Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A flea market operator in Durham, North Carolina, received a notice of violation (NOV) from the city's planning department following a field inspection. The NOV stated that the market had failed to comply with an approved site plan, referencing the city’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), and warned of possible civil penalties unless corrective action was taken within thirty days. The NOV included copies of photographs and a copy of the site plan but did not specifically identify which aspects of the property were in violation or the specific corrective measures required.The market appealed the NOV to the City’s Board of Adjustment (BOA). At the quasi-judicial hearing, city staff explained that the NOV was intentionally broad because there were several violations, and listing each one would allow the market to fix only some issues. One BOA member expressed concern that the NOV’s lack of specificity failed to inform the market of the exact violations or needed corrections. Despite this, the BOA voted to deny the market’s appeal. The market then appealed to the Superior Court, Durham County, arguing that the NOV was too vague and did not comply with ordinance requirements. The superior court affirmed the BOA’s decision and ordered the market to come into compliance within thirty-six months. The market further appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the NOV sufficient under the UDO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal and held that the NOV did not comply with the city’s ordinance because it failed to provide a description of the specific violations as required by UDO § 15.2.1.C. The court concluded that property owners must receive enough detail to understand the alleged violations and what corrective action is required. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions for the city to dismiss the NOV. View "Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

A developer, Schooldev East, LLC, proposed to build a charter school in the Town of Wake Forest and applied for major subdivision and site plan permits. The proposed site was a 35-acre parcel within a larger tract of land. The developer's plans included constructing a multi-use path to provide pedestrian and bicycle access to nearby areas. The Town's planning board and board of commissioners (BOC) held hearings and ultimately denied the applications, citing non-compliance with the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) requirements for pedestrian and bicycle connectivity to surrounding residential areas.The Superior Court of Wake County affirmed the BOC's decision, concluding that the developer failed to demonstrate compliance with the UDO and that the Town's requirements were not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, also affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, agreeing that the developer did not meet its burden of production to show entitlement to the permits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that the UDO provision in question was unclear regarding whether it required connectivity to all surrounding residential areas. The Court held that any ambiguity in land use ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. The Court concluded that the developer had presented competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the UDO by proposing a multi-use path that provided access to a public park and a future residential subdivision. As no evidence was presented in opposition, the BOC had no basis to deny the applications. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the Town to approve the developer's applications. View "Schooldev East, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint in this case involving the removal of a Confederate monument with prejudice, holding that dismissal should have been without prejudice.After the City of Winston Salem decided to remove a Confederate monument from the grounds of the former Forsyth County Courthouse Plaintiff, the United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division, Inc., filed a complaint against the City and County seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from taking affirmative action to remove or relocate the monument prior to full adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiff failed establish standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by dismissing the amended complaint for lack of standing; but (2) erred by dismissing the complaint with, rather than without, prejudice. View "United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Division v. City of Winston-Salem" on Justia Law

In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals.After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. View "Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court holding that the City of Asheville improperly denied an application for the issuance of a conditional use permit submitted by PHG Asheville, LLC seeking authorization to construct a hotel in downtown Asheville, holding that the City lacked the authority to deny the requested conditional use permit.The trial court determined that PHG was entitled to the issuance of the requested conditional use permit because the City had improperly concluded that PHG failed to present competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that the proposed hotel satisfied the standards of a conditional use permit set out in the City's unified development ordinance. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PHG presented competent, material, and substantial evidence that the proposed hotel satisfied the relevant conditional use permit standards set out in the City's unified development ordinance. View "PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment for the Town of Pinebluff, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Session Law 1999-35 required Moore County to approve Pinebluff's expansion request.Session Law 1999-35 amended North Carolina's extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-360, as it pertained to Pinebluff. After Pinebluff annexed land extending beyond the town's corporate boundaries, Pinebluff requested that the Moore County Board of Commissioners adopt a resolution to authorize the expansion of Pinebluff's ETJ two miles beyond the annexed boundary, pursuant to section 160A-360. The Board denied the request. Pinebluff filed a complaint against Moore County seeking a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pinebluff and directed Moore County to adopt a resolution authorizing Pinebluff to exercise its ETJ within the proposed area. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between subsections (e) and (f) of section 160A-360, as modified by Session Law 1999-35, and that subsection (e) prohibits Pinebluff from extending its ETJ into the requested areas within an agreement between Pinebluff and Moore County. View "Town of Pinebluff v. Moore County" on Justia Law