Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs owned approximately 94 acres of land in Wake County, North Carolina, with about 9.93 acres affected by the North Carolina Department of Transportation's (DOT) recording of a transportation corridor map on August 6, 1996. Under the now-repealed Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, this recording imposed significant restrictions on the plaintiffs’ rights to improve, develop, and subdivide that portion of their property. These restrictions lasted for nearly twenty years, ending only when the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on July 11, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that such restrictions constituted a taking requiring just compensation.After the rescission, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action in Wake County Superior Court, seeking compensation for the restrictions imposed from 1996 to 2016. The Superior Court found that DOT had effected a temporary taking under the Map Act and determined just compensation should be measured by the fair rental value of the property during the period of restriction. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the taking was temporary due to the legislative rescission, but reversed the measure of damages, directing that compensation be based on diminution in value during the period the restrictions were in effect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Map Act corridor recordings cause indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the time of recording, and legislative rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one for purposes of calculating just compensation. The Court ruled that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all relevant factors, including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was observed by law enforcement in the parking lot of a hotel known for illegal activity. The officer identified the defendant as the owner of a station wagon and a convicted felon with outstanding arrest warrants. Upon seeing the officers, the defendant refused to exit his vehicle and attempted to hide items, then fled at high speed, leading police on a dangerous chase before crashing and fleeing on foot. After his arrest, officers found a holster in the car and, following a search, discovered a loaded .38 Special revolver hidden behind a loose dashboard panel. The gun was determined to be stolen. The defendant was charged with fleeing to elude arrest, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a stolen firearm.At trial in the Superior Court of Brunswick County, the defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charges for insufficient evidence, arguing that the State had not shown he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant on all charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence—specifically the defendant’s flight, the gun’s concealment, and his misrepresentations about the firearm—was sufficient for a rational juror to infer knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the evidence as insufficient on the knowledge element.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the issue of whether substantial evidence supported the defendant’s knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the firearm was stolen. The Supreme Court held that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented met the substantial evidence standard, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "State v. Bracey" on Justia Law

A flea market operator in Durham, North Carolina, received a notice of violation (NOV) from the city's planning department following a field inspection. The NOV stated that the market had failed to comply with an approved site plan, referencing the city’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), and warned of possible civil penalties unless corrective action was taken within thirty days. The NOV included copies of photographs and a copy of the site plan but did not specifically identify which aspects of the property were in violation or the specific corrective measures required.The market appealed the NOV to the City’s Board of Adjustment (BOA). At the quasi-judicial hearing, city staff explained that the NOV was intentionally broad because there were several violations, and listing each one would allow the market to fix only some issues. One BOA member expressed concern that the NOV’s lack of specificity failed to inform the market of the exact violations or needed corrections. Despite this, the BOA voted to deny the market’s appeal. The market then appealed to the Superior Court, Durham County, arguing that the NOV was too vague and did not comply with ordinance requirements. The superior court affirmed the BOA’s decision and ordered the market to come into compliance within thirty-six months. The market further appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the NOV sufficient under the UDO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal and held that the NOV did not comply with the city’s ordinance because it failed to provide a description of the specific violations as required by UDO § 15.2.1.C. The court concluded that property owners must receive enough detail to understand the alleged violations and what corrective action is required. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions for the city to dismiss the NOV. View "Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

A real estate development dispute arose when three businessmen, each controlling separate entities, formed an LLC to redevelop property in Charlotte. The plaintiff, through one entity, held a minority interest and served as a manager with another member. The operating agreement contained strict requirements for transferring membership interests, including the need for prior written consent from both managers. Tensions developed among the partners, and two of them attempted to transfer their interests to new holding companies and later voted to remove the plaintiff as manager. There was, however, no evidence that the formal requirements for transferring membership interests—such as written consent—were ever met.The case was designated a mandatory complex business case and heard in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, sitting as the North Carolina Business Court. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the attempted transfers were valid, rendering the removal of the plaintiff as manager invalid, and further alleged breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The Business Court found that the plaintiff failed to show the transfer provisions of the operating agreement were followed, so the original members retained their interests and the removal of the plaintiff as manager was valid. The court also ruled that no fiduciary duty arises among a coalition of minority LLC members absent a single majority member with control, and thus dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case on appeal. It affirmed the Business Court’s order and opinion, holding that the plaintiff failed to show compliance with the operating agreement’s transfer provisions and that there was no basis to impose a fiduciary duty on a coalition of minority LLC members. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

A young child, Alice, made several allegations of sexual misconduct against her father over the course of multiple years, beginning in 2021. These allegations were investigated on several occasions by county departments of social services, but none found substantiating evidence, and some investigators suspected that Alice’s mother coached her to fabricate accusations. The parents, who never married, were engaged in an ongoing custody dispute. The Carteret County District Court ultimately awarded primary custody to Alice’s father, finding the mother’s denials of visitation willful and her testimony untruthful. Additional reports of abuse were made thereafter, including by Alice’s school counselor and a therapist. These led to further investigations and court actions, but again no evidence of abuse was substantiated.The District Court in Carteret County dismissed a subsequent juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency, relying on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, finding the issues had already been litigated. The Court of Appeals vacated this order, holding that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the previously adjudicated abuse allegations but not new allegations arising after the prior custody and interference proceedings. The appellate court remanded for further proceedings on the new allegations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the application of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department of Social Services’ juvenile petition because the Department was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior child custody or interference proceedings. Additionally, the prior court findings did not “actually determine” the relevant abuse issues for collateral estoppel purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, also noting the Department’s conflict of interest in this matter. View "In re A.D.H" on Justia Law

A teenage patient experienced persistent back pain and, in 2010, was treated by an orthopedic physician at a medical clinic. The physician misdiagnosed her condition and performed unnecessary surgeries in 2010 and 2012. Over the following years, internal complaints and concerns surfaced among other physicians and administrators at the clinic regarding this doctor’s substandard care, but the clinic did not take corrective action until the physician resigned in 2013. Subsequent medical evaluations revealed the original diagnosis was incorrect and the surgeries were not properly performed, resulting in further harm to the patient.The patient and her parents brought suit in Wake County Superior Court in 2016, alleging medical malpractice against the physician, and both vicarious liability and direct claims—specifically negligent retention and supervision—against the clinic. The trial court dismissed the malpractice claims as untimely under North Carolina’s four-year statute of repose, but allowed the negligent retention and supervision claims to proceed. On summary judgment, however, the trial court concluded that all remaining claims were also time-barred. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on most claims but reversed as to the negligent retention claim, reasoning that such a claim against a corporate medical practice was not subject to the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a negligent retention claim against a corporate medical practice qualifies as a “medical malpractice action” under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.11, and thus is subject to—and barred by—the statute of repose in N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c). The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision on this point, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on the negligent retention claim. The court declined to review the dismissal of other tort claims. View "Cottle v. Mankin" on Justia Law

The case involves a fatal shooting that occurred outside the defendant’s residence, where the defendant admitted to shooting and killing Brandon Adams. The incident unfolded after Adams, following a dispute with his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers, went to the defendant’s home. Tensions escalated between Adams and Rodgers, leading the defendant to ask Adams to leave. Later, after a series of confrontational encounters and threatening messages from Adams, Adams attempted to force his way into the defendant’s home. The defendant, after a physical struggle at the doorway and observing Adams make a sudden movement, fatally shot Adams. The defendant was subsequently charged and went to trial, asserting a defense under North Carolina’s castle doctrine.A jury in the Superior Court of Burke County convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 144 to 185 months in prison. At trial, the defendant requested an instruction on the castle doctrine. The trial court gave a pattern instruction on defense of habitation but did not instruct the jury that the curtilage of the home is protected under the statute. The jury also received instructions that allowed it to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in imminent harm and the necessity of the force used.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the State presented substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of reasonable fear and that the jury instruction was proper.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the correct application of the castle doctrine statute, specifically whether the statutory presumption of reasonable fear could be rebutted by circumstances not listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption may only be rebutted by the five circumstances enumerated in the statute. Because the jury instructions failed to reflect this, and likely affected the trial’s outcome, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Allison" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a large tract of land in Cumberland County, North Carolina. In 1992 and 2006, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed official corridor maps under the Map Act, which imposed restrictions on portions of the plaintiff’s property, limiting development and affecting value. In 2002 and 2010, NCDOT initiated two direct condemnation actions to acquire parts of the plaintiff’s land—some of which overlapped with the previously restricted areas—resulting in two settlements and consent judgments. After the 2010 settlement, 28.041 acres of the plaintiff’s property remained subject to Map Act restrictions until the maps were repealed in 2016.Following the repeal and a 2016 North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that Map Act restrictions constituted a taking, the plaintiff filed an inverse condemnation action in Cumberland County Superior Court in 2018. The plaintiff sought compensation specifically for the Map Act restrictions not addressed in prior settlements. The Superior Court dismissed some claims but allowed the action to proceed for the remaining 28.041 acres. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the Map Act restrictions were not barred and could proceed as an independent interest not covered by the earlier condemnation actions.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes, the plaintiff was required to raise claims related to the Map Act restrictions as part of the answer in NCDOT’s 2010 direct condemnation action, since those restrictions were pertinent to determining just compensation for the partial taking. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, he could not pursue a separate inverse condemnation claim for those restrictions under N.C.G.S. § 136-111. The Court’s disposition was to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

An individual employed as a law enforcement officer by a county sheriff’s office regularly took advantage of a policy allowing approved off-duty work to supplement his income. When a construction company contracted with the state to repair bridges and overpasses, the contract required the company to use uniformed law enforcement officers to manage traffic. The sheriff’s office coordinated which officers would staff these off-duty positions, managed their assignments, collected timesheets, and required that officers be paid directly by the company. On one such off-duty assignment, the officer was injured by a vehicle while directing traffic and sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming both the sheriff’s office and the construction company as employers.The officer filed a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which determined that he was employed solely by the sheriff’s office, not by the construction company. This decision was affirmed by the Full Commission. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed the officer was not an independent contractor, but determined that the construction company was liable as a joint employer under the joint employment doctrine.The Supreme Court of North Carolina, upon discretionary review, clarified the distinction between the joint employment and lent employee doctrines. Applying the joint employment doctrine, the Court found that while there was an implied contract for hire between the officer and the construction company, the company did not exercise sufficient control over the details of the officer’s work to qualify as a joint employer. The Court held that the sheriff’s office was the officer’s sole employer for workers’ compensation purposes and reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the construction company was a joint employer. View "Lassiter v. Robeson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law