Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After experiencing significant water damage in their home when a water heater malfunctioned in July 2017, the plaintiffs hired the defendant company to remediate the damage. The parties executed an agreement that included a prominent clause limiting the time to bring any claim related to the contract to one year from when the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the cause of action. The defendant did not commence the remediation work, and the plaintiffs eventually hired another company. Despite this, their home developed extensive mold and was ultimately demolished. Nearly three years after becoming aware of the defendant’s failure to perform, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices.The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the contractual one-year limitation period. The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals held that the one-year contractual limitation was unenforceable as applied to claims under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), reasoning that public policy and the statute’s purpose precluded contractual abrogation of the four-year limitation period established by N.C.G.S. § 75-16.2.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, absent a statute prohibiting it, parties may contractually shorten the period for bringing claims, including UDTPA claims, so long as the agreed period is reasonable. The legislature had not prohibited such contractual limitation periods, and the one-year period was not shown to be unreasonable. Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc" on Justia Law

A law firm provided legal services to a construction business owned by Nick Muntjan. Before the engagement, Nick’s father, Paul Muntjan, orally promised to pay for the firm’s services. The firm then sent an engagement letter addressed to both Nick and Paul, but neither signed it. Subsequently, Paul sent several emails to the firm in which he discussed payment for the services, referenced invoices, and used language indicating shared responsibility for payment. Some payments were made using Paul’s credit card, but a significant balance remained unpaid.To recover the unpaid fees, the law firm sued Paul Muntjan in the District Court, Wake County, alleging breach of contract. After a bench trial, the court found that Paul had promised to pay for the firm’s services and concluded that his promise was an “original promise,” not subject to the statute of frauds, so no written agreement was required. The court entered judgment in favor of the law firm.Paul appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The majority found that Paul’s promise was a collateral guaranty to pay his son’s debts and therefore must satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires such an agreement to be in writing and signed. The majority also found that Paul’s emails did not clearly express a written promise to pay and thus did not satisfy the statute. A dissenting judge argued that the statute of frauds was satisfied by the emails.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Paul’s emails constituted a sufficient written memorandum of his oral guaranty to pay the debts, satisfying the statute of frauds under N.C.G.S. § 22-1. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP v. Muntjan" on Justia Law

A real estate development dispute arose when three businessmen, each controlling separate entities, formed an LLC to redevelop property in Charlotte. The plaintiff, through one entity, held a minority interest and served as a manager with another member. The operating agreement contained strict requirements for transferring membership interests, including the need for prior written consent from both managers. Tensions developed among the partners, and two of them attempted to transfer their interests to new holding companies and later voted to remove the plaintiff as manager. There was, however, no evidence that the formal requirements for transferring membership interests—such as written consent—were ever met.The case was designated a mandatory complex business case and heard in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, sitting as the North Carolina Business Court. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the attempted transfers were valid, rendering the removal of the plaintiff as manager invalid, and further alleged breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The Business Court found that the plaintiff failed to show the transfer provisions of the operating agreement were followed, so the original members retained their interests and the removal of the plaintiff as manager was valid. The court also ruled that no fiduciary duty arises among a coalition of minority LLC members absent a single majority member with control, and thus dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case on appeal. It affirmed the Business Court’s order and opinion, holding that the plaintiff failed to show compliance with the operating agreement’s transfer provisions and that there was no basis to impose a fiduciary duty on a coalition of minority LLC members. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Cherry Oil is a closely held corporation in eastern North Carolina, primarily owned and managed by members of the Cherry and Mauck families. Armistead and Louise Mauck, who together own 34% of the company’s shares, became involved in the business after Armistead was invited to join during a period of financial difficulty. In 1998, the families formalized their relationship through a Shareholder Agreement, which included provisions allowing either party to force a buyout of shares at fair market value. Over time, disputes arose regarding management and succession, culminating in the Maucks’ removal from the board and Cherry Oil’s attempt to buy out their shares. The buyout process stalled, leaving the Maucks as minority shareholders no longer employed by the company.The Maucks filed suit in Superior Court, Lenoir County, asserting claims for judicial dissolution under N.C.G.S. § 55-14-30, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and breach of the Shareholder Agreement. The case was designated a mandatory complex business case and assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. The Business Court dismissed most claims, including the judicial dissolution claim for lack of standing, finding that the Shareholder Agreement’s buyout provision provided an adequate remedy. It also dismissed other claims for reasons such as untimeliness and insufficient factual allegations. The court later granted summary judgment to defendants on the remaining claims, concluding that the actions taken by the Cherry family were valid corporate acts and that the Maucks had not demonstrated breach of duty or contract.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Maucks did have standing to seek judicial dissolution but affirmed the dismissal of that claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Shareholder Agreement’s buyout provision provided a sufficient remedy and that the complaint did not allege facts showing dissolution was reasonably necessary. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Business Court’s rulings. View "Mauck v. Cherry Oil Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were business associates who sought to purchase three restaurants known as Jib Jab. Plaintiff, with a background in investing, initiated negotiations and sought a partner with restaurant experience, leading to an oral agreement with defendant. Plaintiff was to handle acquisition terms and financing, while defendant would manage operations. No written partnership agreement was executed. Both parties made several unsuccessful attempts to secure financing, including SBA loans, but neither was willing to personally guarantee the loan, and plaintiff refused to pay off defendant’s unrelated SBA debts. Eventually, defendant proceeded alone, secured financing, and purchased Jib Jab through an entity he formed, without plaintiff’s involvement.Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging the formation of a common law partnership and asserting direct and derivative claims against defendant and the purchasing entity, including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, misappropriation of business opportunity, and requests for judicial dissolution and accounting. Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, resulting in dismissal of all derivative claims, certain direct claims, and claims for constructive trust. The remaining claims were plaintiff’s direct claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and claims for judicial dissolution and accounting.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims, holding that North Carolina law does not permit derivative actions by a general partner on behalf of a general partnership. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of conclusory tortious interference claims and upheld the Business Court’s decision to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and disregard an unsworn expert report. Finally, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that no partnership existed due to lack of agreement on material terms, and that plaintiff failed to show he could have completed the purchase but for defendant’s actions. View "Cutter v. Vojnovic" on Justia Law

Daniel Jones signed a blank application for a homeowner’s insurance policy, trusting his agent, J. Kim Hatcher Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Hatcher), to complete it accurately. Jones relied on Hatcher’s assurance based on their prior dealings and the commission Hatcher would earn. After Hurricane Florence destroyed Jones’s home, his insurer refused to cover the losses, citing material misrepresentations in the application. Jones discovered that Hatcher had omitted the existence of a pond and understated the property size.Jones sued Hatcher for negligence and gross negligence, among other claims. Hatcher moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing contributory negligence. The trial court granted Hatcher’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that dismissal was not warranted as the complaint did not necessarily defeat Jones’s claim for ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the dismissal of Jones’s claim for punitive damages.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Jones’s complaint did not show contributory negligence as a matter of law, as the factual circumstances could support that Jones acted with ordinary prudence in trusting Hatcher. The court also found that Jones’s complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for punitive damages based on Hatcher’s willful and wanton conduct, giving Hatcher adequate notice of the claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision on the contributory negligence issue and reversed its decision on the punitive damages issue. View "Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC, a manufacturer and distributor of high-speed circular knitting machines, sued its former president and CEO, William Moody, and his associated entities, Nova Trading USA, Inc., and Nova Wingate Holdings, LLC. The lawsuit stemmed from an investigation by Pai Lung Machinery Mill Co. Ltd., which owns a majority interest in Vanguard Pai Lung, revealing alleged fraud and embezzlement by Moody. Plaintiffs brought sixteen claims, including fraud, conversion, embezzlement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment. Defendants counterclaimed with twelve claims primarily based on alleged breaches of contract.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, designated as a mandatory complex business case, heard the case. After a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on several claims, including fraud and conversion, defendants filed post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The business court ruled that several issues raised in the JNOV motion were not preserved because they were not included in the directed verdict motion. The court also denied defendants' other post-trial motions on the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court affirmed the business court's decision, endorsing the rule that to preserve an issue for a JNOV motion under Rule 50(b), the movant must have timely moved for a directed verdict on that same issue. The court agreed that the business court correctly determined that several of defendants' arguments were not preserved and properly rejected the remaining post-trial arguments on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and post-trial orders of the business court. View "Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody" on Justia Law

During the Fall 2020 semester, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, North Carolina State University (NCSU) and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) transitioned to online classes and closed their campuses. Students, including the plaintiffs, sought refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits paid for services and facilities they could no longer access. The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina moved to dismiss the lawsuit, citing sovereign immunity, which generally protects the State and its agencies from being sued.The Superior Court of Wake County denied the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claims but dismissed the constitutional claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply to valid contract claims against the State. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that implied contracts existed between them and the universities for the provision of services and facilities funded by the fees.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that sovereign immunity does not bar the breach of contract claims at this stage. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the plaintiffs had alleged the existence of express contracts, not implied ones. The court held that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the universities made offers to provide specific services and facilities in exchange for mandatory fees, which the plaintiffs accepted by paying those fees. Therefore, the court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, allowing the breach of contract claims to proceed. View "Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C" on Justia Law

A clothing retailer, Cato Corporation, with over 1,300 stores, purchased an "all-risk" commercial property insurance policy from Zurich American Insurance Company in July 2019. In the spring of 2020, Cato alleged that the COVID-19 virus and related government orders forced it to close or severely curtail operations, causing significant revenue losses and expenses for remediation and reconfiguration of its stores. Cato sought coverage for these losses under its insurance policy, but Zurich refused, leading Cato to file a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract and violations of North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cato's claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in North State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that tangible alteration to the property was necessary to recover for a "direct physical loss of or damage" to property, which Cato failed to allege sufficiently.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal but disagreed with its reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that Cato sufficiently alleged a "direct physical loss of or damage" to property under the precedent set in North State Deli. However, the Court found that the viral contamination exclusion in Cato's policy precluded coverage for the alleged losses. Therefore, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals' decision but affirmed its judgment dismissing Cato's claims. View "Cato Corp. v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Circle of Seven, LLC, left a Dodge Ram truck on a foreclosed property. The new property owner hired Bottoms Towing & Recovery to remove the truck. Bottoms Towing later sought to sell the truck to cover unpaid towing and storage fees. Circle of Seven contested the sale and the lien amount, arguing that the towing company had used the truck without authorization, which should reduce the lien.The Superior Court of Nash County held a hearing where Circle of Seven presented testimony from its managing member and an employee. The court found that Bottoms Towing had driven the truck and made unnecessary alterations, reducing the lien by $1,427.14 for maintenance and $62.50 for unauthorized use. Circle of Seven appealed, claiming the reduction was insufficient.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, with a divided opinion. The majority found that the trial court's findings were supported by competent evidence. The dissent argued that Bottoms Towing unlawfully converted the truck for personal use and that the lien should be reduced based on the truck's loss in market value due to this conversion.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case based on the dissent. The Court held that it could not address the dissent's theory because Circle of Seven had not raised the conversion argument or presented evidence on the truck's value in the lower courts. The Court emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bottoms Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Circle of Seven, LLC" on Justia Law