Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a trooper, was dismissed from the State Highway Patrol for allegedly violating the Patrol’s truthfulness policy. The State Personnel Commission (SPC) concluded that Petitioner’s dismissal was supported by just cause. The superior court reversed, determining that Petitioner’s conduct did not provide just cause for dismissal and that the decision to dismiss Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the official who dismissed Petitioner proceeded under a misapprehension of the law that he had no discretion over the range of discipline he could administer; and (2) as such, by upholding the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety’s use of a per se rule of mandatory dismissal for all violations of a particular policy, the SPC failed to examine the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s individual case as required by the state’s jurisprudence. Remanded for a decision by the employing agency as to whether Petitioner should be dismissed based upon the facts of this case and without the application of a per se rule. View "Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Georgia, entered into an employment contract with Employer. Plaintiff was in South Carolina when he signed the offer letter. Plaintiff later transferred to Employer's Charlotte, North Carolina division, but Plaintiff never had a route that involved any deliveries in North Carolina during his employment with Employer. After Plaintiff received a work-related injury, Plaintiff began receiving disability and medical compensation according to Georgia law. Plaintiff later filed a claim for benefits with the North Carolina Industrial Commission. The Commission concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s transfer to Employer’s Charlotte division involved a modification of Plaintiff’s employment contract, and that the modification was a proper basis to find the contract was “made” within North Carolina for purposes of establishing the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-36, which authorizes compensation pursuant to North Carolina law if an individual’s employment contract was “made” in North Carolina, does not apply to a contract initially made in another state and subsequently modified in North Carolina. View "Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Plaintiff was terminated later that year for “reduction of staff due to lack of work.” Employer accepted Plaintiff’s injury as compensable. In January 2009, Plaintiff began to receive unemployment benefits from Employer and Insurer (together, Defendants). In December 2010, Defendants sought to terminate payment of compensation, alleging that Plaintiff could no longer show he was disabled. The Industrial Commission concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after December 2010 and that Defendants were entitled to a credit for any payments they had made after that date, finding that Plaintiff’s inability to find work was not due to his injury but to large-scale economic factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove that his inability to earn the same wages as before his injury resulted from his work-related injury. View "Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury while working for Defendant. Since Plaintiff's injury, his wife (Wife) attended to his needs. The North Carolina Industrial Commission later determined that Plaintiff required attendant care services, which Wife provided. Plaintiff and Defendant disagreed whether Wife should be compensated for the attendant care she provided Plaintiff before the Commission approved her rendering that service. The Commission concluded that Wife's attendant care services were medical compensation for which Defendant was responsible and further compensated Wife for the attendant care services previously provided. The court of appeals reversed in part the opinion and award entered by the Commission that provided retroactive compensation for Wife's attendant care services to her husband. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals on that issue because the court relied on a provision of the Commission's medical fee schedule that was not authorized by the legislature. Remanded. View "Mehaffey v. Burger King" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a secretary and office assistant at a middle school, was sprayed when a fire extinguisher Defendant was handling was abruptly discharged. Defendant was the principal of the school. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging gross negligence and loss of consortium on the part of her husband. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant willfully and wantonly engaged in reckless behavior when he was playing with the fire extinguisher, causing it to spray her, and that the spraying aggravated a preexisting medical condition. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's claim, as well as a summary judgment motion. The trial court denied both motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were co-employees, allowing Plaintiff to sue Defendant personally under the exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision established in Pleasant v. Johnson; but (2) Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to survive Defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Trivette v. Yount" on Justia Law