Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of statutory sexual offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. Over a period of approximately fifty months, the defendant was represented by five different court-appointed attorneys, each of whom either withdrew due to conflicts, personal reasons, or at the defendant’s request. Dissatisfied with his representation, the defendant twice filed handwritten documents titled “Waiver of Counsel,” with the first explicitly requesting to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The trial court conducted a colloquy with the defendant to assess whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily wished to waive his right to counsel, ultimately finding that he did and assigning standby counsel. The defendant represented himself at trial, with standby counsel examining witnesses upon the State's motion. The jury convicted him on several counts, and he was sentenced to a minimum of seventy-five years.After conviction, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the judgments and remanded for a new trial, holding that the defendant had neither knowingly nor voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and therefore, his convictions could not stand.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances—including the defendant’s two written waivers, his in-court statements, and his consistent course of conduct—the defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed his intent to proceed without counsel. The Court further held that the trial court’s colloquy, while not perfectly precise as to the full range of potential punishments, substantially complied with statutory requirements because both the misstated and actual sentences amounted to more than the defendant’s natural life. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that the waiver of counsel was valid and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "State v. McGirt" on Justia Law

A middle school student in the Alamance-Burlington School District alleged that her teacher violently assaulted her in the classroom. The teacher, who was not licensed at the time, reportedly grabbed the student, slammed her into a door, and then onto the ground, causing physical and emotional harm. After the incident, the Board of Education suspended the student, later reversed the suspension when media reported on the attack, but still transferred her to an alternative school without her consent. The student’s academic performance suffered as a result.The student, through her guardian, sued the teacher and the Board of Education in Superior Court, claiming assault, emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and violations of the North Carolina constitutional right to a sound basic education. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity on the tort claims and failure to state a constitutional claim. The Superior Court granted the Board’s motion, dismissing all claims against it. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the student had not adequately alleged waiver of sovereign immunity or a constitutional violation under relevant precedent.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the student’s complaint stated a viable constitutional claim. The Supreme Court held that, accepting the allegations as true, the Board’s actions—suspending and transferring the student after she was assaulted by a teacher—could constitute deliberate indifference to her right to access a sound basic education under the state constitution. The Court found the student lacked any other adequate remedy due to sovereign immunity and that her complaint met the necessary elements for a direct constitutional claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "K.H. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant whose vehicle crossed the center line and collided with a motorcycle, resulting in the deaths of both riders. The defendant left the scene but later turned himself in. He was charged with several offenses, including driving while impaired, felony hit and run, attaining violent habitual felon status, and two counts of second-degree murder. Before trial, the defendant pled guilty to driving while license revoked and, through written stipulations and oral colloquies, admitted to several facts related to the charges, including being the driver, the collision, and his revoked license status.At trial in the Superior Court of Rowan County, the defendant’s counsel, with the defendant’s partial consent, conceded certain elements of the offenses. During closing argument, counsel asked the jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses—misdemeanor death by vehicle and misdemeanor hit and run—without explicitly seeking a not guilty verdict. The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of second-degree murder and felony hit and run. The defendant appealed, arguing his counsel provided ineffective assistance by conceding guilt to the lesser charges without his knowing consent.The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that, under State v. Harbison, a defense counsel’s admission of guilt without the defendant’s consent is per se ineffective assistance, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the defendant had consented. The State sought discretionary review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina clarified that, following Florida v. Nixon, the per se prejudice rule of Harbison is limited. The general standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington’s two-prong test, unless the narrow United States v. Cronic exception applies (where the defendant is wholly surprised by the concession). Because the defendant was not wholly surprised and could not show prejudice, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Farook" on Justia Law

After observing a traffic violation, a sheriff’s deputy attempted to stop a driver who did not immediately pull over, instead proceeding to an apartment complex known for high criminal activity. The deputy observed the driver, who had prior narcotics and weapons convictions, behaving evasively and refusing to answer questions. Both the initial deputy and another responding officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. During a frisk for weapons, an officer found what was believed to be a marijuana blunt in the driver’s pocket; the driver did not claim it was legal hemp. A subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle uncovered a firearm. The driver was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a stolen firearm.In the Superior Court of Forsyth County, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the searches, arguing that the odor and sight of marijuana could not, in light of the legalization of industrial hemp, provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, citing the driver’s failure to stop, the high-crime location, prior convictions, evasive conduct, and the odor of marijuana as sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon but not guilty of possessing a stolen firearm.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the defendant received a fair trial. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that under the totality of the circumstances—including but not limited to the odor of marijuana—officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant and probable cause to search the car. The odor of marijuana remains a relevant factor despite the existence of legal hemp. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "State v. Rowdy" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon after an incident in which he confronted his former girlfriend and her uncle, brandished a firearm, struck his former girlfriend with the weapon, and fired several shots in their direction, though no one was injured. The defendant, his attorney, and the State entered into written stipulations acknowledging the defendant’s prior felony conviction and that he possessed a firearm during the incident. Both stipulations were discussed and consented to by the defendant in open court through separate colloquies with the trial judge.A jury in Superior Court, Durham County, found the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and two counts of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms. On appeal, the defendant argued that his counsel’s closing argument included an implicit admission of guilt to the firearm charge without his knowing consent, which he claimed was per se prejudicial under State v. Harbison and State v. McAllister. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, found the record did not establish whether the defendant knowingly consented to his attorney’s admission of guilt and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the defendant expressly consented on the record to the stipulations concerning his prior felony and firearm possession, following thorough colloquies. The Court further found that defense counsel’s actions did not exceed the scope of those stipulations nor did counsel explicitly or implicitly concede guilt beyond what the defendant had authorized. Therefore, the per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule from Harbison and McAllister was not triggered. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "State v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

A group of students, their parents or guardians, and local school boards from several low-wealth and urban school districts in North Carolina brought suit against the State and the State Board of Education in 1994. They claimed that the State’s method of funding education deprived students in their districts of their constitutional right to the opportunity for a sound basic education, focusing on perceived inadequacies in the implementation and funding of the Basic Education Program (BEP) as it then existed. The plaintiffs did not allege that the statewide education system was unconstitutional on its face, but rather that it was unconstitutional as applied to their specific districts due to disparities in resource allocation.After various procedural developments, including intervention by additional parties and the dismissal of some claims, the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which previously clarified that the right at issue belonged only to students, not school boards. The Supreme Court held in Leandro v. State that the constitution guarantees every child the opportunity for a sound basic education, and remanded the case for as-applied determinations regarding whether that right was denied in the named districts. In Hoke County Board of Education v. State, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court finding that at-risk students in Hoke County had been deprived of their right, but otherwise found the statewide education system generally constitutional as then structured. The Supreme Court remanded for further as-applied proceedings in the other named districts, but no further trials occurred.Over time, the case’s subject matter shifted, and the trial court, with the parties’ acquiescence, began addressing a statewide, facial challenge to the current education system, including ordering the implementation of a statewide remedial plan without a new or amended complaint raising such a claim. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, reviewing an order entered on 17 April 2023, held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a facial challenge to the statewide education system, since no party had properly invoked jurisdiction over such a claim by amending the pleadings or following the statutory procedure. The Court vacated the trial court’s order and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that any orders entered after 24 July 2017, when the litigation’s nature changed, were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

In 2023, Charlotte Chemuti was arrested by officers from the Mooresville Police Department for resisting a public officer. To prepare for her trial, Chemuti served a subpoena on the police department requesting body camera footage related to her arrest. The Town of Mooresville responded, arguing that the requested recordings were confidential under North Carolina General Statute § 132-1.4A and could only be released through the procedure outlined in that statute, not by subpoena.Chemuti subsequently filed a motion in the District Court of Iredell County, without notice to the town, seeking release of the recordings. The district court granted her request, finding that while the statutory petition in superior court was the generally accepted practice, it was not the exclusive method for obtaining such evidence, and ordered the town to comply with the subpoena. The town appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not affect a substantial right. The town then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that orders compelling disclosure of information protected by statutory confidentiality are immediately appealable, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4A provides the exclusive procedure for obtaining law enforcement recordings in criminal cases, requiring a petition in superior court, and that district court subpoenas cannot be used to compel their release. The Court further held that this procedure does not violate constitutional rights to present a complete defense, as courts must still ensure defendants’ constitutional protections. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Chemuti" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers investigated a breaking and entering at a market in Fletcher, North Carolina, where cash, cigarettes, and lottery tickets were stolen. Days later, someone attempted to redeem one of the stolen lottery tickets at a store in Edneyville. Security footage showed a woman leaving the store and entering a black Dodge Durango with distinctive features. Detective Diaz traced the vehicle to a nearby residence, discovered it had a fictitious license plate, and observed items inside the vehicle that appeared related to the theft. Officers later conducted a search of the vehicle and the residence, recovering stolen property and tools linked to the crime.The Superior Court of Henderson County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, which argued that law enforcement’s observations at the residence and of the vehicle were improper without a warrant. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to several charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that probable cause existed for the search warrant and that officers acted lawfully at the scene. The majority also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply, while a dissenting judge disagreed on both points.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, even excluding information obtained during the contested “knock and talk,” the remaining facts in the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the vehicle. The Court did not decide whether the officers’ conduct during the knock and talk was unconstitutional, nor did it address the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the search warrant was properly issued based on probable cause supported by untainted evidence. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, stemming from an armed robbery in which two victims were killed and another was left paralyzed. During jury selection at his trial in Cleveland County Superior Court, the State used peremptory challenges to excuse two black female prospective jurors. The defense objected, raising a Batson challenge and arguing that the State’s strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court heard arguments from both sides, including the State’s race-neutral explanations for the strikes, and ultimately denied the Batson challenge, finding no prima facie case of discrimination.Following his conviction on all charges and sentencing to consecutive life terms plus additional imprisonment, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, found that the trial court had moved past Batson’s first step by soliciting and hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons before ruling. The majority held that this rendered the first step moot and remanded the case for a new Batson hearing under the procedural requirements established in State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020). The dissent argued that the trial court had not actually proceeded to Batson’s third step and that the first step was not moot.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Batson’s first step moot and remanding for a new hearing. The Supreme Court held that the mootness exception to Batson’s three-step process is to be applied cautiously and only when the trial court has fully completed all three steps. Because the trial court had clearly ruled at step one and had not proceeded to step three, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of whether the trial court’s step-one determination was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law