Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A minor, Freedom Morris, sought emergency treatment for appendicitis at Vidant Medical Center and was operated on by Dr. David Rodeberg. Despite complaining of severe pain after the surgery, Morris was discharged. He returned to the hospital a day later with a fever and sharp abdominal pain. A second surgery performed by a different doctor revealed that not all of the appendix had been removed during the first operation. This had caused a ruptured appendix and infection in Morris' body. Morris underwent a third surgery to drain a pelvic abscess.More than five years after the first surgery, Morris filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rodeberg and Vidant Medical Center alleging medical malpractice and medical negligence. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims of persons who are over ten years old but under eighteen years old when their claims accrue. The trial court denied the defendants' motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the three-year statute of limitations barred Morris' medical malpractice claims. The Court reasoned that while the North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that individuals under certain disabilities, including being a minor, are unable to appreciate the nature of potential legal claims and take appropriate action, subsection 1-17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminates the tolling of the medical malpractice claims of minors, except in certain situations. None of those exceptions applied to Morris' case, so his claim was subject to the standard three-year statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred. The Court did not address Morris' argument that the application of the three-year statute of limitations violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it did not have jurisdiction to review that issue. View "Morris v. Rodeberg" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court compelling discovery pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 37, holding that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact to support its ruling.Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against the defendants from which the decedent sought medical care. At issue was Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendants to comply with an existing discovery order. The trial court granted the motion but did not make specific findings of fact. The court of appeals remanded the case for the trial court to enter factual findings and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not specifically request findings of fact regarding the statutory elements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.22A; and (2) in the absence of such a request, the trial court was not required to make any findings of fact in resolving Plaintiff's motion to compel. View "Williams v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Harnett Health Systems, Inc.'s motion to dismiss this medical malpractice complaint for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint as the administrator of her husband's estate, alleging that Harnett Health violated the standard of care applicable to her husband at the time he was treated for renal failure. Plaintiff identified as an expert witness Dr. Gary Harris. Harnett Health moved to disqualify and exclude Dr. Harris on the grounds that he did not qualify as a standard of care expert under N.C. R. Evid. 702. The trial court granted the motion and then entered summary judgment in favor of Harnett Health. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Plaintiff reasonably believed her Rule 9(j) expert witness was willing to testify that Harnett Health violated the standard of care in the ways alleged in her complaint; and (2) the court of appeals utilized the correct standard of review in examining the trial court's grant of Harnett Health's motion to exclude another witness. View "Miller v. Carolina Coast Emergency Physicians, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion rendered by the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment entered upon the jury's verdict in favor of Defendants in this medical malpractice case, holding that it is appropriate to overrule Byrd v. Marion General Hospital, 202 N.C. 337 (1932), as it is applied to the facts of this case.During the preparation of an "ablation procedure" on three-year-old Amaya Gullatte's heart and shortly after she was induced with the anesthetic sevorflurance Amaya went into cardiac arrest, resulting in the onset of permanent brain damage, cerebral palsy, and profound developmental delay. During trial, the court excluded evidence offered by Plaintiffs intended to show that Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist Gus Vansoestbergen breached the professional duty of care governing his participation in the preparation and administration of the course of anesthesia. The ruling was dictated by the application of the principle set forth in Byrd establishing that nurses categorically do not owe a duty of care under the circumstances of this case. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's exclusion of Plaintiffs' expert testimony, holding that it is appropriate to overrule Byrd as it is applied to the facts of this case. View "Connette v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice and remanding the case to the trial court to give the parties an opportunity to gather and present evidence on a motion for summary judgment, holding that the trial court was not required to convert the motion to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff brought this action after being diagnosed with metastatic pancreatic cancer, arguing that Defendant swere negligent in failing to diagnose Plaintiff with cancer. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose in N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-15(c). The trial court dismissed the claims with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by ruling that the trial court considered matters outside the pleading, thus converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. View "Blue v. Bhiro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant in this medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant.Plaintiff went to the hospital complaining of slurred speech and numbness in her left arm. Defendant contacted Plaintiff's primary care physician and erroneously communicated that Plaintiff had no neurological deficits. Plaintiffs symptoms continued until she was admitted. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Defendant's negligence diminished her likelihood of full recovery, thus proximately causing her injury. At issue was whether Plaintiff's "loss of chance" at a better outcome following her stroke was a separate type of injury for which Plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting summary judgment for Defendant, holding that losing the chance for an increased opportunity for an improved outcome is not a cognizable and compensable claim in North Carolina. View "Parkes v. Hermann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals holding that Plaintiff failed properly to plead administrative negligence under N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.11(2)(b), holding that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on pain and suffering damages.Plaintiff failed a complaint for medical negligence against Defendant, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned verdicts finding that the decedent's death was caused by Defendant's negligence and negligent performance of administrative duties. The court of appeals reversed in part, vacated in part, and granting a new trial in part, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's award for pain and suffering, and (2) Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead administrative negligence. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on pain and suffering damages; (2) Plaintiff was not required to plead a claim for administrative negligence separate from medical negligence; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial; and (4) the trial court did not err by granting Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on contributory negligence. View "Estate of Savino v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that an internist proffered by Plaintiff to provide standard of care expert testimony against three hospitalists was properly qualified under N.C. R. Evid. 702(b) and that the evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the hospitalists proximately caused Plaintiff's injury.Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice action seeking recovery for the decedent's injury and death. The only claims remaining arose from the hospitalists' alleged medical negligence. During discovery, Plaintiff provided the deposition of Dr. Paul Genecin as expert testimony on the standard of care. The trial court concluded that Dr. Genecin did not qualify as an expert and, because Dr. Genecin was Plaintiff's only standard of care expert, granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Dr. Genecin was competent to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Dr. Genecin was qualified to testify to the standard of care, and his testimony sufficiently forecasted proximate cause; and (2) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause, and therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. View "Da Silva v. WakeMed" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff's complaint failed to comply with N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j), holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Plaintiff's expert witness was unwilling to testify that Defendant did not comply with the applicable standard of care.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) both the trial court and the court of appeals erred in failing to view the evidence regarding the expert witness's willingness to testify under Rule 9(j) in the light most favorable to Plaintiff; (2) in its de novo review, the court of appeals erred by deferring entirely to the findings of the trial court; and (3) the complaint should not be dismissed on Rule 9(j) grounds because the factual record demonstrated that the expert witness was willing to testify at the time of the filing of the complaint that Defendant breached the standard of care. View "Preston v. Movahed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Rule 9(j) does not permit a plaintiff to amend a timely filed medical malpractice complaint to cure a defective Rule 9(j) certification after the statute of limitations has run when the expert review required by Rule 9(j) occurred before the filing of the original complaint, holding that the procedures Plaintiff followed in this case were consistent with the letter and spirit of the rule.Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice complaint, but Plaintiff’s Rule 9(j) certification inadvertently used the language of a prior version of Rule 9(j). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to cure her defective Rule 9(j) certification. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that where Plaintiff did not file the complaint with the proper Rule 9(j) certification before the running of the statute of limitation, the complaint could not have been deemed to have commenced within the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her medical malpractice complaint to correct a purely technical pleading error under the circumstances of this case. View "Vaughan v. Mashburn" on Justia Law