Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Nhiem Tran and Nung Ha had a fire insurance policy with Nationwide General Insurance Company. Nationwide canceled the policy due to property hazards, including an unfenced swimming pool and rotting wood. Nationwide mailed a cancellation notice on May 22, 2015, and terminated the policy on June 6, 2015. Plaintiffs claimed they never received the cancellation letter but did receive, sign, and cash a refund check for the excess premium over a month before their house burned down on July 24, 2015. Nationwide denied their insurance claim, leading to this lawsuit.The Superior Court of Wake County found that Nationwide had properly canceled the policy by mailing the cancellation notice, satisfying statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute required actual receipt of the cancellation notice. Nationwide appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the case to determine the applicable statute. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of Nationwide, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that proof of mailing was sufficient for cancellation.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision but on different grounds. The Court held that plaintiffs had actual notice of the cancellation due to several factors: their prior knowledge of property hazards, receipt and cashing of the refund check, and the cessation of monthly premium withdrawals. The Court emphasized that actual notice was sufficient to meet statutory requirements, making the manner of giving notice secondary. Therefore, Nationwide effectively canceled the policy before the fire, and the judgment for Nationwide was affirmed. View "Ha v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of imprisonment in 2019 for obtaining property by false pretenses. In June 2020, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming his detention was unlawful due to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety's inability to protect him from COVID-19, which he argued violated the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied his petition.The Superior Court of Wake County summarily denied the petition, citing N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2), which mandates denial of habeas corpus applications when the petitioner is held under a valid final judgment by a competent court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but held that N.C.G.S. § 17-33(2) provided an exception to the rule in § 17-4(2). Despite acknowledging the case was moot due to the petitioner's release, the Court of Appeals applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and proceeded to the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2) requires summary denial of habeas corpus applications for those detained by a final judgment of a competent court. The Court found no conflict between §§ 17-4 and 17-33, as the latter applies only to those detained by civil process, not criminal judgments. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, emphasizing that habeas corpus relief is not available under the circumstances presented by the petitioner. View "State v. Daw" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law

Between December 2012 and March 2015, the defendant met several women, including A.C., H.M., A.B., and M.F., and supplied them with heroin, leading to their addiction. The defendant used heroin to coerce the women into prostitution, which he and his wife arranged through online advertisements on Backpage. The women paid the defendant for heroin and basic needs, often more than the heroin's worth. The defendant withheld drugs, food, sleep, and communication means from the women, occasionally locking them in his basement or hotel rooms. He transported the women across North Carolina and to other states for prostitution.The defendant was indicted and convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking, promoting prostitution, conspiracy to promote prostitution, and attaining habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced him to 240 to 312 years in prison and required him to register as a sex offender. The defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which issued a divided opinion finding no error in the trial court's judgments. The dissenting judge argued that human trafficking is a continuing offense and that the defendant should only be convicted of a single count of human trafficking per victim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the statutory language of N.C.G.S. § 14-43.11 is clear and unambiguous, allowing for multiple counts of human trafficking per victim. Each distinct act of recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a victim constitutes a separate offense. The court also found that the trial court erred in calculating the defendant's prior record level but concluded that this error did not prejudice the defendant, as his federal firearms conviction is substantially similar to a Class G felony in North Carolina. View "State v. Applewhite" on Justia Law

Travis Davenport was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder of Mike Griffin. The evidence showed that Davenport and Griffin had a tumultuous relationship, culminating in a physical altercation. On the night before Griffin's murder, Davenport was seen at Griffin's home, and they exchanged several phone calls. The next morning, Griffin was found dead with multiple stab wounds, and his wallet and phone were missing. Davenport was later arrested, and another inmate testified that Davenport confessed to killing Griffin to steal $10,000 from him.In Superior Court, Martin County, Davenport's motion to dismiss the robbery charge was denied, and he was convicted of both charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the State had not presented substantial evidence for the robbery charge and that the admission of evidence regarding Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos constituted plain error. The appellate court also found that a hearsay statement, "Dianne to the house," was inadmissible.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the State had presented substantial evidence for each element of the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge and Davenport's identity as the perpetrator. The Court also ruled that the admission of evidence related to Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos did not amount to plain error, as it did not prejudice the jury's decision. Lastly, the Court determined that the statement "Dianne to the house" was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Circle of Seven, LLC, left a Dodge Ram truck on a foreclosed property. The new property owner hired Bottoms Towing & Recovery to remove the truck. Bottoms Towing later sought to sell the truck to cover unpaid towing and storage fees. Circle of Seven contested the sale and the lien amount, arguing that the towing company had used the truck without authorization, which should reduce the lien.The Superior Court of Nash County held a hearing where Circle of Seven presented testimony from its managing member and an employee. The court found that Bottoms Towing had driven the truck and made unnecessary alterations, reducing the lien by $1,427.14 for maintenance and $62.50 for unauthorized use. Circle of Seven appealed, claiming the reduction was insufficient.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, with a divided opinion. The majority found that the trial court's findings were supported by competent evidence. The dissent argued that Bottoms Towing unlawfully converted the truck for personal use and that the lien should be reduced based on the truck's loss in market value due to this conversion.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case based on the dissent. The Court held that it could not address the dissent's theory because Circle of Seven had not raised the conversion argument or presented evidence on the truck's value in the lower courts. The Court emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bottoms Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Circle of Seven, LLC" on Justia Law

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Roy Cooper of North Carolina issued an executive order limiting attendance at outdoor venues to twenty-five people. Robert Turner, who operated Ace Speedway in Alamance County, publicly opposed these restrictions and kept the racetrack open. This led to a series of events where Governor Cooper allegedly pressured local officials to enforce the order against Ace Speedway, culminating in the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issuing an abatement order to shut down the racetrack as a health hazard.The Superior Court of Alamance County initially issued a preliminary injunction against Ace Speedway, prohibiting it from holding events until it complied with the abatement order. Ace Speedway and its operators counterclaimed, alleging constitutional violations, including the right to earn a living and selective enforcement. The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss these counterclaims, and the State appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, allowing the case to proceed.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that Ace Speedway sufficiently alleged colorable claims under the North Carolina Constitution. The allegations suggested that the State's actions were not for a proper governmental purpose but to retaliate against Turner for his public criticism, thus violating the right to earn a living. Additionally, the selective enforcement claim was deemed colorable because Ace Speedway alleged it was targeted while other similar venues were not, based on Turner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court concluded that these claims were sufficient to overcome the State’s sovereign immunity at this stage. View "Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd" on Justia Law

Debra Cullen sued Logan Developers, Inc. for injuries sustained when she fell through a hole in her attic floor, which the defendant had cut to provide access to the home’s air handler. Cullen admitted she did not look before stepping backward into the hole, despite knowing it was unsafe to walk on non-floored parts of the attic. The hole was covered with insulation, making it an open and obvious risk.The Superior Court of Brunswick County granted summary judgment in favor of Logan Developers, finding Cullen contributorily negligent for failing to look where she was stepping and determining there were insufficient facts to support a claim of gross negligence. The Court of Appeals vacated this decision, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Cullen’s knowledge of the attic’s condition and whether Logan Developers’ actions constituted gross negligence.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Cullen was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the hole was an open and obvious risk that she could have avoided by exercising reasonable care. The court also found that Logan Developers did not exhibit the conscious disregard for Cullen’s safety necessary to prove gross negligence, even if they violated the North Carolina Building Code. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Logan Developers was reinstated. View "Cullen v. Logan Developers, Inc" on Justia Law

In this juvenile proceeding, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) received several reports in 2021 regarding the respondent mother’s interactions with her children, Amanda, Jade, and Juliet. Incidents included the mother breaking a car window to reach Jade, hitting her with a belt, and leaving her outside in cold weather. DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency for the children. The trial court admitted statements from Jade, who did not testify, and concluded that all three children were neglected and that Jade and Juliet were dependent.The District Court of Pitt County entered an order based on these findings. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that many of the trial court’s findings were based on inadmissible hearsay and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the juvenile petitions. The Court of Appeals held that the remaining findings were insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of neglect and dependency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals did not adequately examine whether the remaining findings supported the trial court’s conclusions or whether the record contained sufficient evidence to support necessary findings. The Supreme Court determined that while some findings were unsupported, the record contained clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that could support the necessary findings for neglect and dependency adjudications. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, allowing the trial court to enter a new order based on the existing record or conduct further proceedings as necessary. View "In re A.J., J.C., J.C" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law