Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several home builder companies challenged fees they were required to pay to a city when connecting to municipal water and sewer systems. These so-called Capital Facilities Fees were imposed as a condition of development between 2016 and 2018. The builders paid these fees directly to the city and allege that the charges were not authorized by state law. They sought to recover the payments and also requested to represent a class of all entities who, like them, paid the fees during the relevant period.In Superior Court, Wake County, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, arguing that their claims and those of other payors shared common legal and factual questions. The trial court certified a class including all entities who paid the fees between January 2016 and June 2018, finding that the class was numerous, the claims predominated over individual differences, and class treatment was the superior method for resolving the dispute. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the merits, but the city appealed only the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered only whether class certification was proper. It held that, under the applicable state statute, the right to a refund depends on who made payment to the city, not on who ultimately bore the cost. The possibility that some builders incorporated the fees into home prices did not defeat class certification, as the statute entitles the actual payor to relief. The court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the legal criteria for class certification and did not abuse its discretion. The order certifying the class was therefore affirmed. View "Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh" on Justia Law

A woman filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against her estranged husband, alleging incidents of sexual abuse, physical injury, and emotional mistreatment in the months before her complaint. She submitted a written statement detailing these allegations, which accompanied her unverified complaint. The parties had separated prior to the incidents described. An ex parte DVPO was initially granted, and after continuances, a hearing was held where both parties testified. The woman expanded upon her written allegations during her testimony, describing specific incidents and the emotional impact of her husband’s conduct. The husband denied any abuse or injury. The trial court reviewed the written statement, marking out portions it found unsupported, and entered a one-year DVPO, concluding that acts of domestic violence had occurred and that the woman was in danger of serious and immediate injury.After the DVPO was issued, the husband filed a motion under Rule 60 to set it aside, which was denied by the District Court, Durham County. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s findings were insufficient, as they incorporated the wife’s written statement rather than independently setting out findings. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that competent evidence supported the findings and that the incorporation-by-reference method was permissible given the trial court’s credibility assessment and review of testimony. The dissent argued that the trial court failed to make specific findings as required by Rule 52 and would have vacated the DVPO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court’s method of incorporating the written statement—after hearing testimony and marking up the statement—complied with Rule 52. The trial court’s findings were sufficient in form, and competent evidence supported the issuance of the DVPO. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Jay v. Jay" on Justia Law

A group of Carteret County property owners challenged the county’s policy of charging waste disposal fees. The county does not provide direct trash or recycling collection services but instead offers access to waste disposal sites and a landfill. The county funded these facilities by charging fees to property owners, including both those who potentially used the county sites and those who hired private waste collection services. The plaintiffs argued that the county unlawfully charged these fees to property owners who never used the county sites or who had private waste collection, and also that the total fees collected exceeded the cost of operating the facilities, in violation of state law.Following extensive discovery, the Superior Court in Carteret County considered plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court rejected one proposed class, finding that determining whether each property owner actually used a county site would require individualized inquiries that would predominate over common issues. However, the court certified three other classes: those allegedly charged fees despite using private waste collection services, and those asserting that the county collected fees beyond its actual operating costs. The county appealed the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the denial of the first class.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Superior Court’s class certification order. The Court held that it is feasible to ascertain class members who used private waste collection services by relying on the customer lists from the limited number of providers in the county. The Court also determined that issues of predominance and superiority did not bar class certification and that any future developments could be addressed through modification or decertification of the class. Thus, the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Armistead v. County of Carteret" on Justia Law

Several individuals died in a 2015 small aircraft accident in Georgia, including the pilot and three passengers. The plaintiffs, representing the victims and their estates, brought claims in 2017 against Avco Corporation and its division, Lycoming Engines, which manufactured the aircraft’s engine, as well as against companies that performed maintenance on the engine. The claims included strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranties, and other theories. Over time, all defendants except Avco were voluntarily dismissed from the suit.The Superior Court in Buncombe County was assigned the case as exceptional. In 2022, the court granted Avco summary judgment on all claims except negligent failure to warn, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Avco had misrepresented or withheld information from the Federal Aviation Administration, which could trigger an exception to the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). Avco moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in 2024, reaffirming that the question of whether Avco knowingly concealed required information should go to the jury.Avco appealed this interlocutory order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, presumably for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order. Avco then sought review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that an interlocutory order denying a statute of repose defense, such as GARA, affects a substantial right because it grants immunity from suit—not merely from liability—and thus is immediately appealable. The Court overruled contrary Court of Appeals precedent and reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the merits of Avco’s claim to statutory immunity. View "Byrd v. Avco Corp" on Justia Law

A defendant was indicted in Guilford County in 2019 on multiple charges related to a series of motor vehicle and credit card thefts. He chose to represent himself at trial and was convicted by a jury of thirteen offenses. The trial court consolidated these convictions into two judgments for sentencing, applying the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act. However, in one judgment, the trial court incorrectly calculated the defendant’s prior record level, assigning him nine points instead of the correct ten, and sentenced him as a level III offender rather than level IV.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had erred in accepting the defendant’s waiver of counsel, prejudicing his trial, and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court also noted clerical errors in the original judgments but did not rule on them due to the new trial order. Following retrial, the defendant was again convicted, and the trial court corrected the prior record level, assigning ten points and sentencing him as a level IV offender, resulting in a longer sentence for one judgment than was imposed at the initial sentencing. The defendant appealed, arguing that under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335, the trial court could not impose a more severe sentence after his successful appeal and retrial.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that when a trial court must correct an illegal sentence to comply with the structured sentencing framework, it may lawfully impose a harsher sentence on remand, even if N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335 generally prohibits harsher resentencing following a successful appeal. The Court concluded that the specific provisions of structured sentencing control when in conflict with the general bar of § 15A-1335, affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the corrected sentence. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After experiencing significant water damage in their home when a water heater malfunctioned in July 2017, the plaintiffs hired the defendant company to remediate the damage. The parties executed an agreement that included a prominent clause limiting the time to bring any claim related to the contract to one year from when the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the cause of action. The defendant did not commence the remediation work, and the plaintiffs eventually hired another company. Despite this, their home developed extensive mold and was ultimately demolished. Nearly three years after becoming aware of the defendant’s failure to perform, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices.The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the contractual one-year limitation period. The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals held that the one-year contractual limitation was unenforceable as applied to claims under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), reasoning that public policy and the statute’s purpose precluded contractual abrogation of the four-year limitation period established by N.C.G.S. § 75-16.2.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, absent a statute prohibiting it, parties may contractually shorten the period for bringing claims, including UDTPA claims, so long as the agreed period is reasonable. The legislature had not prohibited such contractual limitation periods, and the one-year period was not shown to be unreasonable. Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon after an incident in which the victim, Damon Scott, was assaulted outside an apartment. Scott was struck from behind, pistol-whipped by the defendant, and stomped by multiple attackers. He lost consciousness and later awoke in the road, realizing his phone, house key, and $250 were missing. Scott identified the defendant as his primary assailant and testified to the presence of a firearm during the attack. The missing possessions were never recovered, and Scott was hospitalized for serious injuries. At trial, the State introduced evidence of the defendant's prior participation in a similar armed robbery to demonstrate intent.The case was first reviewed in the Superior Court, Cabarrus County, where the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the robbery charge, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to decide whether the defendant, or someone acting with him, took Scott's property. The jury convicted the defendant of both robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault inflicting serious bodily injury. The defendant then appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he or an accomplice took Scott’s property. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and vacated the robbery conviction, concluding the evidence of opportunity, intent, and plan did not amount to substantial evidence under North Carolina Supreme Court precedent.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. The Court found that, viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the State, there was more than a scintilla of evidence to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant, or someone acting in concert with him, took Scott’s property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

A law firm provided legal services to a construction business owned by Nick Muntjan. Before the engagement, Nick’s father, Paul Muntjan, orally promised to pay for the firm’s services. The firm then sent an engagement letter addressed to both Nick and Paul, but neither signed it. Subsequently, Paul sent several emails to the firm in which he discussed payment for the services, referenced invoices, and used language indicating shared responsibility for payment. Some payments were made using Paul’s credit card, but a significant balance remained unpaid.To recover the unpaid fees, the law firm sued Paul Muntjan in the District Court, Wake County, alleging breach of contract. After a bench trial, the court found that Paul had promised to pay for the firm’s services and concluded that his promise was an “original promise,” not subject to the statute of frauds, so no written agreement was required. The court entered judgment in favor of the law firm.Paul appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The majority found that Paul’s promise was a collateral guaranty to pay his son’s debts and therefore must satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires such an agreement to be in writing and signed. The majority also found that Paul’s emails did not clearly express a written promise to pay and thus did not satisfy the statute. A dissenting judge argued that the statute of frauds was satisfied by the emails.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Paul’s emails constituted a sufficient written memorandum of his oral guaranty to pay the debts, satisfying the statute of frauds under N.C.G.S. § 22-1. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP v. Muntjan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned approximately 94 acres of land in Wake County, North Carolina, with about 9.93 acres affected by the North Carolina Department of Transportation's (DOT) recording of a transportation corridor map on August 6, 1996. Under the now-repealed Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, this recording imposed significant restrictions on the plaintiffs’ rights to improve, develop, and subdivide that portion of their property. These restrictions lasted for nearly twenty years, ending only when the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on July 11, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that such restrictions constituted a taking requiring just compensation.After the rescission, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action in Wake County Superior Court, seeking compensation for the restrictions imposed from 1996 to 2016. The Superior Court found that DOT had effected a temporary taking under the Map Act and determined just compensation should be measured by the fair rental value of the property during the period of restriction. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the taking was temporary due to the legislative rescission, but reversed the measure of damages, directing that compensation be based on diminution in value during the period the restrictions were in effect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Map Act corridor recordings cause indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the time of recording, and legislative rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one for purposes of calculating just compensation. The Court ruled that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all relevant factors, including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was observed by law enforcement in the parking lot of a hotel known for illegal activity. The officer identified the defendant as the owner of a station wagon and a convicted felon with outstanding arrest warrants. Upon seeing the officers, the defendant refused to exit his vehicle and attempted to hide items, then fled at high speed, leading police on a dangerous chase before crashing and fleeing on foot. After his arrest, officers found a holster in the car and, following a search, discovered a loaded .38 Special revolver hidden behind a loose dashboard panel. The gun was determined to be stolen. The defendant was charged with fleeing to elude arrest, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a stolen firearm.At trial in the Superior Court of Brunswick County, the defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charges for insufficient evidence, arguing that the State had not shown he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant on all charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence—specifically the defendant’s flight, the gun’s concealment, and his misrepresentations about the firearm—was sufficient for a rational juror to infer knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the evidence as insufficient on the knowledge element.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the issue of whether substantial evidence supported the defendant’s knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the firearm was stolen. The Supreme Court held that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented met the substantial evidence standard, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "State v. Bracey" on Justia Law