Justia North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a landlord, in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, a tenant. The plaintiff had suffered serious burns in an explosion caused by a gas leak in the rental property. He claimed that the landlord had been negligent, violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breached the implied warranty of habitability.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that he had notified the landlord of the issues with the flooring or the heating system, or that the landlord had any actual knowledge of these issues. Consequently, the landlord's duty under the RRAA had not yet arisen. Therefore, the landlord could not be held liable for negligence, violation of the RRAA, or breach of the implied warranty of habitability.The Court further clarified that the RRAA does not completely abrogate the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) in relation to repairs and dangerous conditions on leased residential premises. The RRAA only imposes a duty on the landlord to make repairs after receiving notice or acquiring actual knowledge of the need for them. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on all of the plaintiff's claims, reinstated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the matter. View "Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Midland ordering Defendants to pay the Town a total of $97,400 in civil penalties but remanding the trial court's mandatory permanent injunction and abatement order and reversing the trial court's denial of Defendants' request for attorney's fees, holding that there was no error.In an earlier round of litigation, the court of appeals determined that Defendants were under a continuing responsibility to maintain the roads in a residential subdivision. The zoning administrator later sent Defendants a demand letter informing them that they owed civil penalties. When Defendants took no action, the Town filed suit, seeking a mandatory injunction and order of abatement requirement Defendants to repair the roads at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town. The court of appeals affirmed the civil penalties but reversed the permanent injunction and abatement order for failure to survive appellate scrutiny. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Town had standing to bring this suit; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that it was bound by the prior decision of another panel holding Defendants responsible for the subdivision's roads. View "Town of Midland v. Harrell" on Justia Law

In this case requiring a determination of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC's scope of authority under an easement it acquired to create Lake Norman, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the superior court, holding that the easement's plain language was clear and unambiguous and that Duke's actions were encompassed with the easement's broad grant of authority.In 1961, Duke purchased the easement at issue, which covered a tract of what is now known as Lake Norman. In 2017, after the lake level receded, Duke filed suit against Defendants alleging trespass and wrongful interference with the easement by building a retaining wall and backfilling the lakebed area subject to Duke's easement. The trial court ordered Defendants to remove the retaining wall and clear the backfilled area from the lakebed and then granted summary judgment for Duke on its remaining trespass claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Duke acted within its broad authority under the easement and that the trial court did not err. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and holding that eight of nine restrictive covenants governing Plaintiffs' lots within the parties' residential subdivision were extinguished by operation of North Carolina's Real Property Marketable Title Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 47B-1 to 47B-9, holding that the eight covenants were extinguished by operation of law.At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the Act's thirteenth enumerated exception did not apply to save all of the nine restrictive covenants in question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that all but one of the restrictive covenants, as applied to Plaintiffs' property, were to be extinguished under the Act; and (2) a plain reading of section 47B-3(13) exempts from extinguishment only those covenants that actually require that a property be used residentially within the confines of a general or uniform scheme of development. View "C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the trial court's order authorizing sale and remanded the case, holding that the condominium association Executive Office Park of Durham Association, Inc. (Executive Office) had the power of sale for foreclosure pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. 47C-3-116 for nonpayment of an assessment that occurred after October 1, 1986.The condominium in this case was formed prior to the enactment of the North Carolina Condominium Act in 1985. In 2018, Executive Office filed a claim of lien against three units owned by Martin Rock, alleging that assessments and other charges from 2018 had remained unpaid for more than thirty days. Thereafter, the substitute trustee sainitiated a power of sale foreclosure. The superior court entered an order authorizing sale. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Executive Office lacked the power of sale for foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by failing to apply N.C. Gen. Stat. 47C-1-102(a) when addressing Rock's argument that Executive Office lacked the power of sale for foreclosure; and (2) because the condominium was created in North Carolina before October 1, 1986 and the assessments and non-payment occurred after that date, Executive Office possessed the power of sale permitted by section 47C-3-116(f). View "In re Foreclosure of a Lien by Executive Office Park of Durham Ass'n against Rock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant Harnett County and dismissing the claims brought by plaintiff PF Development Group and all but one of the claims asserted by the remaining plaintiffs, holding that remand was required.At issue in this case was an ordinance adopted by the County that required residential property developers to pay one-time water and sewer capacity use fees associated with the lots they planned to develop as a precondition for obtaining the County's concurrence in the developer's application for the issuance of required water and sewer permits. In seeking relief from the trial court's orders, Plaintiffs argued on appeal that genuine issues of material fact existed. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "capacity use" fees at issue were "monetary exactions" subject to constitutional scrutiny and therefore must satisfy the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" test to avoid being treated as takings of Plaintiffs' property. View "Anderson Creek Partners, L.P. v. County of Harnett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the district court concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to "reasonable attorney's fees" on appeal from a decision of the magistrate in Plaintiff's favor, holding that there was no error.The trial court awarded the attorney's fees at issue in this action seeking the recovery of money Defendant owed Plaintiff under a contract to purchase real estate that obligated Defendant, the buyer, to pay Plaintiff, the seller, a due diligence fee and an earnest money deposit. The court of appeals affirmed the attorney's fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's allegations of error were unavailing. View "Reynolds-Douglass v. Terhark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to Belmont Association, Inc. on its claim for injunctive relief and dismissing Defendants' first counterclaim for declaratory judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 22B-20.In its order, the trial court ruled that section 22B-20(d) applied to this action involving a binding agreement that runs with the land that would prohibit the location of solar collectors as described in section 22B-20(b) and that section 22B-20(c) was not applicable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither subsection (d) nor (c) of the statute applied and that the restriction at issue violated section 22B-20(b). View "Belmont Ass'n v. Farwig" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's lawsuit against Defendants asserting claims under North Carolina's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Defendants were co-principals in a joint real estate development venture with a party that intended to defraud creditors by way of the party's insider conveyance to Defendants of certain real property. In dismissing Plaintiff's UVTA lawsuit, the trial court concluded that Defendants were good faith purchasers for value and therefore possessed a legitimate defense against Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendants were imputed with the knowledge of their co-principal's fraudulent intent by virtue of the principal-agent relationship existing between the parties pursuant to common law. View "Cherry Community Organization v. Sellars" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that a trial was required as to certain claims.This case arose from a dispute surrounding the purchase of an oceanfront beach house by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs later discovered significant structural damages to the house arising from past water intrusion Plaintiffs brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The trial court reversed in part and remanded the case for a trial on the merits on certain claims, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of negligence and fraud against Re/Max Community Brokers and Robert Carroll; and (2) erred by reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rudd & Associates, Inc., Brooke Rudd-Gaglie, and James Goodman as to Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary claim. View "Cummings v. Carroll" on Justia Law