Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer stopped and searched Defendant outside a shop known for drug activity. Defendant was subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, and conspiracy to posses with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the initial stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court sufficiently established that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of Defendant. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The district court entered an ex parte Domestic Violence Order of Protection (DVPO) against Defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50B-3. The court ordered Defendant in the DVPO to surrender his firearms and ammunition and further ordered that law enforcement officers shall search “Defendant’s person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.” When officers served the DVPO on Defendant at his residence, they entered the house to execute the search for weapons. Once inside the home, officers found a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was subsequently charged with drug-related offenses. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the relevant DVPO statutes do not authorize the district court to order a general search of Defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence for weapons; and (2) the ex parte DVPO was not a de facto search warrant. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) section 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of a defendant’s residence under a civil DVPO; and (2) because the search of Defendant’s home was conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement, it violated Defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. View "State v. Elder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for one count of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory rape, and first-degree sex offense with a child. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent two consecutive notes to the court indicating that they were deadlocked. The judge instructed the jurors to continue with their deliberations. The jury eventually found Defendant guilty of one count of first-degree statutory rape but failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining two counts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two counts on which the jury deadlocked. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-1235(c), which sets out procedures a trial court may follow when a jury is deadlocked, and that the error resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury.The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the instructions, any error was not preserved and was subject to plain error review; and (2) applying this standard, the trial court’s instructions did not result in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury. View "State v. May" on Justia Law

Defendant’s predecessor in title ("Wayne") owned two tracts of land (“Wayne Tracts”). Park Creek, LLC held adjacent land. Under a pre-approved plan, Wayne and the LLC began constructing a development plan for a residential subdivision using land owned by both Wayne and the LLC. When Wayne conveyed his property to Defendant, his revocable trust of which he was the trustee, future phases of the subdivision remained undeveloped. The Town of Midland later filed two condemnation actions against Defendant condemning three acres of Defendant’s property necessary for an easement. The trial court determined that no unity of ownership existed as to the contiguous tracts of land owned by Defendant and Park Creek, LLC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that no unity of ownership existed between the Wayne Tracts and the LLC Tract for the purpose of determining compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, where Defendant and the LLC had a vested right to complete the subdivision pursuant to the pre-approved plan, unity of ownership existed between the adjacent properties. View "Town of Midland v. Wayne" on Justia Law

When two detectives were parked in Defendant’s driveway, they saw three potted marijuana plants within the home’s curtilage. The detectives seized the plants before returning the next day with a warrant to search Defendant’s home. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the seized plants, claiming that discovery of the plants was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure of the plants violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the detectives’ seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Grice" on Justia Law

Following the census conducted in 2010, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs sought to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court concluded that the General Assembly applied traditional and permissible redistricting principles to achieve partisan advantage and that no constitutional violations occurred. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the twenty-six districts drawn to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, holding that the trial court erred when it applied strict scrutiny before making adequate findings of fact, but because the trial court correctly found that each of the twenty-six districts survived strict scrutiny, the case need not be remanded for reconsideration under what may be a less demanding standard of review; and (2) affirmed as to the remaining challenged districts. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Based upon an affidavit by a state law enforcement officer, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s home and outbuildings on his property. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant and seized fifty-five marijuana plans, indoor growing supplies, firearms and ammunition, and $1540 in cash. Defendant was indicted for maintaining a dwelling to keep a controlled substance, manufacture of a controlled substance, and trafficking in marijuana by possession, among other offenses. The trial court suppressed the items seized under the search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. View "State v. Benters" on Justia Law

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law