Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Deputies from the Caswell County Sheriff’s Office stopped an SUV on suspicion of contraband being thrown over a prison yard wall. The search revealed drugs hidden in footballs, leading to the arrest of the defendant, who was charged with multiple offenses, including possession with intent to sell or distribute drugs and attempting to provide contraband to an inmate. While in custody, the defendant was involved in an altercation and was charged with assaulting a government employee and communicating threats. His court-appointed counsel filed a motion questioning his competency to stand trial, which was granted, but the evaluation was never completed as the defendant posted bond and was released.The Superior Court of Caswell County, presided over by Judge Edwin G. Wilson Jr., did not conduct a competency hearing before the trial. The defendant did not raise the issue of competency at trial, and the jury found him guilty on four of seven charges. The defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not determining his competency. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, found no error, holding that the defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing by not asserting it at trial.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing by failing to assert it in a timely manner and by acting inconsistently with a purpose to insist upon it. The court distinguished between the waivable statutory right and the non-waivable constitutional right to a competency hearing, concluding that the defendant’s conduct indicated he was competent and ready to proceed with the trial. View "State v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Philip Morris USA, Inc. (Philip Morris) disputed with the North Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) over tax credits for manufacturing cigarettes for exportation (Export Credits). The issue was whether the "credit allowed" in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.45(b) (2003) limited the Export Credits such that they could not be carried forward to future years.The Department audited Philip Morris' tax returns for 2012-2014 and disallowed the Export Credits claimed, arguing that the statute capped the credits generated each year at six million dollars, thus no credits were available to carry forward. Philip Morris objected and requested a review, but the Department upheld the disallowance. Philip Morris then petitioned the Office of Administrative Hearings, where the administrative law judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Philip Morris appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the ALJ's decision, stating that the statute limited credit generation to six million dollars per year.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found the statute ambiguous. The Court held that the term "credit allowed" in subsection (b) should be interpreted as "credit generated," allowing any generated Export Credit in excess of the annual cap to be carried forward for the next ten years. The Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Department and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Martin B. Sturdivant, an employee of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, sustained a back injury while working as a corrections officer. The injury led to chronic back pain, and Sturdivant received temporary total disability payments through the workers' compensation system. As he approached the 500-week limit for these payments, he applied for extended compensation, claiming a total loss of wage-earning capacity.The North Carolina Industrial Commission denied Sturdivant's claim, concluding that he had not sustained a total loss of wage-earning capacity. The Commission interpreted this phrase to mean a total loss of the ability to earn wages in any employment. Sturdivant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which rejected the Commission's interpretation. The Court of Appeals held that "total loss of wage-earning capacity" was synonymous with "total disability," incorporating a broader legal test.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the phrase "total loss of wage-earning capacity" means the complete elimination of the capacity to earn any wages. The Court clarified that this phrase does not share the same legal meaning as "total disability." The Court found that the Industrial Commission's interpretation was correct and that the Commission's findings were supported by competent evidence. The Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals' opinion to reject its statutory interpretation but otherwise affirmed the decision. View "Sturdivant v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of a four-year-old child, Katy, who was initially placed with him by the Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) after her mother, who had custody, was found to have substance abuse issues. DSS later discovered the father had a significant criminal history and was arrested for assault. Consequently, DSS recommended placing Katy with her paternal aunt and uncle, which the trial court approved. The trial court also found that both parents acted inconsistently with their constitutional rights as parents, although neither parent raised a constitutional claim during the trial.The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and, in a divided opinion, reversed the trial court's decision. The majority held that the trial court lacked authority to place Katy with anyone other than her father, as there were no allegations or findings that he was unfit or had acted inconsistently with his constitutional rights. The majority also ruled that the constitutional issue was preserved for appellate review because the father opposed DSS's recommendation. The dissent argued that the trial court's findings on the constitutional standard were premature and unnecessary.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and focused on whether the constitutional issue was properly preserved for appellate review. The Court held that a parent must explicitly raise a constitutional claim in the trial court to preserve it for appeal. Since the father conceded he did not argue the issue as a constitutional violation in the trial court, the Supreme Court determined the issue was not preserved. Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, emphasizing the need for parents to inform the trial court and opposing parties of any constitutional challenges to ensure proper evidence is presented. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

A child, referred to as Liam, suffered severe injuries at one month old, including multiple fractures and bruises, while in the care of his parents. The Onslow County Department of Social Services (DSS) took custody of Liam, who now requires extensive medical care due to cerebral palsy and other conditions resulting from the abuse. Liam was placed with foster parents, Daniel and Jessica Hall, who have provided him with a stable and nurturing environment. Liam's maternal grandfather expressed interest in custody but admitted he could not provide the necessary care.The District Court of Onslow County adjudicated Liam as abused and neglected and held multiple permanency-planning hearings. The court ultimately awarded custody to the Halls, finding that reunification with the parents was not in Liam's best interest due to their inability to explain his injuries and the mother's failure to participate in his medical care. The court also considered but did not find the maternal grandfather a suitable caretaker.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order, finding the trial court's findings insufficient under relevant statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new hearing.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements, including considerations of the child's best interests and the feasibility of reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order awarding custody to the Halls and converting the case to a Chapter 50 civil custody proceeding. View "In re L.L." on Justia Law

A clothing retailer, Cato Corporation, with over 1,300 stores, purchased an "all-risk" commercial property insurance policy from Zurich American Insurance Company in July 2019. In the spring of 2020, Cato alleged that the COVID-19 virus and related government orders forced it to close or severely curtail operations, causing significant revenue losses and expenses for remediation and reconfiguration of its stores. Cato sought coverage for these losses under its insurance policy, but Zurich refused, leading Cato to file a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract and violations of North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cato's claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in North State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that tangible alteration to the property was necessary to recover for a "direct physical loss of or damage" to property, which Cato failed to allege sufficiently.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal but disagreed with its reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that Cato sufficiently alleged a "direct physical loss of or damage" to property under the precedent set in North State Deli. However, the Court found that the viral contamination exclusion in Cato's policy precluded coverage for the alleged losses. Therefore, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals' decision but affirmed its judgment dismissing Cato's claims. View "Cato Corp. v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in District Court, Buncombe County, of driving while impaired (DWI), reckless driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of marijuana paraphernalia. The court found an aggravating factor but balanced it with a mitigating factor, sentencing the defendant to Level IV punishment, which included 120 days of imprisonment (suspended), twelve months of supervised probation, seven days in custody, a $100 fine, and court costs. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court, Buncombe County, where a jury found him guilty of DWI and reckless driving but acquitted him of the other charges. The superior court judge found three aggravating factors and imposed Level III punishment, which included six months of imprisonment (suspended), thirty-six months of supervised probation, three days in custody, a $500 fine, and court costs.The defendant appealed the superior court's judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by finding aggravating factors without a jury. The Court of Appeals agreed, citing Blakely v. Washington, and held that the trial judge's finding of aggravating factors violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The court noted that the General Assembly amended the DWI sentencing statute in 2006 to require that juries, not judges, find aggravating factors. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that resentencing is required whenever a trial judge finds aggravating factors in violation of the statute, regardless of whether the error was harmless.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply harmless error review to the trial judge's finding of aggravating factors. The Supreme Court concluded that the finding of aggravating factors by a trial judge contrary to N.C.G.S. § 20-179(a1)(2) does not constitute reversible error if the error was harmless. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the error was harmless. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nhiem Tran and Nung Ha had a fire insurance policy with Nationwide General Insurance Company. Nationwide canceled the policy due to property hazards, including an unfenced swimming pool and rotting wood. Nationwide mailed a cancellation notice on May 22, 2015, and terminated the policy on June 6, 2015. Plaintiffs claimed they never received the cancellation letter but did receive, sign, and cash a refund check for the excess premium over a month before their house burned down on July 24, 2015. Nationwide denied their insurance claim, leading to this lawsuit.The Superior Court of Wake County found that Nationwide had properly canceled the policy by mailing the cancellation notice, satisfying statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute required actual receipt of the cancellation notice. Nationwide appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the case to determine the applicable statute. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of Nationwide, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that proof of mailing was sufficient for cancellation.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision but on different grounds. The Court held that plaintiffs had actual notice of the cancellation due to several factors: their prior knowledge of property hazards, receipt and cashing of the refund check, and the cessation of monthly premium withdrawals. The Court emphasized that actual notice was sufficient to meet statutory requirements, making the manner of giving notice secondary. Therefore, Nationwide effectively canceled the policy before the fire, and the judgment for Nationwide was affirmed. View "Ha v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of imprisonment in 2019 for obtaining property by false pretenses. In June 2020, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming his detention was unlawful due to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety's inability to protect him from COVID-19, which he argued violated the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied his petition.The Superior Court of Wake County summarily denied the petition, citing N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2), which mandates denial of habeas corpus applications when the petitioner is held under a valid final judgment by a competent court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but held that N.C.G.S. § 17-33(2) provided an exception to the rule in § 17-4(2). Despite acknowledging the case was moot due to the petitioner's release, the Court of Appeals applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and proceeded to the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2) requires summary denial of habeas corpus applications for those detained by a final judgment of a competent court. The Court found no conflict between §§ 17-4 and 17-33, as the latter applies only to those detained by civil process, not criminal judgments. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, emphasizing that habeas corpus relief is not available under the circumstances presented by the petitioner. View "State v. Daw" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law