Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment for the Town of Pinebluff, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Session Law 1999-35 required Moore County to approve Pinebluff's expansion request.Session Law 1999-35 amended North Carolina's extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-360, as it pertained to Pinebluff. After Pinebluff annexed land extending beyond the town's corporate boundaries, Pinebluff requested that the Moore County Board of Commissioners adopt a resolution to authorize the expansion of Pinebluff's ETJ two miles beyond the annexed boundary, pursuant to section 160A-360. The Board denied the request. Pinebluff filed a complaint against Moore County seeking a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pinebluff and directed Moore County to adopt a resolution authorizing Pinebluff to exercise its ETJ within the proposed area. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between subsections (e) and (f) of section 160A-360, as modified by Session Law 1999-35, and that subsection (e) prohibits Pinebluff from extending its ETJ into the requested areas within an agreement between Pinebluff and Moore County. View "Town of Pinebluff v. Moore County" on Justia Law

In this case involving a disputed property line the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim and granting summary judgment and other relief to Defendant, holding that, under the circumstances, the intent of the parties concerning the boundary line was a question of fact to be determined by a jury.Only by reference to a recorded map, Defendant took ownership of the contested property. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and to quiet title. Defendants answered claiming the disputed land to be within its boundary. The conveyances at issue only referenced lot numbers on a recorded map, and the disputed property line as shown on the map was ambiguous. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the intent of the parties as shown on the map is ambiguous, a jury issue existed, and therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted. View "Daughtridge v. Tanager Land, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was when the claims that Plaintiffs asserted against Defendant, the Town of Carthage, accrued and whether Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a one-year, two-year, three-year, or ten-year statute of limitations and the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued upon the Town’s exaction of the unlawful impact fees against Plaintiffs; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims against the Town arose from a liability created by statute that was subject to the three-year statute of limitations set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(2); and (3) Plaintiffs’ claims against the Town were not barred by the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits. View "Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were entitled to seek compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 40A-51 based upon the extended flooding of their property as a result of actions taken by the City of Boiling Spring Lakes for an allegedly private purpose.The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, which concluded that Plaintiffs had proven their section 40A-51 cause of action because the City took a temporary easement in a portion of Plaintiffs’ property without filing a complaint containing a declaration of taking. In reversing, the court of appeals ruled that there can be no inverse condemnation when property is not taken for a public purpose. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a property owner seeking to assert a statutory inverse condemnation claim under section 40A-51 need not show that the condemnor acted to further a public purpose. View "Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes" on Justia Law

A showing of strict compliance with a corporate entity’s internal bylaws and governance procedures is not necessary for that entity to invoke the jurisdiction of the General Court of Justice.Plaintiffs, non-profit corporations representing homeowners in certain residential communities located in the City of Charlotte, instituted this litigation challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted by the City. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims because they failed to comply with various provisions in their corporate bylaws when they initiated this litigation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, despite Plaintiffs’ failure to comply strictly with their respective bylaws and internal governance procedures in deciding to initiate this suit, they possessed a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy” to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to adjudicate this legal dispute. View "Willowmere Community Ass'n v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

In this case seeking just compensation for the taking of property in Greensboro, the trial court erred in excluding testimony from a licensed real estate broker as an expert witness who would testify about the fair market value of the property before and after the taking.After a trial, the jury returned a verdict setting just compensation for the taking by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) of 2.193 acres of land in Greensboro at $350,000. Defendants appealed, arguing that their proposed expert’s report and his testimony on fair market value should have been admitted as evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial was warranted because N.C. Gen. Stat. 93A-83(f) did not prohibit the proposed expert from preparing his expert report on fair market value, and the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of the testimony about fair market value on that basis prejudiced Defendants. View "North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Mission Battleground Park, DST" on Justia Law

In this case seeking just compensation for the taking of property in Greensboro, the trial court erred in excluding testimony from a licensed real estate broker as an expert witness who would testify about the fair market value of the property before and after the taking.After a trial, the jury returned a verdict setting just compensation for the taking by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) of 2.193 acres of land in Greensboro at $350,000. Defendants appealed, arguing that their proposed expert’s report and his testimony on fair market value should have been admitted as evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial was warranted because N.C. Gen. Stat. 93A-83(f) did not prohibit the proposed expert from preparing his expert report on fair market value, and the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of the testimony about fair market value on that basis prejudiced Defendants. View "North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Mission Battleground Park, DST" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s order addressing the appropriate measure of damages in this condemnation action.The North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) condemned a leasehold interest held by Adams Outdoor Advertising of Charlotte Limited Partnership (Adams). Adams owned a billboard situated on the leasehold and rented out space on the billboard. At the time of the taking the billboard did not conform to city or state regulations, but Adams possessed permits that allowed for the billboard’s continued use. The Supreme Court held (1) the fair market value provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. Article 9 governed this condemnation proceeding; (2) the value added by the billboard, the evidence of rental income derived from leasing advertising space on the billboard, and the value added to the leasehold interest by the permits issued to Adams may be considered in determining the fair market value of the leasehold interest; (3) an automatic ten-year extension of a lease may be considered in determining the fair market value, but options to renew the lease may not be; and (4) bonus value method evidence offered by DOT may not be considered in determining the fair market value of the leasehold interest. View "Department of Transportation v. Adams Outdoor Advertising of Charlotte Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Borrowers executed a promissory note to purchase real property. The debt was secured by a deed of trust on the underlying real property. Bank, the alleged holder of note and subject deed of trust, filed a complaint against Borrowers under the deed of trust, seeking judicial foreclosure and judgment on the note, alleging that Borrowers defaulted under the terms of the note by failing to make payments. Borrowers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Bank failed to establish its status as a holder of the note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint adequately stated a cause of action for judicial foreclosure and that the court of appeals erred by applying the requirements applicable in non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale to Plaintiff’s judicial foreclosure action. View "U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Pinkney" on Justia Law

Borrowers executed a promissory note to purchase real property. The debt was secured by a deed of trust on the underlying real property. Bank, the alleged holder of note and subject deed of trust, filed a complaint against Borrowers under the deed of trust, seeking judicial foreclosure and judgment on the note, alleging that Borrowers defaulted under the terms of the note by failing to make payments. Borrowers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Bank failed to establish its status as a holder of the note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint adequately stated a cause of action for judicial foreclosure and that the court of appeals erred by applying the requirements applicable in non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale to Plaintiff’s judicial foreclosure action. View "U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Pinkney" on Justia Law