Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial with respect to the issue of Defendant's guilt of the murder of his grandfather, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court's instruction that the jury was entitled to find that Defendant attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe as a deadly weapon did not constitute prejudicial error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the attempted first-degree murder of his mother, and the first degree murder of his grandfather on the basis of the felony-murder rule using attempted first-degree murder as the predicate felony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court did not err by instructing that the jury could find that Defendant's hands and arms constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of the felony-murder provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-17(a); but (2) the trial court's instruction concerning the use of the garden hoe as a deadly weapon during Defendant's alleged attempt to murder his mother constituted prejudicial error necessitating a new trial in the case in which Defendant was convicted of murdering his grandfather. View "State v. Steen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her two children, holding that, given the very limited inquiry inquiry that the trial court undertook before allowing Mother's counsel's withdrawal motion, the trial court erred by allowing that motion.During the termination proceedings, Mother retained Roy Dawson to represent her. Dawson later filed motions seeking leave to withdraw as Mother's counsel in the proceedings. The trial court granted the request without further inquiry. After a termination of parental rights hearing, Mother's parental rights were terminated. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry before allowing Dawson's withdrawal motion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court erred by allowing Mother's counsel to withdraw his representation of Mother without (1) making an adequate inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the making of that motion; and (2) inquiring, at the time Mother appeared at the termination hearing, whether she was represented by counsel, whether she wished to apply for court-appointed counsel, or whether she wished to represent herself. View "In re K.M.W." on Justia Law

In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals.After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. View "Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board" on Justia Law

In this dispute in which Plaintiffs sought reimbursement for healthcare costs based upon claims for restraint of trade and monopolization pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 75 and N.C. Const. art. I, 34, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the trial court deciding issues arising from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the trial court erred in part.Plaintiffs were a group of current and former North Carolina residents who were covered under the commercial health insurance obtained through the Hospital Authority, a non-profit corporation providing healthcare services with a principal place of business in Charlotte. The trial court granted the Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' restraint of trade and monopolization claims but denied the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' monopolization claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' Chapter 75 restraint of trade and monopolization claims; but (2) erred by denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to article I, section 34. View "DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Mother's parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests.The trial court concluded that Mother's parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's ultimate findings that there was current ongoing neglect and a likelihood of repetition of neglect were supported by the record evidence; and (2) the trial court's evidentiary and ultimate findings had sufficient record support. View "In re J.J.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding that trial court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings in favor of certain members of the North Carolina General Assembly and against the Governor of the State of North Carolina, holding that the General Assembly did not overstep its constitutional authority by appropriating the federal block grant money in a manner that differed from the Governor's preferred method for distributing the funds.In 2017, the Governor submitted a recommended budget to the General Assembly suggesting that funds derived from three specific federal block grant programs be spent in a particular manner. The General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 257, which became law as Session Law 2017-57. The Governor filed an amended complaint against certain legislative defendants challenging the constitutionality of the enacted state budget. The trial court granted the legislative defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the block grant funds at issue were subject to the General Assembly's appropriation authority; and (2) the enactment of Session Law 2017-57 did not violate the separation of powers or faithful execution clauses of the North Carolina State Constitution. View "Cooper v. Berger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision vacating a juvenile's adjudications for first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and a disposition order but reversed the court's holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile's attempted-larceny admission, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a new dispositional order as to that offense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by denying the juvenile's motions to dismiss second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and first-degree forcible sexual offense; (2) the trial court did not err by accepting the juvenile's admission of attempted larceny; (3) the level 3 disposition and commitment order entered by the trial court must be vacated; and (4) the matter cannot be remanded for the entry of a new disposition order because the trial court's jurisdiction terminated when the juvenile turned eighteen years old. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendations from the Judicial Standards Commission that Edwin D. Clontz, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District Twenty-Eight, be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission's findings and recommendation of public reprimand were appropriate.After a disciplinary hearing, the Commission made findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Supreme Court publicly reprimand Judge Clontz for conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission's findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and there was no error in the Commission's conclusions; and (2) Judge Clontz must be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Clontz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Court of Appeals Judge Hunter Murphy should be censured for violations of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376(b), holding that censure was appropriate.The Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Judge Murphy be censured based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law. After reviewing the record and transcript, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the judge's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and denigrated the reputation and integrity of the judiciary as a whole. Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Murphy be censured. View "In re Murphy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant in this medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant.Plaintiff went to the hospital complaining of slurred speech and numbness in her left arm. Defendant contacted Plaintiff's primary care physician and erroneously communicated that Plaintiff had no neurological deficits. Plaintiffs symptoms continued until she was admitted. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Defendant's negligence diminished her likelihood of full recovery, thus proximately causing her injury. At issue was whether Plaintiff's "loss of chance" at a better outcome following her stroke was a separate type of injury for which Plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting summary judgment for Defendant, holding that losing the chance for an increased opportunity for an improved outcome is not a cognizable and compensable claim in North Carolina. View "Parkes v. Hermann" on Justia Law