Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns two young siblings, E.H. and R.H., whose parents brought E.H., a three-week-old infant, to the hospital with a fractured arm. Medical examinations revealed multiple acute fractures on E.H.’s body, which doctors concluded were caused by nonaccidental trauma, likely from shaking or similar abuse. Both parents denied any knowledge of how the injuries occurred and provided no plausible explanation. They were E.H.’s sole caretakers, and there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child. The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened, taking both E.H. and his older brother R.H. into custody.The District Court of New Hanover County adjudicated E.H. as abused and neglected and R.H. as neglected, finding that the parents’ inability to explain E.H.’s injuries and refusal to accept responsibility created an injurious environment for both children. The court found that, given the parents’ lack of accountability, there was a substantial risk of similar harm to R.H. The parents appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the adjudication for E.H. but, in a divided opinion, vacated the neglect adjudication for R.H., reasoning that the trial court relied solely on E.H.’s abuse without specific findings predictive of probable neglect for R.H. The majority remanded for further findings, while the dissent argued the trial court’s findings were sufficient.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding R.H. The Supreme Court held that when a child is severely abused and the parents cannot plausibly explain the injuries or assure that abuse will not recur, a trial court may find that other children in the home are at substantial risk and thus neglected. The Court also emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. The adjudication of R.H. as neglected was reinstated. View "In re E.H. & R.H." on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and employees in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders required bars to remain closed for over 400 days, while allowing other businesses, including restaurants, breweries, and wineries, to reopen under certain restrictions. The plaintiffs argued that this differential treatment lacked a meaningful public health justification and violated their constitutional and statutory rights. They also sought records supporting the Governor’s decisions and claimed entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act.In the Superior Court, Wake County, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss, finding that the executive orders were reasonable and based on scientific data. The trial court also dismissed the statutory claims, concluding that the Emergency Management Act did not provide compensation for mere restrictions on business operations and that the Public Records Act claim was moot because the requested records had been produced. The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had effectively granted summary judgment and vacated that order on the constitutional claims, remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals applied rational basis review to the Fruits of Labor claim and strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, finding the Governor’s actions unjustified under both standards. It affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Fruits of Labor claim and that the proper legal standard, as clarified in Ace Speedway, is not rational basis but a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the government’s action was reasonably necessary to promote a public good. The Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ remand for further proceedings on this claim, allowing additional discovery. However, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ application of strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, holding that rational basis review applies to economic regulations not involving a suspect class or fundamental right. The Court affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims, finding no entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act and no jurisdiction for the Public Records Act claim due to failure to complete required mediation. View "Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a home in a subdivision governed by restrictive covenants that generally prohibit keeping animals other than up to three horses, unless the animals are “household pets” not kept for commercial purposes. After moving in, the plaintiffs acquired a flock of chickens, which at times numbered around sixty. The homeowners association notified the plaintiffs that keeping chickens violated the covenants and threatened fines. The plaintiffs argued that their chickens were household pets and not used commercially, while the association disagreed, citing the number of chickens and evidence suggesting some eggs were sold.In the Superior Court of Union County, both parties moved for summary judgment, but the court found factual disputes and sent the case to a jury. At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of their affectionate relationship with the chickens, while the association highlighted the flock’s size and evidence of egg sales. The jury found that the chickens were not household pets, and the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no evidence the chickens were not household pets and that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the motions for directed verdict and JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the chickens were not household pets. The Court also found no error in the trial court’s jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or limitations on closing arguments. The main holding is that whether the chickens qualified as household pets was a factual question for the jury, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict for the homeowners association. View "Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

A mother and father, after separating, entered into a consent order in 2017 granting them joint legal and physical custody of their two children, one of whom has a serious medical condition. The order required cooperation regarding the child’s medical care. In 2020, following ongoing disputes and allegations of contempt by the father, the parties agreed to a modified custody order that maintained joint custody but appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage escalating conflict, particularly regarding the children’s medical needs.Subsequently, the father repeatedly disagreed with the parenting coordinator’s decisions, refused to comply with directives about the children’s therapy and medication, and engaged in hostile conduct toward the coordinator. The mother moved to modify custody again, alleging the father’s actions endangered the children’s welfare. The District Court, Wake County, found that the father’s conduct—including failure to administer medication and interference with therapy—adversely affected the children’s health and welfare. The court issued temporary and then permanent orders granting the mother primary physical custody and final decision-making authority on major issues.The father appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate majority held that the findings did not support a conclusion of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare, reasoning that the children were insulated from parental conflict.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that an escalating pattern of conflict and a parent’s unwillingness to communicate or cooperate regarding the children’s health, education, and welfare can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a custody order. The Court found the trial court’s findings supported both the existence of such a change and that modification was in the children’s best interests. The case was remanded to reinstate the trial court’s modified custody order. View "Durbin v. Durbin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol and becoming heavily intoxicated, joined a group of friends at a municipal golf course and later proceeded to the driving range. While at the driving range, the plaintiff sat in a golf cart, distracted by his phone and unaware of his surroundings. The cart’s exact position was disputed, but evidence showed it was in or near the range of play. Defendant Hendricks, one of the group, hit a golf ball from the tee-off area, which struck the plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. The plaintiff did not see the ball coming and was unaware of the risk due to his lack of attention and intoxication.The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Superior Court, Wilson County, against both Hendricks and the City of Wilson, alleging negligent conduct and inadequate safety measures. Both defendants raised contributory negligence as a defense, and the City also asserted governmental immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed, and a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s lack of situational awareness, due in part to intoxication and distraction, barred recovery. The majority also found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cart’s location or movement and declined to address governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the risk of injury was open and obvious, and a reasonably prudent person would have recognized and avoided the danger. The Court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, as contributory negligence was dispositive. View "Moseley v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

George Jackson purchased a RainSoft home water treatment system from Carolina Water Systems, which operated as an authorized service provider for Home Depot in North Carolina and South Carolina. At the time of purchase, Carolina Water Systems was running a promotion that offered customers rebates or refunds for referring other potential buyers, with the possibility of a full refund for sufficient referrals. Jackson later defaulted on payments for the system, leading to a debt-collection action by Citibank. In response, Jackson argued that his debt was void under North Carolina’s referral statute, which prohibits sales promotions offering consideration for customer referrals. He subsequently brought a putative class action against the defendants, seeking relief for himself and others who purchased systems during the promotion.After preliminary issues were resolved, including a federal court removal and arbitration challenges, Jackson moved in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County to certify a class of all purchasers of RainSoft systems from the defendants between November 2012 and November 2016. The trial court granted class certification, finding that the requirements for class actions were met and that a class action was the superior method for resolving the dispute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the class certification order. The Court held that North Carolina’s referral statute does not require proof that the illegal sales promotion induced each buyer to make a purchase, thus supporting class certification for North Carolina residents. However, the Court found that South Carolina’s referral statute does require inducement, which would necessitate individualized inquiries and defeat the predominance requirement for class certification. Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Police officers in Charlotte, North Carolina, received a tip from a confidential informant that a man matching the defendant’s description was riding a bicycle and carrying an illegal firearm. Officers located the defendant, who took a shortcut on a dirt path marked “No Trespassing.” After stopping him, officers asked for his identification, which he provided, and requested that he step off his bicycle and remove his backpack. The officers conducted a pat-down with the defendant’s permission. When asked for consent to search his backpack, the defendant initially agreed, then declined several times, expressing fear. Eventually, after further questioning, the defendant agreed to open his backpack, revealing a handgun. The defendant was arrested, and additional contraband was found.The Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officers had returned his identification and that he freely consented to the search. The court also found that the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause for the stop. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the charges and was sentenced to prison. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, holding that the trial court’s finding that the officers returned the identification was not supported by competent evidence, and that the defendant’s consent to the search was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that competent evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officers returned the defendant’s identification. The court further held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and operators in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders initially required bars to close statewide, then imposed restrictions that effectively prevented them from operating, such as prohibiting onsite consumption of alcohol and limiting service to outdoor areas only. Some bars could not reopen at all due to lack of outdoor space, while others found the restrictions made operation unprofitable. The restrictions lasted for approximately nine months, during which time the plaintiffs allege they were forced to remain closed or operate at a loss.After the Governor allowed bars to fully reopen, the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Carteret County, alleging that the executive orders violated their fundamental rights to earn a living under the North Carolina Constitution. They sought damages and other relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the constitutional claims to proceed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated colorable constitutional claims and that sovereign immunity did not bar their action.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that, under established precedent, plaintiffs may bring direct constitutional claims against the state when they allege a violation of their rights and lack an adequate alternative remedy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could support violations of their rights to earn a living under the Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause. The Court also clarified that plaintiffs are not required to plead that they seek the least intrusive remedy at this stage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "Howell v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Philip Morris USA, Inc., a Virginia-based corporation doing business in North Carolina, was assessed additional franchise taxes by the North Carolina Department of Revenue for tax years 2012–2014. The Department determined that Philip Morris had improperly deducted certain debts from its capital base, as the debtor corporations were not subject to North Carolina’s franchise tax, contrary to the requirements of the relevant statute. After exhausting administrative remedies, Philip Morris petitioned the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a contested case hearing, arguing that the statute, as applied to it, violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the OAH rejected the Department’s argument that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Philip Morris’s constitutional claim and granted summary judgment in favor of Philip Morris, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. The Department sought judicial review, and the case was assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. The Business Court reversed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes, reasoning that such challenges must be heard by the judiciary, not administrative agencies, and that the relevant statutes did not confer such jurisdiction on the OAH.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s decision de novo. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 105-241.17 does not grant the OAH subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes. The Court reasoned that the power to rule on the constitutionality of statutes is reserved for the judiciary, and the statute’s language and legislative intent did not clearly confer such authority on the OAH. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Business Court’s order reversing the OAH’s decision and remanding the case for dismissal. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, responsible for training and certifying school bus drivers, was terminated after admitting to recertifying five bus drivers without conducting the required ride-along observations. The Department asserted that this conduct violated a criminal statute, N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1, which makes it a felony for an employee to knowingly enter false information concerning a driver’s license or special identification card into department records, and mandates dismissal for such violations. The Department argued that the false information about school bus driver certificates fell within the statute’s scope.The employee challenged his termination before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the statute did not apply because the information at issue concerned school bus driver certificates, not driver’s licenses, and concluded that the Department failed to prove just cause for termination. The Department appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since a school bus driver must have both a commercial driver’s license and a school bus driver’s certificate, false information about the certificate was “concerning a driver’s license,” especially since the information was entered into the same database as driver’s license records. The Court of Appeals did not address the just cause issue, finding the statutory violation dispositive.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified that courts must apply de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation, expressly rejecting any rule requiring deference to agency interpretations of state statutes. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1 does not apply to false information concerning school bus driver certificates, as the statute is limited to driver’s licenses and special identification cards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Savage v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law