Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and several related offenses stemming from the killing of Keith Crump. He filed a motion under the Racial Justice Act to bar the death penalty, but the case proceeded as a capital trial. In December 2011, a jury convicted him on all counts, including first-degree murder, and recommended a death sentence, which the Superior Court of Stanly County imposed. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, as is standard in cases involving a death sentence.After his conviction, the defendant filed further motions under the Racial Justice Act and successfully moved to stay appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, pending resolution of those motions. While the appeal was pending, he sought clemency from the governor. On December 31, 2024, the governor commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The defendant then requested that the Supreme Court of North Carolina dissolve the appellate stay and remand his case to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that his case was no longer a capital case and thus should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Carolina examined whether it retained jurisdiction for direct appeal under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(1) after the governor’s commutation. The court held that the statutory right to direct appeal to the Supreme Court exists to prevent arbitrary or unjust executions and applies only while a death sentence is active. Because the commutation eliminated the possibility of execution, the legislative intent underlying direct Supreme Court review no longer applied. Therefore, the court dissolved its stay and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review under the ordinary appellate procedure for non-capital cases. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Caleb Adams in the bedroom of Wendy Hicks on June 13, 2017. Adams was shot twice in the back from more than six inches away, and evidence at the scene suggested he was attempting to leave when shot. Hicks was the only armed individual present. During her interactions with law enforcement and at trial, Hicks provided multiple, inconsistent accounts of the events leading up to the shooting. She claimed Adams was the aggressor and that a struggle over her phone and the gun occurred, but the crime scene and her physical condition did not show signs supporting her account of a violent struggle.After Hicks was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in Randolph County Superior Court, she was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, she argued, among other issues, that the trial court erred in admitting unredacted phone-extraction reports (Exhibits 174 and 175) into evidence without objection or limiting instruction. The Court of Appeals initially reversed her conviction on a different issue, but after remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding plain error in the admission of the phone-extraction exhibits.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that Hicks had not met her burden to show that the admission of the phone-extraction reports constituted plain error. Applying the standard from State v. Lawrence, the Court found the remaining evidence of lack of justifiable self-defense to be substantial, and determined it was not probable the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the disputed evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received a promotional flyer advertising a car dealership event, which offered a chance to win one of several grand prizes. The flyer instructed recipients whose code matched a winning number to call a hotline and then visit the dealership to claim their prize. Plaintiffs alleged that the scratch-off numbers on all flyers matched the grand prize, misleading recipients, while defendants maintained that a separate activation code determined the actual prize, which was a nominal cash amount for all claimants. Approximately 50,000 flyers were sent, 2,118 people called the hotline, and records indicated 927 people visited the dealership. However, there were no records identifying those 927 individuals.The Superior Court in Gaston County initially certified a class of the 927 people who visited the dealership. Defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the certification due to inconsistencies between the class definition and the court’s analysis, remanding for clarification. On remand, the trial court again certified a class based on revised criteria: receiving the flyer, calling the hotline, and visiting the dealership. However, the trial court allowed a named plaintiff who had not personally called the hotline to remain as a representative, leading to further conflict in its reasoning. Defendants appealed the renewed certification order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, on the current record, class certification was improper. The Court found that the class was not ascertainable because there was no objective method to identify class members without individualized fact determinations, which would overwhelm common issues. The Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, leaving open the possibility of addressing spoliation claims if pursued. View "Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC" on Justia Law

Julie Ann Mincey operated a travel agency in New Bern, North Carolina, where she defrauded elderly clients by collecting payments for elaborate travel packages that she failed to deliver, resulting in financial losses exceeding $100,000. After her conduct was discovered, a grand jury indicted her on multiple felony charges—specifically, fourteen counts of embezzlement, two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, and for attaining habitual felon status based on prior Colorado felony convictions. At her trial in Superior Court, Craven County, several charges were dismissed, and a jury convicted her on nine counts of embezzlement and one count of obtaining property by false pretenses. Ms. Mincey admitted to habitual felon status, and the trial court conducted a colloquy to confirm her understanding of the plea’s consequences before accepting her guilty plea.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed Ms. Mincey’s appeal after she argued that the trial court failed to determine an adequate factual basis for her habitual felon guilty plea, particularly because one predicate offense had been reclassified as a misdemeanor in Colorado after her conviction. The Court of Appeals concluded that Ms. Mincey had a right to appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding the plea was supported by sufficient factual basis. A dissenting judge disagreed on the right to appeal and would have preferred granting certiorari to review the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that Ms. Mincey did not have a statutory right to appeal her guilty plea to attaining habitual felon status. The court held that, absent certain exceptions, defendants who plead guilty may only seek appellate review through a writ of certiorari, which was not properly issued here. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case. View "State v. Mincey" on Justia Law

Two North Carolina electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to implement performance-based regulation (PBR), an alternative to traditional ratemaking, and to increase rates through multiyear rate plans (MYRPs). The General Assembly had enacted legislation authorizing PBR in 2021, aiming to allow utilities to adjust rates over a three-year period based on projected capital investments and to incentivize carbon emissions reductions. The utilities, Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas, filed applications with supporting testimony and proposals, prompting intervention from stakeholders including the Attorney General, industrial customer groups, and electric membership corporations. The parties contested issues such as interclass subsidization, electric vehicle (EV) charging revenue treatment, approval of projected future capital projects, allocation of fuel and transmission costs, and the authorized return on equity (ROE) for the utilities’ shareholders.Following evidentiary hearings, the North Carolina Utilities Commission approved both utilities’ requests for modified MYRPs, allowed a 10% reduction in interclass subsidies (less than what some intervenors wanted), permitted the exclusion of estimated residential EV charging revenue from decoupling mechanisms, and authorized certain projected capital projects as “known and measurable” for rate recovery. The Commission also discontinued the “equal percentage” methodology for allocating fuel costs, approving voltage-differentiated rates instead, and adopted a stipulation shifting some transmission costs from one utility to the other to mitigate customer rate disparity. ROEs of 9.8% for Duke Energy Progress and 10.1% for Duke Energy Carolinas were set, with the latter reflecting a shift in Commission membership and risk assessment.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Commission’s orders violated law, misinterpreted the PBR statute, or lacked evidentiary support. The Court held that the Commission properly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, made sufficient findings supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and did not abuse its discretion regarding subsidy reductions, EV revenue exclusion, capital project approval, fuel cost allocation, or ROE determinations. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in full. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II" on Justia Law

Two affiliated electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to increase rates and implement performance-based regulation (PBR) under recently enacted legislation. The utilities submitted general rate case applications that included multiyear rate plans (MYRPs), which would permit preapproved rate increases over three years. Numerous parties, including the Attorney General, business groups, and electric membership corporations, intervened to challenge various aspects of the applications, including how the utilities allocated costs among customer classes, how revenues from residential electric vehicle charging would be handled, proposed capital spending projects, and the utilities’ allowed return on equity.The North Carolina Utilities Commission held extensive evidentiary hearings, with intervenors offering expert testimony and raising objections about statutory interpretation and factual sufficiency. The Commission issued final orders approving the MYRPs for each utility, making modifications to proposed subsidy reductions, excluding certain revenues from decoupling mechanisms to promote electric vehicle adoption, approving projected capital investments, and adjusting how fuel costs would be allocated among customer classes. The Commission also set new rates of return on equity for the utilities, noting changes in economic conditions and balancing interests of customers and investors.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the appeals as of right. It held that the Commission correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, including the PBR statute’s requirements for minimizing interclass subsidies and for cost causation. The Court found the Commission’s factual findings and legal conclusions were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The Court also determined that the Commission’s process and explanations met statutory and constitutional requirements. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in all respects. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates III" on Justia Law

A group of property owners and a civic association challenged a North Carolina county’s use of occupancy tax revenues. The county, which experiences a large seasonal influx of tourists, imposed a tax on lodging rentals. The proceeds from this tax, by statute, could only be spent on activities that promote travel and tourism or on tourism-related expenditures. The county’s commissioners decided to allocate a significant portion of these funds to public safety services, such as law enforcement, emergency medical services, and fire response—especially in areas most frequented by tourists. The plaintiffs argued that such services are not direct tourist attractions and, therefore, not valid uses of the occupancy tax revenue under the enabling statute.After the plaintiffs filed suit, the Superior Court in Currituck County granted summary judgment in favor of the county, holding that the challenged expenditures were tourism-related. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the statute did not permit the use of occupancy tax revenues for general public safety services. The Court of Appeals relied in part on the legislative history, noting that earlier versions of the statute had explicitly referenced police and emergency services, but those references were later removed.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the occupancy tax statute did not categorically bar the county from spending tax revenue on enhanced public safety services that are connected to area tourism. The court determined that the county commissioners, vested with statutory discretion, could reasonably conclude that such expenditures are tourism-related, given the substantial increase in demand for public safety during tourist season and the importance of safety to attracting visitors. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the county on this claim. View "Costanzo v. Currituck County" on Justia Law

After observing a parked vehicle with a visible handgun in the driver’s door pocket in downtown Greensboro, law enforcement officers conducted surveillance. When four individuals entered the car and departed quickly, officers followed and initiated a traffic stop after pacing the vehicle at ten miles per hour over the speed limit. During the stop, officers noticed an odor of burnt marijuana and a strong, freshly sprayed perfume they identified as a cover scent. The officers conducted background checks revealing that one backseat passenger had previous drug distribution convictions and the other, Tyron Lamont Dobson, had a prior felony conviction and pending violent felony and firearm charges. A search of Dobson’s person and the vehicle led to the discovery of marijuana and a handgun.The Superior Court in Guilford County denied Dobson’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the traffic violation, marijuana odor, the driver's statements about possible marijuana exposure, and the presence of a cover scent provided probable cause for the search. After consulting with counsel, Dobson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the detection of both marijuana odor and a cover scent together supported probable cause.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the “totality of the circumstances” test and instead created a “double odor” rule. The Supreme Court held that the officers relied on more than just the two odors, including the traffic violation and criminal backgrounds. The Court affirmed that, under the totality of the circumstances, the search was supported by probable cause and was objectively reasonable, thus affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Dobson" on Justia Law

Bradley Home, a North Carolina corporation, operated two mental health facilities whose licenses were revoked by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) following an investigation. DHHS mailed notice of the revocation by certified mail on August 3, 2021, informing Bradley Home that it had sixty days from the mailing date to challenge the decision by filing a petition for a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings. Bradley Home filed its petition sixty-three days after the notice was mailed.An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition as untimely, finding that the applicable administrative code provisions and Rule 6(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure did not extend the statutory filing deadline since the Rules of Civil Procedure only govern actions once a contested case exists. The Superior Court of Wake County reversed the ALJ’s dismissal, reasoning that the administrative code incorporated Rule 6(e) into the computation of time for filing, thus granting an additional three days when notice was provided by mail.On appeal, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the administrative code’s incorporation of Rule 6(e) applied only to time computations within an already-commenced contested case, not to the statutory deadline for commencing such a case. The dissent believed the agency’s mailed notice could be considered part of the contested case process.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The holding was that Rule 6(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the statutory sixty-day limitation period for commencing a contested case under N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(f). Because Bradley Home filed after the statutory period, dismissal was required. View "Bradley Home v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

The case concerns an altercation between Blaine Dale Hague and Thomas “Tommy” Cass, culminating in Hague fatally shooting Cass in a cornfield where Cass and others were hunting doves. Hague, who operated a nearby horse rescue farm, had previously interacted with Cass regarding hunting and firearm use near his property. On the day in question, Hague approached the hunting party after hearing gunshots and finding his horses spooked. An argument ensued with Cass, who pushed Hague to the ground. Hague, claiming to fear for his life due to Cass’s actions and his knowledge of Cass’s felony status and history of carrying firearms, shot Cass. At trial, Hague asserted self-defense and sought to introduce evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions to support the reasonableness of his fear.The Superior Court of Iredell County, presided over by Judge David L. Hall, excluded evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions under Rules 404(a)(2) and 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and also redacted related statements from Hague’s 911 call. The jury found Hague guilty of first-degree murder. Hague appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by excluding the prior convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals also found error in the trial court’s denial of Hague’s motion to dismiss but did not find error in the omission of a stand-your-ground jury instruction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions under Rule 404(b), as this evidence was relevant to Hague’s state of mind and the reasonableness of his self-defense claim. The court remanded the case for a new trial, dismissed discretionary review of the jury instruction issue, and did not address the motion to dismiss. The court’s disposition was to modify and affirm the appellate decision. View "State v. Hague" on Justia Law