Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error by failing to adequately instruct the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that he had possessed and transported cocaine. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and awarded him a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury in accordance with footnote four to N.C.P.I. Crim. 260.17 and 260.30 because the trial court’s instructions here adequately addressed the issue that the jury had to decide to determine Defendant’s guilt or innocence. View "State v. Galaviz-Torres" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped and searched Defendant outside a shop known for drug activity. Defendant was subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, and conspiracy to posses with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the initial stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court sufficiently established that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of Defendant. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The district court entered an ex parte Domestic Violence Order of Protection (DVPO) against Defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50B-3. The court ordered Defendant in the DVPO to surrender his firearms and ammunition and further ordered that law enforcement officers shall search “Defendant’s person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.” When officers served the DVPO on Defendant at his residence, they entered the house to execute the search for weapons. Once inside the home, officers found a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was subsequently charged with drug-related offenses. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the relevant DVPO statutes do not authorize the district court to order a general search of Defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence for weapons; and (2) the ex parte DVPO was not a de facto search warrant. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) section 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of a defendant’s residence under a civil DVPO; and (2) because the search of Defendant’s home was conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement, it violated Defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. View "State v. Elder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for one count of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory rape, and first-degree sex offense with a child. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent two consecutive notes to the court indicating that they were deadlocked. The judge instructed the jurors to continue with their deliberations. The jury eventually found Defendant guilty of one count of first-degree statutory rape but failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining two counts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two counts on which the jury deadlocked. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-1235(c), which sets out procedures a trial court may follow when a jury is deadlocked, and that the error resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury.The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the instructions, any error was not preserved and was subject to plain error review; and (2) applying this standard, the trial court’s instructions did not result in an unconstitutional coercion of a deadlocked jury. View "State v. May" on Justia Law

When two detectives were parked in Defendant’s driveway, they saw three potted marijuana plants within the home’s curtilage. The detectives seized the plants before returning the next day with a warrant to search Defendant’s home. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the seized plants, claiming that discovery of the plants was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure of the plants violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the detectives’ seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Grice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a fifteen-year-old child, second-degree rape of a mentally disabled person, and taking indecent liberties with a child. The convictions arose from Defendant’s single act of vaginal intercourse with a juvenile who is mildly to moderately mentally disabled. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his being sentenced of both statutory rape and second-degree rape for the same act. The trial court denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not intend for defendants to be punished separately for both statutory rape and second-degree rape when the convictions are predicated upon a single act of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the General Assembly’s intent for defendants to be separately punished for a violation of the second-degree rape and statutory rape statutes arising from a single act of sexual intercourse, and therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy argument. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using or selling marijuana, and carrying a handgun concealed in his vehicle. The charges arose after a police dog did a protective sweep of Defendant’s home and alerted to the presence of narcotics. At issue in this appeal was conflicting testimonies as to whether marijuana was in plain view before the dog nuzzled into and opened bags containing the marijuana. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the dog was an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, whether instinctive or not, are no different than those undertaken by an officer; and (2) if the dog opened the bags and exposed the otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police dog’s instinctive action, unguided and undirected by the police, that brings evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

Based upon an affidavit by a state law enforcement officer, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s home and outbuildings on his property. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant and seized fifty-five marijuana plans, indoor growing supplies, firearms and ammunition, and $1540 in cash. Defendant was indicted for maintaining a dwelling to keep a controlled substance, manufacture of a controlled substance, and trafficking in marijuana by possession, among other offenses. The trial court suppressed the items seized under the search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. View "State v. Benters" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a firefighter for driving erratically. Defendant unexpectedly drove away from the scene but was soon encountered by police officers, who cited her for driving while impaired and driving while license revoked. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, claiming that firefighters do not have legal authority to conduct traffic stops. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, finding that the firefighter’s actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant never challenged the actions of the arresting officers, she presented no legal basis for suppressing the evidence supporting her conviction. View "State v. Verkerk" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law