Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted in 2019 on charges of felony larceny and two counts of burglary. He was convicted of first-degree burglary in February 2021 and sentenced to 96 to 128 months in prison. Immediately after the conviction, the defendant expressed his desire to appeal, but his appointed counsel did not file a timely notice of appeal. Counsel later admitted that he understood the defendant wanted to appeal but failed to take the necessary steps or discuss appellate options with him. The defendant subsequently sought a writ of certiorari, arguing that his right to a direct appeal was lost due to ineffective assistance of counsel.After sentencing, the defendant, through North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The initial panel dismissed the petition without prejudice, allowing for refiling with additional arguments. The defendant refiled, presenting new legal arguments and citing Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019), to support his claim that prejudice should be presumed under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals granted the writ, remanding for determination of entitlement to counsel and trial transcript at state expense. The State sought review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that the second panel improperly overruled the first and failed to apply the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Court of Appeals did not violate precedent by allowing the second petition since the first dismissal was without prejudice and the second petition included additional arguments. The Court affirmed that the two-part test articulated in Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569 (2023), applies to all certiorari petitions, including criminal cases: petitioners must show potential merit or error below and extraordinary circumstances. The Court concluded that both elements were met here and affirmed the grant of certiorari. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of statutory sexual offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. Over a period of approximately fifty months, the defendant was represented by five different court-appointed attorneys, each of whom either withdrew due to conflicts, personal reasons, or at the defendant’s request. Dissatisfied with his representation, the defendant twice filed handwritten documents titled “Waiver of Counsel,” with the first explicitly requesting to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The trial court conducted a colloquy with the defendant to assess whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily wished to waive his right to counsel, ultimately finding that he did and assigning standby counsel. The defendant represented himself at trial, with standby counsel examining witnesses upon the State's motion. The jury convicted him on several counts, and he was sentenced to a minimum of seventy-five years.After conviction, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the judgments and remanded for a new trial, holding that the defendant had neither knowingly nor voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and therefore, his convictions could not stand.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances—including the defendant’s two written waivers, his in-court statements, and his consistent course of conduct—the defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed his intent to proceed without counsel. The Court further held that the trial court’s colloquy, while not perfectly precise as to the full range of potential punishments, substantially complied with statutory requirements because both the misstated and actual sentences amounted to more than the defendant’s natural life. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that the waiver of counsel was valid and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "State v. McGirt" on Justia Law

In 2003, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent and was required to register as a sex offender. After registering in February 2003, he later violated probation and served his suspended sentence. Over the years, he filed three petitions to terminate his registration. The first petition in 2017 was denied as premature, with the trial court declining to determine the defendant’s tier level under federal law. In 2019, he filed a second petition; this time, the trial court determined he was a Tier II offender under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), requiring 25 years of registration before eligibility for removal. The defendant did not appeal this 2019 order.In 2023, the defendant filed a third petition for termination of registration. The Superior Court in McDowell County denied it, again concluding he was not yet eligible due to his Tier II designation. This time, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that he was a Tier II offender and therefore ineligible for removal until 25 years had elapsed. A dissenting judge believed the defendant was a Tier I offender and eligible for removal, prompting the defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that all petitions to terminate sex offender registration are part of the same underlying proceeding and are therefore subject to the doctrine of law of the case. Because the defendant failed to appeal the 2019 order that designated him as a Tier II offender, he was procedurally barred from relitigating that issue in his 2023 petition. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on this basis. View "State v. Lingerfelt" on Justia Law

A fatal car accident involving an eighteen-year-old driving a 2013 Toyota Scion led to a lawsuit by the driver’s estate against Toyota and Subaru, who had jointly developed the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged negligence, product liability, and violations of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claiming that design defects caused the occupant compartment to collapse and a fire to spread, ultimately resulting in the driver’s death. During discovery, the plaintiff requested extensive documents and depositions, including English translations of Japanese-language materials. Toyota and Subaru objected to several document requests and deposition topics, and disputes arose regarding the timing and sufficiency of their responses.The Superior Court of Robeson County granted the plaintiff’s motions to compel, ordered the production of additional documents (including English translations), and mandated that Toyota and Subaru’s corporate representatives testify to all noticed deposition topics without further objection. When the defendants failed to comply as ordered, the trial court imposed sanctions, deeming certain facts established against them—including elements of duty and breach in the plaintiff’s product liability claim—and struck their regulatory compliance defense. Toyota and Subaru appealed, challenging the discovery and sanctions orders.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and reversed the requirement to translate documents but otherwise affirmed the discovery order, holding that most of the trial court’s actions were not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed only the remaining issues in the discovery order. It held that the trial court erred by enforcing a fourteen-day deadline for objections to document requests in deposition notices (rather than the seven days required by the rules), and by waiving defendants’ objections to deposition topics for not seeking a protective order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision, instructed it to vacate the discovery order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

Allen Williams traveled to a woman’s home in Raleigh, North Carolina, where she and Williams spent time together. While they were outside in Williams’s parked car, the woman’s former partner, Martin Penny, arrived, approached the car, and confronted Williams. Accounts of what happened next varied. According to the woman and Williams, Penny opened the car door, leaned in, and began physically assaulting Williams. Williams testified that Penny also brandished a gun during the altercation, which Williams claimed to have taken from Penny to defend himself. The fight moved outside the vehicle, where Williams ultimately shot and killed Penny.Williams was indicted for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial in the Superior Court of Wake County, Williams requested a jury instruction on North Carolina’s castle doctrine, which provides certain self-defense immunities for occupants of homes or vehicles confronted by unlawful intruders. The trial court denied this request, instructing only on general self-defense. The jury convicted Williams of voluntary manslaughter, and Williams appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Williams was entitled to a castle doctrine instruction because the evidence, when viewed favorably to him, showed he was an occupant of his vehicle when Penny unlawfully and forcibly entered and assaulted him. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s failure to provide the instruction was prejudicial error and remanded for a new trial.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the plain language of the statute covers someone who is assaulted in their vehicle and forced to exit during an attack, so Williams remained a lawful occupant entitled to the castle doctrine instruction. The Supreme Court also clarified that the statute was unambiguous on this point and that the trial court’s failure to instruct was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

A married couple created a revocable trust during their marriage, transferring three properties into it. Both spouses were designated as co-trustees, sole beneficiaries, and settlors of the trust, retaining the right to amend or revoke it together. Following their separation and eventual divorce, they sold two of the properties and retained the third in the trust. Each party then asserted claims for equitable distribution of marital property. In a pretrial order, both parties stipulated that all necessary parties were properly before the court, that the three properties were marital property, and agreed on how the properties and proceeds would be divided.The District Court, Brunswick County, entered an equitable distribution order based on these stipulations. The defendant appealed, arguing that the revocable trust was a necessary party under Rule 19 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the trust was not joined. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the order. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, holding that the trust was not a necessary party because, through their stipulations, the parties effectively revoked the trust. The Court of Appeals also found a clerical error in the order, remanding for correction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether a revocable trust must be joined in an equitable distribution proceeding when all settlors are already parties. The court held that Rule 19 does not require joinder of a revocable trust in such circumstances, as a judgment against the settlors binds the trust without affecting others’ rights. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed on this basis. View "Face v. Face" on Justia Law

Officers stopped a man after recognizing him and knowing he did not have a valid driver’s license. During the stop, a police dog alerted to his vehicle, and a search revealed a bookbag containing drug paraphernalia and trafficking amounts of controlled substances. Other items in the car bore his name, and he made incriminating statements to the officers. He was indicted for several drug offenses, including keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances, as well as attaining habitual felon status based on three prior felony convictions. At trial, he was convicted on the drug charges and pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon status.The North Carolina Superior Court, Union County, denied his motion to dismiss the keeping or maintaining a vehicle charge, and he was sentenced accordingly. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss that charge. However, the Court of Appeals granted his motion for appropriate relief, finding that his habitual felon indictment was impermissibly filed before the principal felony indictment, and remanded for resentencing. A dissenting judge would have reversed the keeping or maintaining a vehicle conviction for lack of evidence that he used the vehicle to keep controlled substances.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the Habitual Felon Act does not require a habitual felon indictment to be filed after the principal felony indictment; therefore, the indictment was not defective, and the Court of Appeals erred in granting relief on this ground. The Supreme Court further concluded that the State failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence that the defendant used the vehicle to keep controlled substances, but remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was sufficient evidence he used the vehicle to sell controlled substances. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded. View "State v. Garmon" on Justia Law

A middle school student in the Alamance-Burlington School District alleged that her teacher violently assaulted her in the classroom. The teacher, who was not licensed at the time, reportedly grabbed the student, slammed her into a door, and then onto the ground, causing physical and emotional harm. After the incident, the Board of Education suspended the student, later reversed the suspension when media reported on the attack, but still transferred her to an alternative school without her consent. The student’s academic performance suffered as a result.The student, through her guardian, sued the teacher and the Board of Education in Superior Court, claiming assault, emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and violations of the North Carolina constitutional right to a sound basic education. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity on the tort claims and failure to state a constitutional claim. The Superior Court granted the Board’s motion, dismissing all claims against it. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the student had not adequately alleged waiver of sovereign immunity or a constitutional violation under relevant precedent.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the student’s complaint stated a viable constitutional claim. The Supreme Court held that, accepting the allegations as true, the Board’s actions—suspending and transferring the student after she was assaulted by a teacher—could constitute deliberate indifference to her right to access a sound basic education under the state constitution. The Court found the student lacked any other adequate remedy due to sovereign immunity and that her complaint met the necessary elements for a direct constitutional claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "K.H. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged after law enforcement discovered his wife’s body in their home, following reports that she was missing. The victim was found tied to a bed with multiple forms of restraint, including handcuffs, zip ties, electrical cables, and an extension cord. Her body was further bound in ways that contorted her posture, and her head was covered with plastic bags secured with tape and cords, causing her death by suffocation. Evidence at trial included the extensive bindings and other items found near the victim.A jury in the Superior Court of Cumberland County convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and common law robbery. The defendant moved to dismiss the kidnapping charge, arguing that the restraints were inherent in the murder by suffocation and thus could not support a separate kidnapping conviction. The trial court denied this motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, vacated the kidnapping conviction, holding that the evidence did not show restraints beyond those inherent in the murder. The dissent argued that additional restraints were present beyond what was needed for the suffocation.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered only whether there was substantial evidence of restraint independent from the murder, as this was the focus of the dissent below. The Supreme Court held that, in addition to restraints needed to effectuate the murder, there were multiple other bindings—such as cables and zip ties that tethered the victim to the bed and contorted her body—that were not necessary for the act of suffocation. These additional restraints provided sufficient evidence for the kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the kidnapping conviction. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this case, a drive-by shooting occurred near a Raleigh convenience store in 2019, resulting in one death and three serious injuries. Law enforcement identified several suspects, including the defendant, who was on post-release supervision and required to wear an ankle monitor. Without obtaining a warrant or consulting his supervising officer, police acquired the defendant’s location data from the monitor, placing him near the crime scene at the relevant time. He was charged with first-degree murder and multiple counts of assault. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the ankle monitor evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. During jury selection, one juror disclosed a prior scheduled vacation, but both sides agreed to seat him. After deliberations began, this juror was excused for his vacation, and an alternate was substituted after the court instructed the new jury to begin deliberations anew.The Superior Court, Wake County, denied the motion to suppress and, following the guilty verdict, entered judgments against the defendant. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the suppression argument but found the juror substitution unconstitutional based on its then-controlling precedent in State v. Chambers, and ordered a new trial. It declined to address the remaining evidentiary issues.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals on the juror substitution issue, holding that so long as the trial court complies with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a)—by excusing a juror before substituting an alternate and instructing the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew—the substitution is constitutional, regardless of the timing or specific facts. On the suppression issue, the court held that the defendant failed to preserve his Fourth Amendment argument by repeatedly stating he had “no objection” when the evidence was introduced at trial. The court therefore modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals on that ground and remanded for review of other appellate issues. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law