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The court of appeals erred by determining the the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury concerning the right of self-defense. Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury. Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury concerning the law of self-defense and defense of another. Instead of delivering the exact instruction that Defendant requested, the trial court instead instructed the jury with respect to the issue of self-defense using a modified version of the pattern jury instruction relating to felonious assaults. The jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals awarded Defendant a new trial on the grounds that the trial court’s deviations from the pattern self-defense instruction misstated the law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s instructions concerning the law of self-defense were not erroneous. View "State v. Holloman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The court of appeals erred by determining the the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury concerning the right of self-defense. Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury. Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury concerning the law of self-defense and defense of another. Instead of delivering the exact instruction that Defendant requested, the trial court instead instructed the jury with respect to the issue of self-defense using a modified version of the pattern jury instruction relating to felonious assaults. The jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals awarded Defendant a new trial on the grounds that the trial court’s deviations from the pattern self-defense instruction misstated the law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s instructions concerning the law of self-defense were not erroneous. View "State v. Holloman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-16.2(b) alone does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 20-16.2(b), which authorizes law enforcement to obtain a blood sample from an unconscious defendant who is suspected of driving while impaired without first obtaining a search warrant, was unconstitutionally applied to Defendant. Defendant in this case filed a pretrial motion to suppress testing performed by law enforcement on his seized blood. The trial court granted the motion, concluding as a matter of law that the seizure of Defendant’s blood was a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection and, under a totality of the circumstances test, no exigency justified a warrantless search. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that section 20-16.2(b) is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment as applied to Defendant in this case because (1) there was no dispute that there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw; (2) section 20-16.2(b) does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement; and (3) the State did not carry its burden of proving voluntary consent. View "State v. Romano" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed an action seeking equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets and child support. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to arbitrate the action under North Carolina’s Family Law Arbitration Act. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an equitable distribution arbitration award by consent. The trial court confirmed the award. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to vacate arbitration award and set aside order and motion to engage in discovery on the basis of Plaintiff’s alleged fraud. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to engage in discovery. The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that Plaintiff had no right to immediately appeal the trial court’s order denying discovery and that the trial court had no discretion to order post-confirmation discovery in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to engage in discovery; and (2) the trial court had the discretion to order discovery in this case. View "Stokes v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of driving while impaired. The court of appeals awarded Defendant a new trial, concluding that N.C. R. Evid. 702(a1) requires that a witness explicitly be found to be an expert before testifying to the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and that the trial court erred in failing to recognize the law enforcement officer in this case as an expert pursuant to rule 702(a). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals awarding Defendant a new trial, holding (1) rule 702(a1) does not require a law enforcement officer to be recognized explicitly as an expert witness pursuant to rule 702(a) before he may testify to the results of an HGN test, and the trial court implicitly recognized the officer as an expert prior to allowing him to testify as to the issue of Defendant’s impairment; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction to explain that results of a chemical breath test are not conclusive evidence of impairment. View "State v. Godwin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Defendant was charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-95(d1)(1)(c). Defendant filed a motion requesting the trial court to declare section 90-95(d1)(1)(c) unconstitutional on the grounds that punishing him for violating a newly enacted statutory provision contravened his federal due process rights. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Thereafter, a jury convicted Defendant as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that the statute, as applied to him, violated his due process rights. Specifically, Defendant argued that when a state has rendered otherwise innocent and lawful behavior subject to significant criminal penalties, due process considerations require either that scienter or mens rea be shown in order to prove guilt or, alternatively, that the State establish that Defendant had fair warning that a previously lawful act was now subject to a criminal sanction. The Court of Appeals held that section 90-95(d1)(1)(c) was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant on notice-related grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s conviction did not result in a violation of his federal constitutional right to due process of law because the conviction rested upon Defendant's own active conduct rather than a “wholly passive” failure to act. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

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In two separate jury trials, Defendant was convicted of assault on a female, second-degree rape, second-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping. Defendant appealed, arguing that the second trial judge erred when she denied Defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements. The Court of Appeals ruled that Defendant did not understand his Miranda rights and therefore did not knowingly and intelligently waive them but that the trial judge’s error in admitting the custodial statements was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the admission of Defendant’s interrogation violated his Miranda rights; but (2) the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Defendant’s convictions and the judgment entered on those convictions. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

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The evidence adequately supported the jury’s determination that Defendant committed the offense of attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-27.2A(a). Defendant was convicted, in addition to his attempted rape charge, of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 to 297 months of imprisonment. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s attempted rape conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for attempted rape. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of felonious larceny. Defendant was overpaid because a payroll processor mistakenly typed “$120,000” instead of $1,200” into a payment processing system. Defendant was informed of the error and asked not to remove the excess funds from his bank account, but Defendant nonetheless made a series of withdrawals and transfers totaling $116,861.80. Specifically at issue on appeal was whether Defendant “took” the property of another when he withdrew and transferred money from his bank account. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions, concluding that he had not committed a trespassory taking. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s larceny convictions. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Plaintiff was injured while working for Defendant. The North Carolina Industrial Commission accepted Plaintiff’s claim as compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and Defendant began paying Plaintiff compensation for temporary total disability. Plaintiff later filed a Form 33 requesting a medical motion hearing regarding his symptoms. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that his anxiety and depression were a result of his work-related accident and that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after January 2011. The court of appeals (1) vacated and remanded in part, ruling that, on remand, the Commission should give Plaintiff the benefit of a presumption that his anxiety and depression were related to his injuries; and (2) reversed in part, ruling that Plaintiff had met his burden of establishing disability. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) Plaintiff was entitled a presumption of compensability in regard to his continued medical treatment; and (2) the Commission failed to address the effects of Plaintiff’s tinnitus in determining whether Plaintiff lost wage-earning capacity. View "Wilkes v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law