the losses, citing material misrepresentations in the application. Jones discovered that Hatcher had omitted the existence of a pond and understated the property size.Jones sued Hatcher for negligence and gross negligence, among other claims. Hatcher moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing contributory negligence. The trial court granted Hatcher’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that dismissal was not warranted as the complaint did not necessarily defeat Jones’s claim for ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the dismissal of Jones’s claim for punitive damages.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Jones’s complaint did not show contributory negligence as a matter of law, as the factual circumstances could support that Jones acted with ordinary prudence in trusting Hatcher. The court also found that Jones’s complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for punitive damages based on Hatcher’s willful and wanton conduct, giving Hatcher adequate notice of the claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision on the contributory negligence issue and reversed its decision on the punitive damages issue. View "Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, Inc" on Justia Law

James Bowman was indicted for seven criminal offenses, including two counts of first-degree forcible sexual offense, after an incident involving S.B. on September 8, 2019. S.B. testified that Bowman, armed with a firearm, forced her to engage in various sexual acts, including anal intercourse and fellatio, against her will. Bowman was found guilty on all charges by a jury in his second trial.The Superior Court of Durham County sentenced Bowman to 365 to 498 months of active imprisonment. Bowman appealed, arguing that the trial court's jury instructions violated his right to a unanimous verdict. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, agreed with Bowman, finding that the trial court's instructions were erroneous and jeopardized his right to a unanimous verdict. The court ordered a new trial for the two counts of first-degree forcible sexual offense.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's jury instructions, when read as a whole, required a unanimous verdict and did not violate Bowman's right to a unanimous jury verdict. The court emphasized that the instructions clearly defined the elements of the offense and the need for unanimity. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Bowman's remaining arguments. View "State v. Bowman" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury after a shooting at a Raleigh motel. The defendant represented himself at trial and chose to be absent from the courtroom after his closing argument was cut off by the trial court. During jury deliberations, Juror #5 was excused for a medical appointment, and an alternate juror was substituted. The trial court instructed the jury to restart deliberations from the beginning. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder conviction and additional imprisonment for the assault conviction.The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations violated his state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed, holding that the substitution resulted in a jury of thirteen people, which violated the state constitution. The court vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial.The State sought discretionary review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which reviewed the constitutionality of the statute allowing mid-deliberation juror substitution. The Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a jury of twelve, as it required the jury to begin deliberations anew following the substitution. The court presumed that the jury followed the trial court's instructions to restart deliberations, ensuring that the verdict was rendered by a properly constituted jury of twelve. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Chambers" on Justia Law