Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which is responsible for issuing permits for animal waste management systems. In 2019, the DEQ added three new conditions to its general permits for swine, poultry, and cattle operations: requirements for monitoring wells in floodplains, a Phosphorous Loss Assessment Tool analysis with mitigation, and annual reporting. These conditions were not present in the previous 2014 permits but were included in a draft permit as part of a 2018 settlement with environmental groups. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation challenged the new conditions, arguing that the DEQ had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment to the Farm Bureau, finding that the new conditions were “rules” under the APA and thus invalid because they had not been adopted through the required rulemaking process. The Superior Court, Wake County, reversed the OAH, holding that the conditions were not “rules” because they only applied to those who opted for general permits, not all permittees, and thus lacked general applicability. The court also cited legislative history and statutory language to support its conclusion.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the conditions were generally applicable regulations and thus “rules” under the APA, requiring formal rulemaking. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the three general permit conditions are “rules” within the meaning of the APA and are invalid until adopted through the APA’s rulemaking process. The court clarified that while general permits themselves need not be adopted as rules, generally applicable conditions within them must be. View "N.C. Dep't of Env't Quality v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc." on Justia Law

A health care provider operating imaging centers in Wake County, North Carolina, and a major hospital system both applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to acquire a new fixed MRI scanner, as required by state law. The state’s 2021 plan determined that only one additional scanner could be approved in the county. The provider sought to place the scanner in Wake Forest, while the hospital system proposed a location in Raleigh. After a competitive review, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services awarded the CON to the hospital system, finding its application more effective under certain comparative factors.The provider challenged this decision in the Office of Administrative Hearings, alleging the agency’s review was flawed and prejudicial. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the agency’s comparative analysis contained errors, deviated from established practices, and was based on subjective judgment rather than expertise or proper procedure. The ALJ reversed the agency’s decision and awarded the CON to the provider, also finding that the provider suffered substantial prejudice from the denial.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the appellants failed to challenge specific findings of fact, which made those findings binding on appeal. The court applied the whole record review standard, focusing on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, under current law, the ALJ’s final decision—not the agency’s—is the focus of judicial review, and a high degree of deference is owed to the ALJ’s findings. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment regarding the comparative analysis but reversed on the issue of substantial prejudice, finding that the provider, as a denied applicant, was inherently prejudiced by the agency’s decision. The award of the CON to the provider was affirmed. View "Pinnacle Health Servs. of N.C. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at Winston-Salem State University was terminated in 2017 for failing to fulfill essential job duties, including grading and teaching, and for sending a letter to a colleague containing offensive racial slurs. The professor challenged his dismissal through the university’s administrative process, arguing, among other things, that the university did not follow its own rules and regulations regarding the termination of tenured faculty.The case proceeded from the university’s Board of Trustees to the University of North Carolina Board of Governors, then to the Superior Court in Forsyth County, and finally to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. At each stage, the professor’s claims were rejected. The Court of Appeals held that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous, relying on federal law principles.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the standard for judicial review of state agency interpretations of their own regulations. The court held that, under North Carolina law, courts must apply de novo review to state agency interpretations of state rules and regulations, meaning courts are not bound by the agency’s interpretation but may consider it as informative. The court expressly rejected any rule requiring judicial deference to state agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations and overruled contrary lower court precedent. On a separate issue, the court determined that the Court of Appeals dissent erred in suggesting a remand was necessary for further First Amendment analysis, holding that appellate courts may resolve such legal questions de novo without remand if the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Mitchell v. Univ. of N.C. Bd. of Governors" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and employees in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders required bars to remain closed for over 400 days, while allowing other businesses, including restaurants, breweries, and wineries, to reopen under certain restrictions. The plaintiffs argued that this differential treatment lacked a meaningful public health justification and violated their constitutional and statutory rights. They also sought records supporting the Governor’s decisions and claimed entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act.In the Superior Court, Wake County, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss, finding that the executive orders were reasonable and based on scientific data. The trial court also dismissed the statutory claims, concluding that the Emergency Management Act did not provide compensation for mere restrictions on business operations and that the Public Records Act claim was moot because the requested records had been produced. The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had effectively granted summary judgment and vacated that order on the constitutional claims, remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals applied rational basis review to the Fruits of Labor claim and strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, finding the Governor’s actions unjustified under both standards. It affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Fruits of Labor claim and that the proper legal standard, as clarified in Ace Speedway, is not rational basis but a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the government’s action was reasonably necessary to promote a public good. The Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ remand for further proceedings on this claim, allowing additional discovery. However, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ application of strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, holding that rational basis review applies to economic regulations not involving a suspect class or fundamental right. The Court affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims, finding no entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act and no jurisdiction for the Public Records Act claim due to failure to complete required mediation. View "Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol and becoming heavily intoxicated, joined a group of friends at a municipal golf course and later proceeded to the driving range. While at the driving range, the plaintiff sat in a golf cart, distracted by his phone and unaware of his surroundings. The cart’s exact position was disputed, but evidence showed it was in or near the range of play. Defendant Hendricks, one of the group, hit a golf ball from the tee-off area, which struck the plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. The plaintiff did not see the ball coming and was unaware of the risk due to his lack of attention and intoxication.The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Superior Court, Wilson County, against both Hendricks and the City of Wilson, alleging negligent conduct and inadequate safety measures. Both defendants raised contributory negligence as a defense, and the City also asserted governmental immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed, and a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s lack of situational awareness, due in part to intoxication and distraction, barred recovery. The majority also found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cart’s location or movement and declined to address governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the risk of injury was open and obvious, and a reasonably prudent person would have recognized and avoided the danger. The Court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, as contributory negligence was dispositive. View "Moseley v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and operators in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders initially required bars to close statewide, then imposed restrictions that effectively prevented them from operating, such as prohibiting onsite consumption of alcohol and limiting service to outdoor areas only. Some bars could not reopen at all due to lack of outdoor space, while others found the restrictions made operation unprofitable. The restrictions lasted for approximately nine months, during which time the plaintiffs allege they were forced to remain closed or operate at a loss.After the Governor allowed bars to fully reopen, the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Carteret County, alleging that the executive orders violated their fundamental rights to earn a living under the North Carolina Constitution. They sought damages and other relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the constitutional claims to proceed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated colorable constitutional claims and that sovereign immunity did not bar their action.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that, under established precedent, plaintiffs may bring direct constitutional claims against the state when they allege a violation of their rights and lack an adequate alternative remedy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could support violations of their rights to earn a living under the Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause. The Court also clarified that plaintiffs are not required to plead that they seek the least intrusive remedy at this stage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "Howell v. Cooper" on Justia Law

An employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, responsible for training and certifying school bus drivers, was terminated after admitting to recertifying five bus drivers without conducting the required ride-along observations. The Department asserted that this conduct violated a criminal statute, N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1, which makes it a felony for an employee to knowingly enter false information concerning a driver’s license or special identification card into department records, and mandates dismissal for such violations. The Department argued that the false information about school bus driver certificates fell within the statute’s scope.The employee challenged his termination before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the statute did not apply because the information at issue concerned school bus driver certificates, not driver’s licenses, and concluded that the Department failed to prove just cause for termination. The Department appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since a school bus driver must have both a commercial driver’s license and a school bus driver’s certificate, false information about the certificate was “concerning a driver’s license,” especially since the information was entered into the same database as driver’s license records. The Court of Appeals did not address the just cause issue, finding the statutory violation dispositive.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified that courts must apply de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation, expressly rejecting any rule requiring deference to agency interpretations of state statutes. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1 does not apply to false information concerning school bus driver certificates, as the statute is limited to driver’s licenses and special identification cards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Savage v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Dr. Bruce Cairns, a division chief in the Department of Surgery and Medical Director of the Jaycee Burn Center at UNC Hospitals, was sued by Dr. James Hwang, a former surgeon at the UNC Burn Center. Dr. Hwang alleged that Dr. Cairns harassed him and created a hostile work environment, leading to his resignation. The case also involved a complaint filed with the UNC School of Medicine Human Resources Department, accusing Dr. Hwang of inappropriate behavior at a going-away party. Dr. Hwang claimed that Dr. Cairns falsely accused him of misconduct, including touching female coworkers inappropriately.The Superior Court of Durham County denied Dr. Cairns's motion to dismiss, finding that he was not entitled to public official immunity. The court also denied summary judgment, citing conflicting evidence about the origin of the Human Resources complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Dr. Cairns was a public official entitled to immunity and that Dr. Hwang did not provide sufficient evidence of malice.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that Dr. Cairns was not a public official entitled to public official immunity. The court found that his positions as division chief and Medical Director were not created by statute and did not involve the exercise of sovereign power. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the parties' outstanding arguments. View "Hwang v. Cairns" on Justia Law