Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involved a business owner who operated an event rental company in Asheville, North Carolina. On May 17, 2021, while driving a company vehicle with an employee as a passenger, the owner encountered a man who was locally known for panhandling with his cat, Thomas, usually in a stroller. After a brief interaction in which the driver harassed the man by flicking a golf ball at him, the driver drove onto a grassy area and struck the stroller with the cat inside. Witnesses saw the incident, and the cat was shaken but not physically harmed. Police investigation soon focused on the event rental company’s trucks and driver records. When asked by police about driver documentation, the owner first denied having records, then claimed ignorance about who drove the truck, and eventually law enforcement discovered that the physical copy of the key scheduling document for May 17 was missing, though a digital copy was later found on the owner’s phone.The Superior Court in Buncombe County denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss charges of felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals. The jury found him guilty on both counts. On appeal, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding there was sufficient evidence to submit both charges to the jury. The majority used a “knew or should have known” standard for the cruelty to animals charge, while the dissent argued the obstruction charge should have been dismissed due to lack of legal obligation to retain documents and absence of effective obstruction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the motions to dismiss, holding that substantial evidence supported both charges. Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that the felony cruelty to animals statute requires proof of actual knowledge—not just what the defendant should have known—regarding the presence of an animal. The Court modified the Court of Appeals’ analysis accordingly but affirmed the result. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

A retailer in North Carolina sold a product called “Replenishments” for a wireless provider. During the period audited by state tax authorities, the way Replenishments could be used changed. In the first part of the audit period, customers could only redeem Replenishments for prepaid wireless service. In the second part, they could redeem them for wireless service or for a broader range of products and services from the wireless provider. The state tax agency audited the retailer and determined that sales tax should have been collected and remitted on all Replenishment sales at the point of sale, assessing a significant tax liability.The retailer challenged the assessment in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which divided the audit period into two: Period I (pre-September 2017) and Period II (post-September 2017). The administrative law judge found the retailer responsible for tax collection during Period I, since Replenishments were only for wireless service, but not responsible during Period II, when Replenishments functioned as stored-value cards (like gift cards) usable for various products, making the wireless provider responsible for collecting tax at redemption. The North Carolina Business Court reviewed the case and disagreed with OAH about Period II, holding the retailer responsible for collecting sales tax on all Replenishment sales across both periods.The Supreme Court of North Carolina conducted a detailed statutory analysis, affirmed the Business Court’s ruling for Period I, and reversed as to Period II. The Supreme Court held that in Period I, Replenishments were prepaid wireless calling services taxable at the point of sale, making the retailer responsible for tax collection and remittance. For Period II, the Court held Replenishments were stored-value cards, taxable only when redeemed, with the wireless provider responsible for tax. The Court remanded the case for recalculation of the retailer’s tax liability consistent with this holding. View "N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Wireless Ctr. of N.C., Inc" on Justia Law

A forty-year-old man was convicted by a jury of three counts of taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old girl. The charges stemmed from separate instances on a single morning: kissing the girl on the neck outside his van, kissing her on the mouth inside the van, and kissing her on the mouth a second time inside the van—these last two kisses were separated by a six-to-seven-minute interval during which the defendant and the girl engaged in conversation and joking. The defendant denied any sexual acts beyond kissing, while the girl and two neighbors who witnessed parts of the encounter provided differing accounts. The jury acquitted the defendant of additional charges, including statutory sex offenses and kidnapping.Following conviction in Wake County Superior Court, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, concluded that the three kisses did not constitute three sufficiently distinct acts to support three separate convictions for indecent liberties with a child. The appellate court reasoned that only two acts were distinct enough—those occurring outside the van and the first inside the van—so it reversed one conviction, remanded for judgment to be arrested on that count, and ordered resentencing. The dissent argued that all three acts were sufficiently separate for conviction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the lower appellate court erred in drawing a threshold distinction between “touching” and “sexual acts” and by applying the wrong legal test for multiplicity. Instead, the Supreme Court clarified that the correct standard is whether a “distinct interruption” occurred between acts. Applying this test, it held that the six-to-seven-minute interval between the two kisses inside the van was sufficient to constitute separate acts. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating all three convictions. View "State v. Calderon" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, arising from the killings of two victims in August 2001. After pleading guilty to all charges in 2004, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without parole for the murders, as well as concurrent sentences for the robbery and conspiracy convictions. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, the defendant sought resentencing, and his case eventually returned to the trial court for resentencing under North Carolina’s Miller-fix statute.After multiple appeals, including a key decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina (Kelliher I) holding that consecutive life with parole sentences for juvenile offenders violating North Carolina’s constitution, the trial court was instructed to enter two concurrent sentences of life with parole for the murder charges. On remand, the trial court imposed two concurrent life with parole sentences for murder, but also ordered the sentences for the robbery convictions to run consecutively to the murder sentences. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded the scope of the Supreme Court’s mandate. The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and remanded with instructions for the resentencing court to only change the murder sentences from consecutive to concurrent.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that its prior mandate in Kelliher I required only that the murder sentences be made concurrent, leaving the resentencing court with de novo authority over the remaining convictions. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in running the robbery sentences consecutively, so long as the total sentence complied with the forty-year limitation established in Kelliher I. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the 31 March 2023 judgments were reinstated. View "State v. Kelliher" on Justia Law

Cherry Oil is a closely held corporation in eastern North Carolina, primarily owned and managed by members of the Cherry and Mauck families. Armistead and Louise Mauck, who together own 34% of the company’s shares, became involved in the business after Armistead was invited to join during a period of financial difficulty. In 1998, the families formalized their relationship through a Shareholder Agreement, which included provisions allowing either party to force a buyout of shares at fair market value. Over time, disputes arose regarding management and succession, culminating in the Maucks’ removal from the board and Cherry Oil’s attempt to buy out their shares. The buyout process stalled, leaving the Maucks as minority shareholders no longer employed by the company.The Maucks filed suit in Superior Court, Lenoir County, asserting claims for judicial dissolution under N.C.G.S. § 55-14-30, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and breach of the Shareholder Agreement. The case was designated a mandatory complex business case and assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. The Business Court dismissed most claims, including the judicial dissolution claim for lack of standing, finding that the Shareholder Agreement’s buyout provision provided an adequate remedy. It also dismissed other claims for reasons such as untimeliness and insufficient factual allegations. The court later granted summary judgment to defendants on the remaining claims, concluding that the actions taken by the Cherry family were valid corporate acts and that the Maucks had not demonstrated breach of duty or contract.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Maucks did have standing to seek judicial dissolution but affirmed the dismissal of that claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Shareholder Agreement’s buyout provision provided a sufficient remedy and that the complaint did not allege facts showing dissolution was reasonably necessary. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Business Court’s rulings. View "Mauck v. Cherry Oil Co." on Justia Law

In 2023, Charlotte Chemuti was arrested by officers from the Mooresville Police Department for resisting a public officer. To prepare for her trial, Chemuti served a subpoena on the police department requesting body camera footage related to her arrest. The Town of Mooresville responded, arguing that the requested recordings were confidential under North Carolina General Statute § 132-1.4A and could only be released through the procedure outlined in that statute, not by subpoena.Chemuti subsequently filed a motion in the District Court of Iredell County, without notice to the town, seeking release of the recordings. The district court granted her request, finding that while the statutory petition in superior court was the generally accepted practice, it was not the exclusive method for obtaining such evidence, and ordered the town to comply with the subpoena. The town appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not affect a substantial right. The town then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that orders compelling disclosure of information protected by statutory confidentiality are immediately appealable, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4A provides the exclusive procedure for obtaining law enforcement recordings in criminal cases, requiring a petition in superior court, and that district court subpoenas cannot be used to compel their release. The Court further held that this procedure does not violate constitutional rights to present a complete defense, as courts must still ensure defendants’ constitutional protections. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Chemuti" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers investigated a breaking and entering at a market in Fletcher, North Carolina, where cash, cigarettes, and lottery tickets were stolen. Days later, someone attempted to redeem one of the stolen lottery tickets at a store in Edneyville. Security footage showed a woman leaving the store and entering a black Dodge Durango with distinctive features. Detective Diaz traced the vehicle to a nearby residence, discovered it had a fictitious license plate, and observed items inside the vehicle that appeared related to the theft. Officers later conducted a search of the vehicle and the residence, recovering stolen property and tools linked to the crime.The Superior Court of Henderson County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, which argued that law enforcement’s observations at the residence and of the vehicle were improper without a warrant. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to several charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that probable cause existed for the search warrant and that officers acted lawfully at the scene. The majority also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply, while a dissenting judge disagreed on both points.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, even excluding information obtained during the contested “knock and talk,” the remaining facts in the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the vehicle. The Court did not decide whether the officers’ conduct during the knock and talk was unconstitutional, nor did it address the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the search warrant was properly issued based on probable cause supported by untainted evidence. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, a patient received medical care that included a hysterectomy performed by a physician at a local medical center. Following the procedure, the patient experienced significant complications, including infection, sepsis, and additional surgeries, which led to prolonged recovery and ongoing health issues. The patient and her husband filed a lawsuit against the physician, the medical practice, and the hospital, alleging negligence and gross negligence in the performance of the surgery and subsequent care.The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from civil liability under North Carolina’s Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, which was enacted in response to the pandemic. They asserted that the Act provided them with immunity because the care was rendered during the pandemic and was impacted by it, and that the complaint did not allege bad faith. The Superior Court in Pitt County denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the requirements for statutory immunity under the Emergency Act were not met on the face of the complaint and that the denial of the motions to dismiss was not immediately appealable as a matter of right.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was an interlocutory order and not immediately appealable. The Court concluded that the Emergency Act provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and therefore does not create a substantial right warranting immediate appeal. The Court also found that the denial of the motions did not implicate personal jurisdiction under the relevant statute. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Land v. Whitley" on Justia Law

The case concerns the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which is responsible for issuing permits for animal waste management systems. In 2019, the DEQ added three new conditions to its general permits for swine, poultry, and cattle operations: requirements for monitoring wells in floodplains, a Phosphorous Loss Assessment Tool analysis with mitigation, and annual reporting. These conditions were not present in the previous 2014 permits but were included in a draft permit as part of a 2018 settlement with environmental groups. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation challenged the new conditions, arguing that the DEQ had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment to the Farm Bureau, finding that the new conditions were “rules” under the APA and thus invalid because they had not been adopted through the required rulemaking process. The Superior Court, Wake County, reversed the OAH, holding that the conditions were not “rules” because they only applied to those who opted for general permits, not all permittees, and thus lacked general applicability. The court also cited legislative history and statutory language to support its conclusion.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the conditions were generally applicable regulations and thus “rules” under the APA, requiring formal rulemaking. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the three general permit conditions are “rules” within the meaning of the APA and are invalid until adopted through the APA’s rulemaking process. The court clarified that while general permits themselves need not be adopted as rules, generally applicable conditions within them must be. View "N.C. Dep't of Env't Quality v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, stemming from an armed robbery in which two victims were killed and another was left paralyzed. During jury selection at his trial in Cleveland County Superior Court, the State used peremptory challenges to excuse two black female prospective jurors. The defense objected, raising a Batson challenge and arguing that the State’s strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court heard arguments from both sides, including the State’s race-neutral explanations for the strikes, and ultimately denied the Batson challenge, finding no prima facie case of discrimination.Following his conviction on all charges and sentencing to consecutive life terms plus additional imprisonment, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, found that the trial court had moved past Batson’s first step by soliciting and hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons before ruling. The majority held that this rendered the first step moot and remanded the case for a new Batson hearing under the procedural requirements established in State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020). The dissent argued that the trial court had not actually proceeded to Batson’s third step and that the first step was not moot.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Batson’s first step moot and remanding for a new hearing. The Supreme Court held that the mootness exception to Batson’s three-step process is to be applied cautiously and only when the trial court has fully completed all three steps. Because the trial court had clearly ruled at step one and had not proceeded to step three, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of whether the trial court’s step-one determination was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law