Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. Four years later, he was indicted for additional charges of felony child abuse by committing a sexual act on a child, incest, and indecent liberties with a child. The victim in this case was Defendant's daughter, who experienced a "flashback" to the alleged events and reported the allegedly repressed memory to her therapist. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress expert testimony regarding the repressed memory, concluding that even though evidence of repressed memory was relevant, the evidence must be excluded because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' determination that the trial court properly granted Defendant's motion; but (2) disavowed the portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, required expert testimony always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered memories. Remanded. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and trafficking in cocaine by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant contended that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the charges and therefore the charges should not have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reach a reasonable inference that Defendant constructively possessed the cocaine and rifle at issue, and therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "State v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child and first-degree sexual offense. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of prior acts was properly admitted against Defendant under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of appeals reversed the convictions, determining that the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the alleged crimes to be admitted under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concluding that the trial court, after carefully evaluating the evidence, correctly ruled that the prior acts had sufficient similarity and temporal proximity to those alleged in the charged crimes. Remanded. View "State v. Beckelheimer" on Justia Law

After a Davidson College campus police officer stopped Defendant Julie Yencer's vehicle, the officer arrested Defendant for driving while impaired (DWI) and reckless driving. Defendant pled guilty to DWI but reserved her right to appeal the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that two state court decisions compelled the conclusion that Davidson College was a religious institution for purposes of the Establishment Clause and that the Campus Police Act, which gave the officer authority to arrest Defendant, granted an unconstitutional delegation of discretionary power to a religious institution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Campus Police Act's provision of secular, neutral, and nonideological police protection for the benefit of the students and faculty of Davidson College, as applied to Defendant's conviction, did not offend the Establishment Clause; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that her arrest and conviction for DWI were influenced by any consideration other than secular enforcement of a criminal statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-138.1.View "State v. Yencer" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Lewis was convicted of first-degree sexual offense, felonious breaking or entering, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Defendant discovered information previously unknown to him relating to his trial. Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), alleging that his trial had been tainted because of improper communication between the investigating detective and a juror. The trial court denied Defendant's MAR, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was once more convicted of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the retrial court erred in limiting Defendant's ability to examine before a jury the State's lead investigator about the investigator's possible bias and about instances of purported misconduct by the investigator during Defendant's first trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with resisting a public officer, felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the resisting charge and a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the search incident to arrest. At a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motions, the trial court granted both of Defendant's motions. Immediately thereafter, the State announced to the court that it would be unable to proceed with the case in chief on the remaining charges. As a result, the other charges were dismissed. The State appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the prosecutor's statements to the trial court amounted to a dismissal in open court under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-931. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals to the extent it could be read as affirming to the trial court's dismissal of charges on its own motion, holding (1) the prosecutor's statements did not amount to a dismissal in open court, and (2) the trial court had no authority to enter an order dismissing the case on its own motion. Remanded for consideration of the State's argument pertaining to the motion to suppress. View "State v. Joe" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Nakia Nickerson guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, contending that it was a lesser-included offense of the crime of possession of stolen goods. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods, and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle requires proof of at least one essential element not required to prove possession of stolen goods, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle cannot be a lesser-included offense of possession of stolen goods; and (2) as such, Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. View "State v. Nickerson" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Hill was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon for taking $100 from the victim by means of threatening the use of a sharp object. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented substantial evidence that (1) the victim's money was taken via the use or threatened use of a dnagerous weapon, and (2) the victim's life was endangered or threatened by Defendant's use of a dangerous weapon during the course of the robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

On July 29, 1994, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The date of the offense was August 25, 1993. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). The General Assembly enacted the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to supercede the FSA for offenses committed on or after the SSA's effective date, October 1, 1994. In contrast to the FSA, the SSA imposed shorter terms of imprisonment for second-degree murder. On March 28, 2011, Defendant filed an amended motion for appropriate relief requesting modification of his sentence under the SSA. The superior court ordered that Defendant's life sentence be modified to a term of 157 to 198 months under the SSA. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant's offense was controlled exclusively by the FSA; and (2) the superior court violated a clear and unambiguous statute by modifying Defendant's sentence in accordance with the SSA. Remanded. View "State v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature based on the victim's age and inability to consent due to a mental disability. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish whether the victim had the requisite mental capacity to consent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the State was not required to use expert testimony pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 702 to establish the extent of the victim's mental capacity to consent to sexual acts under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand Defendant's motions to dismiss. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law