Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A child, referred to as Liam, suffered severe injuries at one month old, including multiple fractures and bruises, while in the care of his parents. The Onslow County Department of Social Services (DSS) took custody of Liam, who now requires extensive medical care due to cerebral palsy and other conditions resulting from the abuse. Liam was placed with foster parents, Daniel and Jessica Hall, who have provided him with a stable and nurturing environment. Liam's maternal grandfather expressed interest in custody but admitted he could not provide the necessary care.The District Court of Onslow County adjudicated Liam as abused and neglected and held multiple permanency-planning hearings. The court ultimately awarded custody to the Halls, finding that reunification with the parents was not in Liam's best interest due to their inability to explain his injuries and the mother's failure to participate in his medical care. The court also considered but did not find the maternal grandfather a suitable caretaker.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order, finding the trial court's findings insufficient under relevant statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new hearing.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements, including considerations of the child's best interests and the feasibility of reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order awarding custody to the Halls and converting the case to a Chapter 50 civil custody proceeding. View "In re L.L." on Justia Law

In this juvenile proceeding, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) received several reports in 2021 regarding the respondent mother’s interactions with her children, Amanda, Jade, and Juliet. Incidents included the mother breaking a car window to reach Jade, hitting her with a belt, and leaving her outside in cold weather. DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency for the children. The trial court admitted statements from Jade, who did not testify, and concluded that all three children were neglected and that Jade and Juliet were dependent.The District Court of Pitt County entered an order based on these findings. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that many of the trial court’s findings were based on inadmissible hearsay and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the juvenile petitions. The Court of Appeals held that the remaining findings were insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of neglect and dependency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals did not adequately examine whether the remaining findings supported the trial court’s conclusions or whether the record contained sufficient evidence to support necessary findings. The Supreme Court determined that while some findings were unsupported, the record contained clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that could support the necessary findings for neglect and dependency adjudications. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, allowing the trial court to enter a new order based on the existing record or conduct further proceedings as necessary. View "In re A.J., J.C., J.C" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joshua Reber, who was convicted for sexually abusing a young child. The child, K.W., testified in detail about the abuse, which began when she was eight years old. Reber admitted to taking K.W. into the woods alone at night without informing anyone but denied any sexual abuse. During his testimony, Reber also discussed his normal sexual relationships with adult women. The prosecutor cross-examined Reber about his text messages with a woman named Danielle, which indicated sexual encounters. Reber did not object to these questions.The jury found Reber guilty, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 300 to 420 months in prison. Reber appealed, arguing that the admission of his cross-examination testimony and the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were errors. The Court of Appeals reversed Reber’s convictions, holding that the introduction of the challenged evidence on cross-examination amounted to plain error and that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened on its own initiative.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the admission of the cross-examination testimony was not plain error and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were not so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Reber’s remaining arguments. View "State v. Reber" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating an adjudication of J.U. for simple assault and battery, holding that the juvenile petition supported each element of misdemeanor sexual battery.The State filed a juvenile petition alleging that J.U. committed simple assault and battery. The district court adjudicated J.U. delinquent for simple assault and battery and entered a Level II disposition order. The court of appeals vacated the lower court's adjudication order in part and the disposition order in its entirety, concluding that the juvenile petition was "fatally defective" and failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition complied with statutory pleading standards and that no other jurisdictional defect existed. View "In re J.U." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision vacating a juvenile's adjudications for first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and a disposition order but reversed the court's holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile's attempted-larceny admission, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a new dispositional order as to that offense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by denying the juvenile's motions to dismiss second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and first-degree forcible sexual offense; (2) the trial court did not err by accepting the juvenile's admission of attempted larceny; (3) the level 3 disposition and commitment order entered by the trial court must be vacated; and (4) the matter cannot be remanded for the entry of a new disposition order because the trial court's jurisdiction terminated when the juvenile turned eighteen years old. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court denying a juvenile's motion to dismiss a petition alleging disorderly conduct, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication for disorderly conduct.Two juvenile petitions were filed in the district court alleging that Juvenile was delinquent because of his commission of the offenses of disorderly conduct and resisting a public officer. The district court denied Juvenile's motion to dismiss the petitions and adjudicated Juvenile to be delinquent. The court of appeals vacated the adjudications, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Juvenile's adjudications for the offenses. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication for disorderly conduct; but (2) the court of appeals did not err in vacating the adjudication and disposition orders in regard to the charge of resisting a public officer. View "In re T.T.E." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that the suppression motion contained sufficient findings of fact to support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-2101 before making certain incriminating statements.The court of appeals determined that the totality of the circumstances set forth in the record did not fully support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s findings of fact had adequate evidentiary support, and those findings supported the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile rights; and (2) in reaching a contrary conclusion, the court of appeals failed to focus upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and to give proper deference to those findings. View "State v. Saldierna" on Justia Law

At issue was the validity of the procedures prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1340.19A - 15A-1340.19(D) (the Act) for the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in light of Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012) and its progeny.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, a sentence that was then mandatory. After Miller was decided, the trial court resentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act but reversed the resentencing judgment, concluding that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its decision to impose the sentence. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) the Act does not incorporate a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of a theory other than the felony murder rule; (2) the Act is not impermissibly vague, conducive to the imposition of arbitrary punishments, or an unconstitutional ex post facto law; and (3) further sentencing proceedings are required in this case. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

The Juvenile Code does not mandate that a petition alleging a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent must be filed only by the director or authorized agent of the department of social services of the county “in which the juvenile resides or is found.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-101.The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Division (YFS) filed a juvenile petition with the District Court in Mecklenburg County alleging that A.P. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court concluded that A.P. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that YFS did not have standing to file the juvenile petition because Mecklenburg County was not the juvenile’s county of residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory sections in the Juvenile Code governing parties and venue did not mandate dismissal of the juvenile petition under the circumstances of this case. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Following a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating both parents' parental rights to J.H.K. and J.D.K. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in conducting the TPR hearing when the minor children's non-attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) volunteer was not physically present in court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the children were not represented by a GAL at a critical stage of the termination proceedings pursuant to the juvenile code. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a local GAL program represents a juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-601 and 7B-1108 by performing the duties listed in section 7B-601 and that the non-lawyer GAL volunteer is not required to be physically present at the TPR hearing. The Court concluded that the GAL met its obligations in the present case under the statutes.View "In re J.H.K. and J.D.K." on Justia Law