Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs owned approximately 94 acres of land in Wake County, North Carolina, with about 9.93 acres affected by the North Carolina Department of Transportation's (DOT) recording of a transportation corridor map on August 6, 1996. Under the now-repealed Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, this recording imposed significant restrictions on the plaintiffs’ rights to improve, develop, and subdivide that portion of their property. These restrictions lasted for nearly twenty years, ending only when the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on July 11, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that such restrictions constituted a taking requiring just compensation.After the rescission, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action in Wake County Superior Court, seeking compensation for the restrictions imposed from 1996 to 2016. The Superior Court found that DOT had effected a temporary taking under the Map Act and determined just compensation should be measured by the fair rental value of the property during the period of restriction. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the taking was temporary due to the legislative rescission, but reversed the measure of damages, directing that compensation be based on diminution in value during the period the restrictions were in effect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Map Act corridor recordings cause indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the time of recording, and legislative rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one for purposes of calculating just compensation. The Court ruled that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all relevant factors, including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

A flea market operator in Durham, North Carolina, received a notice of violation (NOV) from the city's planning department following a field inspection. The NOV stated that the market had failed to comply with an approved site plan, referencing the city’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), and warned of possible civil penalties unless corrective action was taken within thirty days. The NOV included copies of photographs and a copy of the site plan but did not specifically identify which aspects of the property were in violation or the specific corrective measures required.The market appealed the NOV to the City’s Board of Adjustment (BOA). At the quasi-judicial hearing, city staff explained that the NOV was intentionally broad because there were several violations, and listing each one would allow the market to fix only some issues. One BOA member expressed concern that the NOV’s lack of specificity failed to inform the market of the exact violations or needed corrections. Despite this, the BOA voted to deny the market’s appeal. The market then appealed to the Superior Court, Durham County, arguing that the NOV was too vague and did not comply with ordinance requirements. The superior court affirmed the BOA’s decision and ordered the market to come into compliance within thirty-six months. The market further appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the NOV sufficient under the UDO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal and held that the NOV did not comply with the city’s ordinance because it failed to provide a description of the specific violations as required by UDO § 15.2.1.C. The court concluded that property owners must receive enough detail to understand the alleged violations and what corrective action is required. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions for the city to dismiss the NOV. View "Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a large tract of land in Cumberland County, North Carolina. In 1992 and 2006, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed official corridor maps under the Map Act, which imposed restrictions on portions of the plaintiff’s property, limiting development and affecting value. In 2002 and 2010, NCDOT initiated two direct condemnation actions to acquire parts of the plaintiff’s land—some of which overlapped with the previously restricted areas—resulting in two settlements and consent judgments. After the 2010 settlement, 28.041 acres of the plaintiff’s property remained subject to Map Act restrictions until the maps were repealed in 2016.Following the repeal and a 2016 North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that Map Act restrictions constituted a taking, the plaintiff filed an inverse condemnation action in Cumberland County Superior Court in 2018. The plaintiff sought compensation specifically for the Map Act restrictions not addressed in prior settlements. The Superior Court dismissed some claims but allowed the action to proceed for the remaining 28.041 acres. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the Map Act restrictions were not barred and could proceed as an independent interest not covered by the earlier condemnation actions.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes, the plaintiff was required to raise claims related to the Map Act restrictions as part of the answer in NCDOT’s 2010 direct condemnation action, since those restrictions were pertinent to determining just compensation for the partial taking. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, he could not pursue a separate inverse condemnation claim for those restrictions under N.C.G.S. § 136-111. The Court’s disposition was to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a home in a subdivision governed by restrictive covenants that generally prohibit keeping animals other than up to three horses, unless the animals are “household pets” not kept for commercial purposes. After moving in, the plaintiffs acquired a flock of chickens, which at times numbered around sixty. The homeowners association notified the plaintiffs that keeping chickens violated the covenants and threatened fines. The plaintiffs argued that their chickens were household pets and not used commercially, while the association disagreed, citing the number of chickens and evidence suggesting some eggs were sold.In the Superior Court of Union County, both parties moved for summary judgment, but the court found factual disputes and sent the case to a jury. At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of their affectionate relationship with the chickens, while the association highlighted the flock’s size and evidence of egg sales. The jury found that the chickens were not household pets, and the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no evidence the chickens were not household pets and that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the motions for directed verdict and JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the chickens were not household pets. The Court also found no error in the trial court’s jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or limitations on closing arguments. The main holding is that whether the chickens qualified as household pets was a factual question for the jury, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict for the homeowners association. View "Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

A developer, Schooldev East, LLC, proposed to build a charter school in the Town of Wake Forest and applied for major subdivision and site plan permits. The proposed site was a 35-acre parcel within a larger tract of land. The developer's plans included constructing a multi-use path to provide pedestrian and bicycle access to nearby areas. The Town's planning board and board of commissioners (BOC) held hearings and ultimately denied the applications, citing non-compliance with the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) requirements for pedestrian and bicycle connectivity to surrounding residential areas.The Superior Court of Wake County affirmed the BOC's decision, concluding that the developer failed to demonstrate compliance with the UDO and that the Town's requirements were not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, also affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, agreeing that the developer did not meet its burden of production to show entitlement to the permits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that the UDO provision in question was unclear regarding whether it required connectivity to all surrounding residential areas. The Court held that any ambiguity in land use ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. The Court concluded that the developer had presented competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the UDO by proposing a multi-use path that provided access to a public park and a future residential subdivision. As no evidence was presented in opposition, the BOC had no basis to deny the applications. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the Town to approve the developer's applications. View "Schooldev East, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law