Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court entered an ex parte Domestic Violence Order of Protection (DVPO) against Defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50B-3. The court ordered Defendant in the DVPO to surrender his firearms and ammunition and further ordered that law enforcement officers shall search “Defendant’s person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.” When officers served the DVPO on Defendant at his residence, they entered the house to execute the search for weapons. Once inside the home, officers found a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was subsequently charged with drug-related offenses. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the relevant DVPO statutes do not authorize the district court to order a general search of Defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence for weapons; and (2) the ex parte DVPO was not a de facto search warrant. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) section 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of a defendant’s residence under a civil DVPO; and (2) because the search of Defendant’s home was conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement, it violated Defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. View "State v. Elder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for one count of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory rape, and first-degree sex offense with a child. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent two consecutive notes to the court indicating that they were deadlocked. The judge instructed the jurors to continue with their deliberations. The jury eventually found Defendant guilty of one count of first-degree statutory rape but failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining two counts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two counts on which the jury deadlocked. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-1235(c), which sets out procedures a trial court may follow when a jury is deadlocked, and that the error resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury.The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the instructions, any error was not preserved and was subject to plain error review; and (2) applying this standard, the trial court’s instructions did not result in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury. View "State v. May" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for the first-degree murders of three women, including Heather Catterton and Randi Saldana. Defendant was first tried capitally for the Catteron murder, which was the matter at issue in this appeal. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury recommended, and the trial court entered, a sentence of death. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court erred by (1) allowing admission of an excessive amount of the Saldana murder evidence under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) allowing Saldana’s sister to testify about Saldana’s good character; and (3) allowing the prosecution to argue without basis to the jury that defense counsel had in effect suborned perjury. Further, the cumulative effect of these three errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Hembree" on Justia Law

In 1973, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary for which he was sentenced to imprisonment “for his natural life.” In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief (MAR) asking the trial court to set aside his sentence on the burglary charge as cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court granted Defendant’s MAR, vacated the judgment in the second-degree burglary case, and resentenced Defendant to a term of thirty years. After giving credit for time served, the trial court ordered that Defendant be immediately released. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the original 1973 judgment and commitment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State of an MAR when the defendant has won relief from the trial court. View "State v. Stubbs" on Justia Law

When two detectives were parked in Defendant’s driveway, they saw three potted marijuana plants within the home’s curtilage. The detectives seized the plants before returning the next day with a warrant to search Defendant’s home. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the seized plants, claiming that discovery of the plants was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure of the plants violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the detectives’ seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Grice" on Justia Law

Defendant was one of a group of prisoners called Bowden-class inmates who committed offenses between 1974 and 1978 and received death sentences that were later reduced to life imprisonment. Defendant accrued various credits during his incarceration, and the Department of Correction (DOC) applied some of Defendant’s credits towards earlier parole eligibility but not towards the calculation of an unconditional release date. In 2005, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was entitled to immediate release from prison because, after applying his various credits, he had completed his life sentence. The trial court ultimately concluded that all of Defendant’s credits should be applied to his sentence for all purposes, including calculating an unconditional release date, and the DOC erred in refusing to apply Defendant’s credits in this way. The trial court then determined that Defendant had served his entire sentence and ordered the DOC to release Defendant unconditionally. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DOC was not required to apply the credits towards the calculation for an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate, and therefore, Defendant remained lawfully incarcerated and was not entitled to release. View "State v. Bowden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under theories of both premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred by declining to give an accessory before the instruction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-5.2 and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder under a theory of felony murder was supported by ample evidence, and therefore, no new trial was warranted, and the conviction must stand. View "State v. Grainger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree sexual offense, three counts of first-degree rape, and five counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding (1) the trial court erred in prohibiting witness testimony about Defendant’s character of being respectful towards children; and (2) the trial court erred in not substituting the term “alleged victim” for the word “victim” in the pattern jury instructions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in prohibiting evidence of Defendant’s respectful attitude towards children, as the proffered evidence was not sufficiently tailored to the State’s charges of child sexual abuse and was thus inadmissible; and (2) the trial court’s use of the term “victim” in the jury instructions was not impermissible commentary on a disputed issue of fact, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to use the phrase “alleged victim” instead of the word “victim” in its charge to the jury. View "State v. Walston" on Justia Law