Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a high school senior, killed his parents one month before his eighteenth birthday. After being convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, he was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. The defendant argued that his sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment, North Carolina’s Miller-fix statute, and the North Carolina Constitution because his crimes did not reflect permanent incorrigibility.The Superior Court of Watauga County conducted a sentencing hearing and considered various mitigating factors, including the defendant's age, immaturity, intellectual capacity, mental health, and familial pressures. The court found that the defendant's actions demonstrated an understanding of the consequences and a deliberate attempt to cover up the crimes. The court concluded that the defendant's crimes reflected irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility, justifying the life sentences without parole. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentencing court's decision, finding no error.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the sentencing court properly considered the mitigating factors and exercised its discretion in sentencing the defendant. The court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility but mandates that the sentencing court consider the defendant's youth and attendant characteristics. The court concluded that the sentencing court's decision was not an abuse of discretion and upheld the life sentences without parole. View "State v. Borlase" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

During the Fall 2020 semester, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, North Carolina State University (NCSU) and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) transitioned to online classes and closed their campuses. Students, including the plaintiffs, sought refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits paid for services and facilities they could no longer access. The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina moved to dismiss the lawsuit, citing sovereign immunity, which generally protects the State and its agencies from being sued.The Superior Court of Wake County denied the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claims but dismissed the constitutional claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply to valid contract claims against the State. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that implied contracts existed between them and the universities for the provision of services and facilities funded by the fees.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that sovereign immunity does not bar the breach of contract claims at this stage. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the plaintiffs had alleged the existence of express contracts, not implied ones. The court held that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the universities made offers to provide specific services and facilities in exchange for mandatory fees, which the plaintiffs accepted by paying those fees. Therefore, the court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, allowing the breach of contract claims to proceed. View "Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C" on Justia Law

Two brothers, Jim and Charles, manage two LLCs, JHD Properties, LLC, and Berry Hill Properties, LLC, which were established by their father as part of his estate plan. Each brother, along with two other siblings, holds a 25% equity interest in the LLCs through individual trusts. The LLCs own approximately sixty-eight acres of undeveloped land in Wake County, North Carolina. The operating agreements of the LLCs require unanimous agreement between the two managers for any binding action. Since 2018, Jim and Charles have been unable to agree on the use or sale of the property, leading to a managerial deadlock.The plaintiffs, James H.Q. Davis Trust and William R.Q. Davis Trust, filed an action seeking judicial dissolution of the LLCs, arguing that it had become impracticable to conduct the business of the LLCs due to the deadlock. The Business Court granted the motion to intervene by the Charles B.Q. Davis Trust and later denied the Charles Trust’s motion to dismiss. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Business Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the deadlock made it impracticable to conduct the LLCs' business in conformance with the operating agreements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Business Court’s decision. The Court held that judicial dissolution was appropriate because the managerial deadlock prevented the LLCs from conducting any economically useful activity and there was no mechanism in the operating agreements to break the deadlock. The Court concluded that it was not practicable for the managers to operate the LLCs in accordance with the operating agreements, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs. View "Davis Trust v. JHD Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Andre Lester was charged and convicted of multiple sex offenses with a minor. At trial, the State presented Verizon phone records to link Lester to the crimes. Exhibit #2 showed the time, date, and connecting number for every call made to or from the phone allegedly belonging to Lester. Exhibit #3 featured a subset of that data, showing communications between Lester’s phone and the victim’s phone. Lester argued that the admission of these exhibits violated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules because he could not cross-examine the source of the data.The Superior Court of Wake County admitted the exhibits under Rule 803(24), the catch-all hearsay exception, despite acknowledging that they did not meet the business records exception under Rule 803(6). The jury convicted Lester on all counts, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the admission of the exhibits violated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules, and ordered a new trial.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Confrontation Clause analysis. The Supreme Court held that machine-generated raw data, if truly machine-generated, are neither hearsay nor testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. The Court emphasized that the primary purpose test should focus on why the data were created, not why they were later retrieved. The Court concluded that if Verizon’s systems recorded the data as part of routine operations, the data were not created for use in a trial. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Lester’s remaining issues. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

Gregory Cohane filed a lawsuit against The Home Missioners of America, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, and Al Behm, alleging child sexual abuse by Behm and negligence by the other defendants. Cohane claimed that Behm, a clergyman employed by Glenmary and supervised by the Diocese, groomed and sexually abused him over several years, starting when he was nine years old. Behm's abuse continued even after he was transferred to different locations due to other allegations of misconduct. Cohane's lawsuit was filed in 2021, invoking the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allows previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be brought within a specific two-year window.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese, ruling that the revival provision only applied to direct abusers, not to institutions that enabled the abuse. Cohane appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the plain language of the revival provision was broad enough to include claims against both direct abusers and enablers.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, applies to claims against both direct abusers and those who enabled the abuse. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish between different types of defendants and that traditional tort principles allow for recovery from both direct tortfeasors and those who contributed to the harm. Thus, Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese were revived under the SAFE Child Act. View "Cohane v. The Home Missioners of America" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiffs sued the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, alleging sexual abuse by priests in the 1970s and 1980s. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Diocese, finding the claims time-barred by the statute of limitations. One plaintiff appealed and lost, while the other did not appeal. Both judgments became final a decade ago.In 2019, the General Assembly passed the SAFE Child Act, which revived previously time-barred claims for child sexual abuse. In 2020, plaintiffs filed new lawsuits asserting the same claims dismissed in the earlier judgments, arguing that the SAFE Child Act allowed them to do so. The trial court dismissed these new lawsuits with prejudice, citing the res judicata effect of the earlier judgments. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the new lawsuits were barred by res judicata because final judgments had already been entered on the same claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decisions. The court held that the General Assembly does not have the power to set aside a final judgment of the judicial branch. The court emphasized that under the North Carolina Constitution, the judicial power belongs exclusively to the judicial branch, and the legislature cannot annul a judgment or decree of a court. The court concluded that the SAFE Child Act, like any other legislative act, cannot overturn a final judgment entered by the judicial branch. View "Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese" on Justia Law

Three former students of East Gaston High School, who were members of the wrestling team, filed a lawsuit against their coach, Gary Scott Goins, and the Gaston County Board of Education. They alleged that Goins subjected them to sexual abuse, physical violence, and psychological harm during the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Goins was criminally convicted in 2014 and sentenced to over thirty-four years in prison. The plaintiffs sought civil damages from the Board of Education, claiming it knew or should have known about the abuse. The claims were initially time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations, which began running on the victims' eighteenth birthdays.The Superior Court of Wake County, in a divided decision, declared the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allowed previously time-barred claims to be filed during a two-year window, unconstitutional. The court held that the expiration of the statute of limitations created a vested right for the defendants, which the legislature could not retroactively alter.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the revival of the statute of limitations did not interfere with vested rights. The court reasoned that statutes of limitations are procedural and do not create property rights. Therefore, the legislature could retroactively alter them without violating the constitution.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the running of a statute of limitations in a tort claim does not create a constitutionally protected vested right. The court emphasized that statutes of limitations are procedural and affect only the remedy, not the underlying right. The court concluded that the General Assembly has the authority to retroactively alter statutes of limitations for tort claims. View "McKinney v. Goins" on Justia Law

In August 1998, a 17-year-old defendant, a member of the Crips gang, participated in the abduction, robbery, and murder of three women, resulting in the death of two and the attempted murder of the third. The defendant was arrested and indicted on multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder. In 2000, a jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to death. The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the death sentence due to a jury polling error and remanded for resentencing. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Roper v. Simmons, which prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, the defendant was resentenced to life without parole.The trial court later resentenced the defendant under a new statutory scheme following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibited mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The trial court considered mitigating factors and sentenced the defendant to two consecutive life without parole terms, finding him irreparably corrupt. The defendant appealed, arguing that his sentences violated the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences, finding that the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors and that the sentences complied with both federal and state constitutional requirements. The court rejected the defendant's argument that his sentences were unconstitutional per se and found that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion of irreparable corruption.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the state constitution's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishments does not provide broader protections than the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that the trial court's resentencing did not violate the principles established in State v. Kelliher. View "State v. Tirado" on Justia Law