Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The case revolves around a dispute over a tract of land in North Carolina. The defendants, Wade and Teresa Cornett, have lived on the property since 1983 and purchased it in 1995. The deed showed a thirty-foot access easement along the western edges of the property, which the Cornetts had used for access to a road. Over the years, the Cornetts made various improvements in the easement, under the belief that they owned the property in the easement. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Joanne and William Hinman, purchased the land from the Churches, who had inherited it from Bennie Church, the Cornetts' former neighbor. The Hinmans commissioned a survey, which confirmed the existence of the easement on their land. They demanded the Cornetts remove the improvements built inside the easement and asserted that the Cornetts could not use the portion of the paved driveway falling outside the easement boundary. The Cornetts refused, and the Hinmans brought suit for trespass and to quiet title.The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hinmans on all claims. The Cornetts appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals opined that the Cornetts’ evidence showed open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious use of the disputed land for over twenty years. The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that the Cornetts’ use was permissive and tolled the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Cornetts’ evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the hostility of their possession of the land. The court found that the Cornetts’ mistaken belief of ownership and their permanent improvements on the property constituted evidence rebutting the presumption of permissive use. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hinman v. Cornett" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the custody of three children, Kelly, Amy, and Matt, who were taken into nonsecure custody by the Vance County Department of Social Services (DSS) due to their parents' issues with homelessness, mental health, and domestic violence. The children were initially placed in foster care and later with their paternal great aunt (Great Aunt). The trial court ordered an investigation into the possibility of placing the children with their maternal grandmother (Grandmother) who lived in Georgia. However, DSS did not initiate the out-of-state home study on Grandmother until November 2021, despite the court's order in February 2019.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant guardianship to Great Aunt, concluding that there was no obligation under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for a home study to be completed to rule out an out-of-state relative as a placement option. The Court of Appeals also vacated the order in part and remanded for reconsideration of the mother's visitation rights.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that trial courts are not necessarily required to wait on completion of a home study to rule out the placement with an out-of-state relative if the trial court concludes that an in-state relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision and the placement is in the best interest of the children. However, the court noted that in some scenarios, the best-interest determination may require the completion of an ICPC home study before the trial court can make a placement. The court also clarified that the ICPC does apply to an order granting guardianship to out-of-state grandparents. View "In re: K.B., A.M.H., M.S.H" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Joshua Reber, who was convicted for sexually abusing a young child. The child, K.W., testified in detail about the abuse, which began when she was eight years old. Reber admitted to taking K.W. into the woods alone at night without informing anyone but denied any sexual abuse. During his testimony, Reber also discussed his normal sexual relationships with adult women. The prosecutor cross-examined Reber about his text messages with a woman named Danielle, which indicated sexual encounters. Reber did not object to these questions.The jury found Reber guilty, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 300 to 420 months in prison. Reber appealed, arguing that the admission of his cross-examination testimony and the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were errors. The Court of Appeals reversed Reber’s convictions, holding that the introduction of the challenged evidence on cross-examination amounted to plain error and that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened on its own initiative.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the admission of the cross-examination testimony was not plain error and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were not so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Reber’s remaining arguments. View "State v. Reber" on Justia Law

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A group of media organizations and reporters sought copies of law enforcement recordings of a march in Graham, North Carolina. The Superior Court granted their petition, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order, arguing that the trial court failed to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request copies of the recordings under the statute. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not understand that it could place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, stating that anyone may seek copies of law enforcement recordings under the provision invoked by the petitioners, so the trial court had no reason to question their eligibility. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously believed that it could not condition or restrict the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not need to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request the recordings, but it did err in believing it could not place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings. View "In re The McClatchy Company, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2000, Betty J. Brown took title to a property in Charlotte, North Carolina. She obtained a loan from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation in 2004, secured by a deed of trust. In 2010, a judgment was entered against Brown in South Carolina, which was domesticated and recorded in North Carolina in 2014. In 2016, Brown refinanced the First Horizon loan with Nationstar Mortgage LLC, which paid off the remainder of the First Horizon loan. The deed of trust for the Nationstar loan was recorded after the 2010 judgment. MidFirst Bank is Nationstar’s successor in interest for the 2016 loan. In 2019, enforcement proceedings began against Brown to collect the 2010 judgment. The property was seized and sold at an execution sale, with Brown's daughter, Michelle Anderson, placing the successful bid.The trial court granted summary judgment to MidFirst Bank, asserting that the Nationstar deed of trust still encumbered the property even after the execution sale. The court also held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, allowing Nationstar to assume the rights and priorities of the First Horizon deed of trust. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the Nationstar lien was extinguished by the execution sale and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was not available to MidFirst Bank because it was not "excusably ignorant" of the publicly recorded judgment.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that it erred by applying the incorrect standard regarding equitable subrogation. The court held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applies when money is expressly advanced to extinguish a prior encumbrance and is used for this purpose. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to be remanded to the trial court for reassessment under the correct legal standard. View "MidFirst Bank v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over a contract between a plaintiff, Pamela Phillips, and the defendant, Charlotte Metro Credit Union. In 2014, Phillips opened a checking account with the Credit Union and agreed to a standard membership agreement. This agreement included a "Notice of Amendments" provision, which allowed the Credit Union to change the terms of the agreement upon notice to Phillips. In 2021, the Credit Union amended its membership agreement to require arbitration for certain disputes and to waive members' right to file class actions. Phillips did not opt out of this amendment within the given 30-day window. Later that year, Phillips filed a class action complaint against the Credit Union for the collection of overdraft fees on accounts that were never overdrawn. The Credit Union responded by filing a motion to stay the action and compel arbitration.The trial court denied the Credit Union's motion to stay and compel arbitration, concluding that the "Notice of Amendments" provision did not permit the Credit Union to unilaterally add an arbitration provision. The Credit Union appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's determination and remanded the case to the trial court to stay the action pending arbitration.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Arbitration Amendment was within the universe of terms of the contract between the parties, and thus complies with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and does not render the contract illusory. As such, the Arbitration Amendment is a binding and enforceable agreement between Phillips and the Credit Union. View "Canteen v. Charlotte Metro Credit Union" on Justia Law

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In 2022, Walter D. Giese was charged with cyberstalking and making harassing phone calls to Sharon Griffin, the county manager for Onslow County, North Carolina. Giese moved to disqualify District Attorney Ernie Lee and his staff from prosecuting him, arguing that Griffin's role as county manager, which included overseeing the county's facilities and public services and proposing the county budget, created a conflict of interest. Giese contended that the prosecutors had a "self-interest" in appeasing Griffin, which could influence their decision-making in his case. The district court agreed and barred the Fifth Prosecutorial District from handling the case. The State challenged this decision, but the superior court upheld the disqualification order, finding a conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the superior court's order and vacated it, finding that the lower courts had erred in disqualifying the entire Fifth Prosecutorial District without finding an actual conflict of interest. The court clarified that an actual conflict of interest exists when the prosecution, by virtue of a prior attorney-client relationship, obtains confidential information that has been or is likely to be used to the detriment of the defendant. The court found that this was not the case here, as there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the Fifth Prosecutorial District had ever represented Giese or obtained confidential information that could be used against him. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Giese" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Tevin Demetrius Vann, was found guilty of first-degree murder, murder of an unborn child, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The case revolved around the murder of a woman, Ashley Ann McLean, who was found dead in a hotel room. Evidence pointed to the defendant, including text messages between him and the victim, surveillance footage of him entering and leaving the hotel, and his confession to assaulting the victim. However, the defendant later recanted his confession during the trial.The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals after the trial court denied the jury's request to review partial transcripts of testimony from the lead detective, the medical examiner, and the defendant. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, concluding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts. The court noted that the trial court had granted previous requests from the jury to review evidence and had instructed the jury that it was their duty to recall the testimony. The court concluded that the defendant failed to provide affirmative evidence that the trial court did not understand or properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, the court found no prejudicial error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Vann" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2017, the City of Greenville, North Carolina, installed traffic cameras at its most dangerous intersections as part of its Red Light Camera Enforcement Program (RLCEP). The program was funded through a cost-sharing agreement with the Pitt County Board of Education (Board), which received 100% of the collected red light penalties and then reimbursed the City for the actual costs of maintaining the program. In 2018, plaintiffs Eric Fearrington and Craig Malmrose received citations for red light violations captured by RLCEP cameras and challenged their citations in court, arguing that the RLCEP violated Article IX, Section 7 of North Carolina’s Constitution, which promises public schools the “clear proceeds” of all penalties, forfeitures, and fines.The trial court ruled in favor of the Board and City, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim and remanded for entry of summary judgment in their favor. The Board and City then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for discretionary review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing but limited the available remedies to injunctive and declaratory relief, not a “refund.” On plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, however, the court reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the Interlocal Agreement and the Local Act authorizing it did not countermand the constitutional provision’s text or purpose. The court did not discern a “plain and clear” constitutional violation, and thus reversed the award of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their constitutional claim, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Greenville and the Board. View "Fearrington v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a defendant, Mack Washington, who was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old stepdaughter, N.M. The abuse was reported by N.M. to her mother, who then reported it to the police. During the investigation, N.M. revealed to a social worker that she had been sexually abused by another individual, a 15-year-old teenager, in the past. Washington was indicted on two counts of sexual offense with a child by an adult and six counts of indecent liberties with a child.Before the trial, Washington sought to admit the portion of N.M.’s interview where she discussed the additional abuser, arguing that it did not fall under Rule 412’s definition of “sexual behavior” because it did not discuss “any specific sex acts.” The trial court denied the motion and excluded the evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Washington was found guilty of all remaining charges and sentenced to 332 to 478 months imprisonment.On appeal, Washington argued that the trial court erred in excluding the interview because sexual abuse does not fall within the definition of ‘sexual behavior’ under Rule 412. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the plain language of Rule 412 does not speak to a consensual requirement and held that the trial court did not err in excluding the interview.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the language of Rule 412 is clear that all evidence of a complainant’s sexual behavior, other than the sexual act at issue, is irrelevant regardless of whether that sexual behavior was consensual or nonconsensual. Therefore, N.M.’s statements about the additional abuser in her SAFEChild interview constitute evidence of sexual behavior “other than the sexual act” committed by Washington in this case and were properly excluded. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law