Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Based upon an affidavit by a state law enforcement officer, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s home and outbuildings on his property. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant and seized fifty-five marijuana plans, indoor growing supplies, firearms and ammunition, and $1540 in cash. Defendant was indicted for maintaining a dwelling to keep a controlled substance, manufacture of a controlled substance, and trafficking in marijuana by possession, among other offenses. The trial court suppressed the items seized under the search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. View "State v. Benters" on Justia Law

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a firefighter for driving erratically. Defendant unexpectedly drove away from the scene but was soon encountered by police officers, who cited her for driving while impaired and driving while license revoked. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, claiming that firefighters do not have legal authority to conduct traffic stops. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, finding that the firefighter’s actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant never challenged the actions of the arresting officers, she presented no legal basis for suppressing the evidence supporting her conviction. View "State v. Verkerk" on Justia Law

After visiting a county office building to pay his water bill, James Bynum fell while walking down the front steps. As a result, Bynum’s legs and right arm were paralyzed. Bynum and his wife filed a complaint against the County alleging that the County negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and repair a county office building. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity because the County’s operation of the building was governmental in nature. View "Bynum v. Wilson Cnty" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of trafficking in opium by possession. During the trial, a laboratory report of the results of a chemical analysis of the contraband were admitted, over Defendant’s objection, without calling the testing chemist as a witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State failed to establish that Defendant waived his confrontation rights because the record did not demonstrate that the State had provided a pretrial copy of the lab report to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant failed properly to raise or preserve the issue regarding the State’s compliance with the statutory requirement that the State provide a copy of the lab report to a defendant before trial. Remanded. View "State v. Whittington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the 2011 legislative changes made to North Carolina's pre-kindergarten program failed to comply with the state's constitutional obligations recognized in Leandro v. State and Hoke County Board of Education v. State. After a hearing, the trial court found that some of the changes violated the State Constitution and mandating that the State not deny any eligible at-risk four-year-old admission to the North Carolina pre-kindergarten program. While the State's appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended the challenged statutory provisions. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal as moot because the 2012 amendments constituted material and substantial changes to the provisions that the trial court found unconstitutional, and thus the questions originally in controversy between the parties were no longer at issue. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v State" on Justia Law

Greensboro police officers recovered a firearm ten to twelve feet from a car in which Defendant, a convicted felon, was a passenger. Defendant was arrested and later confessed that the firearm belonged to him. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon because, pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, the State did not present corroborative evidence, independent of Defendant's confession, tending to show that the crime in question occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the State v. Parker articulation of the corpus delicti rule, the State was not required to submit alternative evidence proving Defendant's identity as the perpetrator beyond Defendant's confession, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the State to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law