Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s predecessor in title ("Wayne") owned two tracts of land (“Wayne Tracts”). Park Creek, LLC held adjacent land. Under a pre-approved plan, Wayne and the LLC began constructing a development plan for a residential subdivision using land owned by both Wayne and the LLC. When Wayne conveyed his property to Defendant, his revocable trust of which he was the trustee, future phases of the subdivision remained undeveloped. The Town of Midland later filed two condemnation actions against Defendant condemning three acres of Defendant’s property necessary for an easement. The trial court determined that no unity of ownership existed as to the contiguous tracts of land owned by Defendant and Park Creek, LLC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that no unity of ownership existed between the Wayne Tracts and the LLC Tract for the purpose of determining compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, where Defendant and the LLC had a vested right to complete the subdivision pursuant to the pre-approved plan, unity of ownership existed between the adjacent properties. View "Town of Midland v. Wayne" on Justia Law

In building their home, Plaintiffs purchased SuperFlex, a stucco-like material, to cover the house’s exterior. GrailCoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. (collectively, GrailCoat), the manufacturers of SuperFlex, provided an express twenty-year warranty for the product. Several years after the construction of their home was completed, the product failed. Plaintiffs brought suit against GrailCoat and Hartley Construction, Inc., the company that had designed and built the home, for damages. Hartley moved for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-50(a)(5), North Carolina’s six-year statute of repose for claims arising out of improvements to real property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty against GrailCoat, holding that GrailCoat knowingly and freely entered into a valid contract of sale with Plaintiffs that provided for a warranty term that exceeded the repose period, and therefore, GrailCoat waived the protections provided by the statute of repose. View "Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between the trustee of a Trust and Fannie Mae concerning which party’s mortgage lien on certain apartments had priority status. N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-37(b) establishes a conclusive presumption that the conditions of prior liens are satisfied after fifteen years from either the date on which the instrument requires performance or the date of maturity of the last installment of debt. The statute further authorizes a senior lienholder to extend the “life of the lien” by filing an affidavit with the register of deeds. Here, the trial court granted summary judgment for Fannie Mae, ruling that, pursuant to section 45-37(b), the Trust’s lien had expired, and the Trust’s failure to file an affidavit extending the life of its lien enabled Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 45-37(b) allows creditors or purchasers for value from a grantor to benefit from the conclusive presumption that prior liens expire after fifteen years irrespective of when those creditors obtain their interest; and (2) in this case, section 45-37(b) acted to terminate the Trust’s lien and permitted Fannie Mae to foreclose on the property unencumbered by a senior lien. View "Falk v. Fannie Mae" on Justia Law

Borrowers applied from a home mortgage loan from Lender. During the transaction, a loan officer made an incorrect statement about lien priority. Borrowers later filed breach of fiduciary and negligent misrepresentation claims against Lender, alleging that the junior status of Lender’s lien decreased the marketability and value of their home and exposed them to increased liability. The trial court granted Lender’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. The Court of Appeals concluded that material issues of fact barred summary judgment on Borrowers’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, reasoning that Lender’s assurance of a first priority lien on Borrowers’ new mortgage loan was an act beyond the scope of a normal debtor-creditor relationship. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Lender on both claims where no fiduciary duty existed and where Plaintiffs did not forecast evidence that they made a reasonable inquiry into the validity of the loan officer’s statements. View "Dallaire v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the parents of Defendant's former husband, Tyson. Defendant and Tyson began living on a twenty-three-acre parcel of land owned by Plaintiffs in 1984. Defendant and Tyson made several improvements to eight acres of the property, including building a bridge and adding heat and running water to the house. Tyson moved away from the property in 2001. When Tyson began divorce proceedings in 2008, Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant vacate the property. Defendant refused to do so. In 2010, Plaintiffs successfully filed a complaint for summary ejectment against Defendant. Defendant appealed and counterclaimed to quiet title by way of adverse possession. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that Defendant only possessed a portion of the twenty-three acre parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not state in her pleading that she possessed just a portion of the disputed partial or present evidence implying that she sought adverse possession of anything less than the twenty-three acres, Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on adverse possession of a portion of the property. View "Minor v. Minor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sold a parcel of land adjacent to a golf club to New South Properties (New South) for development as a residential community. New South hired Hunter Construction Group (Hunter) to prepare the parcel for construction. Hunter built erosion control structures and devices, including a silt collection basin. However, a dam Hunter constructed to form the silt collection basin ruptured, causing mud, water, and debris to flood the golf course. As a result of the damage to the golf course, Plaintiffs filed an action against New South, Apple Creek and Hunter, alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act (SPCA). The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the SPCA claim. Plaintiffs appealed and withdrew their appeal against all defendants except Hunter. The court of appeals affirmed. Without considering the merits of Plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that because Hunter was never cited for a violation for section 113A-66 of the SPCA, Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a civil action against Hunter pursuant to section 113A-66. View "Applewood Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Tonya Bass executed an adjustable rate promissory note with Mortgage Lenders Network USA. The Note was then transferred several times: from Mortgage Lenders to Emax Financial Group, from Emax to Residential Funding Corporation, and from Residential Funding to U.S. Bank. The Note evidenced these transfers by three stamped imprints. In 2009, U.S. Bank filed this foreclosure action after Bass failed to make timely payments. The trial court dismissed the foreclosure action, concluding that because the Note was not properly indorsed and conveyed to Emax or Residential Funding, U.S. Bank was not the rightful holder of the Note. The court based its ruling that the first stamp was "unsigned" and failed to establish negotiation from Mortgage Lenders to Emax. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the indorsements on the Note unambiguously indicated the intent to transfer the Note from each preceding lender and finally to U.S. Bank; and (2) therefore, U.S. Bank was the holder of the Note and had the authority to bring this foreclosure action against Bass. View "In re Foreclosure of Bass" on Justia Law

A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were owners of a condominium unit, and Petitioner was the administrator and manager of the condominium. At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred in granting a judgment and dismissal in favor of Respondents, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 42, reasoning that Petitioner's lien and foreclosure claim against Respondents' condominium unit was invalid because it was based upon an improperly administered assessment and not a valid debt. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the matter to the trial court, concluding that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful, in that it was not uniform and not levied on a pro rata basis, but concluded further that Petitioner did have the authority to make the assessment against Respondents. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that Petitioner's assessment against Respondents' unit was unlawful because it was not applied uniformly nor calculated in accord with Respondents' percentage undivided interest in the common areas and facilities; and (2) held that the remaining issues addressed by the court of appeals were not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "In re Foreclosure of Johnson" on Justia Law